El presente artículo defiende que en _ Gorgias _ 521d Sócrates se atribuye a sí mismo una forma genuina de saber político. Para ello, se abordan los problemas planteados por la crítica reciente en lo que respecta a la aparente incompatibilidad de dicha atribución con (1) el reconocimiento explícito en _ Gorgias _ de no poseer un saber referido a lo justo, y (2) la aparente invalidez de la actividad desarrollada por Sócrates para contar, bajo los criterios que él mismo (...) establece en el _ Gorgias _, como efectivamente política. El trabajo responde a estas dificultades realizando un análisis del tipo de naturaleza que Sócrates atribuye a su propio saber en esta obra, así como de los efectos que su actividad dialógica demuestra ser capaz de producir sobre Calicles. De este modo, el artículo permite aclarar en qué sentido Sócrates es presentado en el _ Gorgias _ como el verdadero político. El presente artículo defiende que en _ Gorgias _ 521d Sócrates se atribuye a sí mismo una forma genuina de saber político. Para ello, se abordan los problemas planteados por la crítica reciente en lo que respecta a la aparente incompatibilidad de dicha atribución con (1) el reconocimiento explícito en _ Gorgias _ de no poseer un saber referido a lo justo, y (2) la aparente invalidez de la actividad desarrollada por Sócrates para contar, bajo los criterios que él mismo establece en el _ Gorgias _, como efectivamente política. El trabajo responde a estas dificultades realizando un análisis del tipo de naturaleza que Sócrates atribuye a su propio saber en esta obra, así como de los efectos que su actividad dialógica demuestra ser capaz de producir sobre Calicles. De este modo, el artículo permite aclarar en qué sentido Sócrates es presentado en el _ Gorgias _ como el verdadero político. (shrink)

This paper reads Republic 583b-608b as a single, continuous line of argument. First, Socrates distinguishes real from apparent pleasure and argues that justice is more pleasant than injustice. Next, he describes how pleasures nourish the soul. This line of argument continues into the second discussion of poetry: tragic pleasures are mixed pleasures in the soul that seem greater than they are; indulging them nourishes appetite and corrupts the soul. The paper argues that Plato has a novel account of the ‘paradox (...) of tragedy’, and that the Republic and Philebus contain complementary discussions of tragic and comic pleasure. (shrink)

Since the Phaedo characterizes Socrates’s death as a punishment by Athens, many scholars argue that he could neither have been responsible for nor have intended his death, so that his death was not suicide. This is no mere semantic quibble: the question turns on issues of responsible and intentional action. I argue that the dialogues portray Socrates as committing suicide. To do so, I use a Platonic account of responsibility and intention to show how Athens and Socrates were jointly responsible (...) for Socrates’s death and that his intention was not only to do what justice requires but also to kill himself. (shrink)

This is a study of Plato's use of the character Socrates to model what philosophy is. The study focuses on the Apology, and finds that philosophy there is the love of wisdom, where wisdom is expertise about how to live, of the sort that only gods can fully have, and where Socrates loves wisdom in three ways, first by honoring wisdom as the gods' possession, testing human claims to it, second by pursuing wisdom, examining himself as he examines others, to (...) achieve a more well justified set of beliefs about how to live, and third by trying to live wisely, insofar as he can, which includes exhorting others to care about living wisely than anything else. The essay also includes some suggestions about how Plato criticizes and revises this model of philosophy outside the Apology. (shrink)

Plato argues that four political arts—politics, kingship, slaveholding, and household-management—are the same. His argument, which prompted Aristotle’s reply in Politics I, has been universally panned. The problem is that the argument clearly identifies household-management with slaveholding, and household-management with politics, but does not fully identify kingship with any of the others. I consider and reject three ways of saving the argument, and argue for a fourth. On my view, Plato assumes that politics is identical with kingship, just as he does (...) elsewhere, but he begs no questions because the point of his argument is to identify the public arts of politics and kingship with the private arts of household-management and slaveholding. He does this successfully by answering three reasons why one might distinguish the private from the public arts. His argument leaves room for Aristotle to propose other reasons. One of them—involving differences among men and women and slaves—is unfortunate, but another is more promising. The Aristotelian can assume that political expertise is a matter of know-how gathered by experience of the particular actions which differ in the public and private arts. But Plato might well be right to reject this, and to insist that the essential difference between the expert and non-expert—the dividing line between good and bad rule—is not in experience but in their grasp of their goals. (shrink)