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On Hart's Way Out

Legal Theory 4 (4):469-507 (1998)

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  1. In defense of content-independence.Nathan Adams - 2017 - Legal Theory 23 (3):143-167.
    Discussions of political obligation and political authority have long focused on the idea that the commands of genuine authorities constitute content-independent reasons. Despite its centrality in these debates, the notion of content-independence is unclear and controversial, with some claiming that it is incoherent, useless, or increasingly irrelevant. I clarify content-independence by focusing on how reasons can depend on features of their source or container. I then solve the long-standing puzzle of whether the fact that laws can constitute content-independent reasons is (...)
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  • The Inner Logic of Exclusivism (and Inclusivism): Shapiro's Shadowing.Mark Mcbride - 2019 - Ratio Juris 32 (3):363-389.
    Scott Shapiro, a prominent defender of exclusive legal positivism—exclusivism—has intriguingly (re)introduced a logical principle, the endorsement and rejection of which he (I take it) supposes can helpfully distinguish exclusivism from its contrary, inclusive legal positivism—inclusivism. It is an intriguing thought that principles pitched at such a high level of abstraction as this could distinguish between the two versions of positivism. My aim will be to test whether this principle—and associated principles—can do such distinguishing work.
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  • Raz’s appeal to law’s authority.Ben Martin - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):267-280.
    Joseph Raz’s _Argument from Authority_ is one of the most famous defences of exclusive positivism in jurisprudence, the position that the existence and content of the law in a society is a wholly social fact, which can be established without the need to engage in moral analysis. According to Raz’s argument, legal systems are _de facto_ practical authorities that, like all _de facto_ authorities, must claim _legitimate_ authority, which itself entails that they must be _capable_ of being an authority. Further, (...)
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  • The Planning Theory of Law: Scott Shapiro: Legality. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2011, 472 pp.Miguel-Jose Lopez-Lorenzo - 2012 - Res Publica 18 (2):201-206.
  • On practices and the law.Mark Greenberg - 2006 - Legal Theory 12 (2):113-136.
    In a recent paper, I launch an attack on a fundamental doctrine of legal positivism. I argue that nonnormative facts cannot themselves constitutively determine the content of the law. In a response published in this journal, Ram Neta defends the view that nonnormative social facts are sufficient to determine normative facts, including both moral and legal facts. Neta's paper provides a useful opportunity to address a spelled-out version of this view, which in various forms is widely held in philosophy of (...)
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  • The Institutionality Of Legal Validity.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):277-301.
    The most influential theory of law in current analytic legal philosophy is legal positivism, which generally understands law to be a kind of institution. The most influential theory of institutions in current analytic social philosophy is that of John Searle. One would hope that the two theories are compatible, and in many ways they certainly are. But one incompatibility that still needs ironing out involves the relation of the social rule that undergirds the validity of any legal system (H.L.A. Hart's (...)
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  • Beyond inclusive legal positivism.Jules L. Coleman - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (3):359-394.
    In this essay, I characterize the original intervention that became Inclusive Legal Positivism, defend it against a range of powerful objections, explain its contribution to jurisprudence, and display its limitations and its modest jurisprudential significance. I also show how in its original formulations ILP depends on three notions that are either mistaken or inessential to law: the separability thesis, the rule of recognition, and the idea of criteria of legality. The first is false and is in event inessential to legal (...)
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  • Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism.Jules L. Coleman - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (3):359-394.
    In this essay, I characterize the original intervention that became Inclusive Legal Positivism, defend it against a range of powerful objections, explain its contribution to jurisprudence, and display its limitations and its modest jurisprudential significance. I also show how in its original formulations ILP depends on three notions that are either mistaken or inessential to law: the separability thesis, the rule of recognition, and the idea of criteria of legality. The first is false and is in event inessential to legal (...)
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