Interpreting Kuhn provides a comprehensive, up-to-date study of Thomas Kuhn's philosophy and legacy. With twelve essays newly written by an international group of scholars, it covers a wide range of topics where Kuhn had an influence. Part I deals with foundational issues such as Kuhn's metaphysical assumptions, his relationship to Kant and Kantian philosophy, as well as contextual influences on his writing, including Cold War psychology and art. Part II tackles three Kuhnian concepts: normal science, incommensurability, and scientific revolutions. Part (...) III deals with the Copernican Revolution in astronomy, the theory-ladenness of observation, scientific discovery, Kuhn's evolutionary analogies, and his theoretical monism. The volume is an ideal resource for advanced students seeking an overview of Kuhn's philosophy, and for specialists following the development of Kuhn scholarship. (shrink)

This paper aims to address some methodological issues related to case-based research in the philosophy of contemporary sciences. We focus on the selection processes by which philosophers pick or generate a particular set of papers to conduct their case-based research. We illustrate how to use various quantitative and qualitative methods to improve the epistemic features of the selection processes, and help generate some potential case-based hypotheses for further philosophical investigation.

1. Biomedical sciences are fast-growing fields with unprecedented speed of research outputs, especially in the quantities of papers. Philosophers aiming to study ongoing biomedical changes face cha...

Traditionally, Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) is largely identified with his analysis of the structure of scientific revolutions. Here, we contribute to a minority tradition in the Kuhn literature by interpreting the history of evolutionary biology through the prism of the entire historical developmental model of sciences that he elaborates in The Structure. This research not only reveals a certain match between this model and the history of evolutionary biology but, more importantly, also sheds new light (...) on several episodes in that history, and particularly on the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), the construction of the modern evolutionary synthesis, the chronic discontent with it, and the latest expression of that discontent, called the extended evolutionary synthesis. Lastly, we also explain why this kind of analysis hasn’t been done before. (shrink)

In his mature works, Kuhn abandons the concept of a paradigm and becomes more interested in the analysis of the conceptual structure of scientific theories. These changes are interpreted as resulting from a ‘linguistic turn’ that Kuhn underwent sometimes around the 1980s. Much of the philosophical discussions about Kuhn’s post-‘linguistic turn’ philosophy revolves around his views on taxonomic concepts. Apart from taxonomy, however, the mature Kuhn introduces other concepts, such as conceptual networks and lexicons. This article distinguishes these three concepts (...) and shows that adopting each one of them has different impacts on Kuhn’s model of science. After distinguishing and assessing the concepts of taxonomy, network, and lexicon, it will be argued that the latter not only fits the Kuhnian model of science better, but it also helps capture the wide sense of Kuhn’s early concept of a paradigm. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) is widely considered as one of the most important philosophers of science of the 20th century, while his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) is regarded as one of the most influential works in the philosophy ofscience. At the same time, however, his place within philosophy of science remains ambiguous. On the one hand, despite the popularity of SSR, there is no proper ‘Kuhnian school of thought’ in HPS. On the other hand, the interest towards Kuhn does (...) not seem to fade away and the number of publications about his work does not seem to decrease. We suggest that there are at least three different ways to go ‘beyond SSR’: (i) by scrutinising the development of Kuhn’s thought, from his pre- to his post-SSR writings; (ii) by contextualising Kuhn in the philosophical milieu of his time, thus interpreting his view as emerging from the intellectual exchanges he had with contemporary philosophers; (iii) by reinterpreting and developing some of his most known ideas, in ways that perhaps Kuhn himself was not able to contemplate. (shrink)

The concept of “paradigm” became widely known with Thomas Kuhn’s book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. From there on, paradigms started being employed in the most diverse fields and situations. Curiously, though, the popularity of the term went hand in hand with an enormous vagueness in its application: numerous meanings were attributed to this concept and different things were claimed to be paradigms. The main reason for the lack of agreement regarding the notion and the use of paradigm was the (...) absence of a detailed description and analysis of a concrete paradigm in Kuhn’s book—especially, one coupled with a discussion that could contrast paradigms to other epistemic objects, such as “theories.” The aim of this article is to fill this gap. First, I briefly examine the notion of paradigm, stressing its core meaning as that of “exemplar.” Next, I analyze a specific case in economics, indicating the features that make it a paradigm: (i) the fact that it is an example not reducible to an axiomatizable theory, and (ii) that this example is constitutive of normal science. (shrink)

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions represented a milestone in the attempt to understand scientific development based on empirical observations. However, in the next decades after the publication of his book, history, psychology, and sociology became increasingly marginal in Kuhn’s discussions. In his last articles, Kuhn even suggested that philosophers should pay less attention to empirical data and focus more on “first principles.” The purpose of this article is, first, to describe this radical transformation in Kuhn’s methodological approach, from his initial (...) naturalism to his later and more strict philosophical stance. Next, I present some of the alleged justifications for explaining this transition, such as his interest in problems more firmly attached to the philosophical tradition and a desire for greater acceptance within this community. Although these factors certainly played a role in explaining Kuhn’s change, I also believe that an important theoretical component exerts a fundamental function in this transition: the idea that scientific development is a kind of evolutionary process, which is better understood through the use of abstract theoretical models, instead of sparse observations of scientific activity. (shrink)

This paper explores Thomas Kuhn’s intellectual history by examining sources that have been understudied so far: the Lowell Lectures of 1951 (The Quest for Physical Theory) and the hitherto unpublished Notre Dame Lectures of 1980. The analysis of these texts aims to reconstruct Kuhn’s development of a semantics that can account for scientific progress. This analysis will show that the alleged “linguistic turn” attributed to the author is actually a renewed interest in problems that existed well before publishing The Structure (...) of Scientific Revolutions. (shrink)

This paper examines ‘The Natures of Conceptual Change’, the Notre Dame lectures given by Kuhn in 1980. In particular, I aim to examine the content of these lectures which was not published before. This exegetical task will shed light on the sources of the notion of taxonomy used in these lectures for the first time with the explicit philosophical purposes. It also will shed new light on Kuhn's position regarding the causal theory of reference. Reviewing these archival materials paves the (...) way for intertextual comparisons, as Kuhn included part of these lectures in the texts published later and in the book Plurality of Worlds: an Evolutionary Theory of Scientific Development. In recent years, the publication of Kuhn's archival material and the research on these texts increased in quantity and quality. Faced with this encouraging landscape, a comparative examination of the different unpublished texts is crucial to refining both our research tools on Kuhn's intellectual biography and the philosophical work inspired by his proposal. (shrink)

Traditionally, Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) is largely identified with his analysis of the structure of scientific revolutions. Here, we contribute to a minority tradition in the Kuhn literature by interpreting the history of evolutionary biology through the prism of the entire historical developmental model of sciences that he elaborates in The Structure. This research not only reveals a certain match between this model and the history of evolutionary biology but, more importantly, also sheds new light (...) on several episodes in that history, and particularly on the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), the construction of the modern evolutionary synthesis, the chronic discontent with it, and the latest expression of that discontent, called the extended evolutionary synthesis. Lastly, we also explain why this kind of analysis hasn’t been done before. (shrink)

According to Kuhn's speciation analogy, scientific specialisation is fundamentally analogous to biological speciation. In this paper, we extend Kuhn's original language-centred formulation of the speciation analogy, to account for episodes of scientific specialisation centred around methodological differences. Building upon recent views in evolutionary biology about the process of speciation by genetic divergence, we will show how these methodology-centred episodes of scientific specialisation can be understood as cases of specialisation driven by value divergence. We will apply our model of specialisation by (...) value divergence to an episode of methodology-centred scientific specialisation: the emergence of molecular biology. (shrink)

Tom McLeish’s Music and Poetry of Science adds to along and complex literature looking at the creative powers of human genius. In addition to his own scientific field, McLeish draws on art, poetry, novels, music, and BBC television productions. Although positioned in the line of the ‘two cultures’ debate typically associated with C. P. Snow, McLeish reprises William Beveridge’s earlier contribution to that tradition, perhaps, to be aligned,although this McLeish does not do, with Peter Pesic’s Music and the Making of (...) Modern Science . The task of coordinating music, poetry, and science requires more, such that the material hermeneutics of the late Irish-Belgian physicist and philosopher, Patrick Heelan might have offered a basis for fruitful dialogue, although this,too, was a missed opportunity. Given McLeish’s illustration of the beauty key to mathematics in physics via BBC television, it seems an illustration of technological millenarianism via Andrew MacKendrick’s 1951 film, The Man in the White Sui , updated for today, key in a nano-context, might be helpful in raising issues of material‘instability,’ i.e., environmental detritus, nano-waste and pollution. (shrink)

The functional approach to scientific progress has been mainly developed by Kuhn, Lakatos, Popper, Laudan, and more recently by Shan. The basic idea is that science progresses if key functions of science are fulfilled in a better way. This chapter defends the function approach. It begins with an overview of the two old versions of the functional approach by examining the work of Kuhn, Laudan, Popper, and Lakatos. It then argues for Shan’s new functional approach, in which scientific progress is (...) defined as an increase of usefulness of exemplary practices. (shrink)

Scientific progress is one of the topics that has always been considered in the philosophy of science and various accounts have been presented as regards the occurrence of progress. One of the most important challenges in progress is the radical changes in scientific theories, i.e. scientific revolutions. Kuhn considers these revolutions to be discontinuities in the history of science. Although he acknowledges progress in the normal science period by referring to the puzzle solving, he fails to explain the progress in (...) scientific revolutions by proposing the incommensurability of paradigms. In contrast, Bhaskar by describing the stratified world, considers science as a continuous process with the aim of achieving causal mechanisms and structures, discovers and describes new and deeper layers. He explains progress on this basis and believes that science has the potentiality of both change and progress. The present essay discusses the progress theories offered by Bhaskar and Kuhn. Also we compare the epistemological and ontological aspects of these perspectives in order to investigate Khun's inability to explain progress during the revolution in the light of Bhaskar's views. (shrink)

This article summarizes aspects of the process of disciplining physical education (PE) in the United States, to provide elements for thinking about relationships between science and education in markedly reflexive parameters. In this way, we seek to restore some of the founding elements of the disciplinary movement of North American PE, as well as to identify its contributions and limits to the structuring of the area as a scientific field. In methodological terms, the study was configured as theoretical-bibliographic and exploratory. (...) Based on this design, articles and book chapters from national and international literature concerning the epistemological debate on PE were initially mobilized and, later, the information was analyzed based on Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical framework. In conclusion, it is emphasized that the disciplinary movement in North American PE has brought significant advances and contributions to place PE in the hierarchy of science and, at the same time, justify its existence in higher education. However, despite these productive aspects, the PE disciplinary movement could not contain the side effects of the proposed organizational dynamics, especially concerning the fragmentation of PE in different subareas that not only communicate little but also compete for the definition in the field. In any case, the disciplinary movement, recognizing in human movement the common connector of the different research fronts in the area, not only induced but made credible the process of organizing PE as an autonomous science. (shrink)

What do we mean by “disagreements between legal theorists”? A simple answer: disagreements among legal theorists occur when two (or more) agents have rival theories to explain a matter within the same field ‒ in the specific case, the study of law. The argumentative strategy I use in this research consists in adopting a broader perspective in order to remove the specialisation bias with which many legal theorists seek to avoid the difficulty of demarcating their own activity. If we consider (...) that the study of law is a heuristic activity, like many others, we have to assume that it shares family resemblances with others. In my thesis, I assume that knowledge depends on a given conceptual scheme, resulting from a specific use of language. In other words, the agents interact among themselves in a certain language game, thereby generating an intersubjective environment. Thus, the main issue that arises is how wide and intense the degree of intersubjectivity is in a certain field. These theoristic disagreements, in order not to be trivial, must belong to the same heuristic field. This condition implies that the problem does not lie in the disagreements that may exist between legal practitioners, since their purpose is not the construction of knowledge, but the operation of a normative system. The relationship I establish between incommensurability and disagreements among legal theorists is justified, since I start from the consideration of the study of law as a heuristic field. However, by introducing the analogy of translation as a solution for multiple meanings, I elaborate a comprehensive conceptual scheme in which I depend on a general theory about disagreement. In this explanation, the conceptual schemes used by theorists are no longer only static frameworks but also influence the interaction among the agents in the heuristic field. When the used schemes are different, the form of interaction is the translation. The activity of translating has its own characteristics and limits; it is not a mechanical exercise, even though it also has its rules. The product of that activity is translation, which entails epistemic losses and gains. In order to notice the interaction in the debate between legal theorists, I propose to look for tools that open up new vistas and choose to create an optimal scenario for translation. (shrink)

It has been widely received that one of Gregor Mendel’s most important contributions to the history of genetics is his novel work on developmental information (for example, the proposal of the famous Mendelian ratios like 1:2:1, 3:1, and 9:3:3:1). This view is well evidenced by the fact that much of early Mendelians’ work in the 1900s focuses on the retrodiction (viz. the re-analysis of the pre-exist data with Mendel’s approach). However, there is no consensus on what Mendel meant by development (...) (Entwicklung). Nor is there an agreement on the interpretation of Mendel’s laws of developmental series (Entwicklungsreihe). This chapter revisits Mendel’s notions of development and developmental series. Firstly, I argue that Mendel’s use of development is greatly influenced by Gärtner’s. Secondly, I show Mendel’s work on developmental series are novel and important for its new ways of experimentation, conceputalisation, and analysis. Thirdly, I argue that Mendel’s laws of developmental information were not about heredity. (shrink)

A mental network can be thought of as an emotionally imposed schema. The first part of this paper suggests that the mental network provides an integrated explanation for the diverse functions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and that mental networks provide the building blocks for self and Theory of Mind. The second part of the paper combines the mental network with the idea that theories generate emotions to provide an integrated explanation for paradigms, ideologies, sweeping statements, mysticism, theology, fundamentalism, conspiracy (...) theories, and various concepts of God. (shrink)

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,Thomas Kuhn famously argued that scientific revolutions consist in paradigm shifts in which the superseded and the new paradigms are incommensurable. My aim in this paper is to show that neither Kuhn’s examples nor Yafeng Shan’s recently proposed example adequately support this incommensurability thesis. Starting from the distinction between global and local incommensurability, I argue that, on the one hand, local incommensurability does not imply that paradigms are globally incommensurable, and, on the other, that it (...) is likely that real support for Kuhn’s thesis that “the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds” requires global incommensurabilities. Thus, I argue that the Kuhnian view is not capable of providing satisfactory evidence that those incommensurabilities ever occurred in the history of science. (shrink)