RESUMEN Se defiende la tesis de que la teoría kantiana del espacio, en el contexto del idealismo trascendental, constituye un marco adecuado para solucionar la paradoja de las contrapartidas incongruentes. Se incluyen dos hipótesis: a) la solución kantiana implica una referencia a la conciencia de la propia corporalidad, para comprender cómo poseemos la capacidad para orientarnos en el espacio; b) no existe contradicción en el uso kantiano de las contrapartidas incongruentes en diferentes estadios de su pensamiento. La solución kantiana de (...) 1768 constituye una versión germinal del desarrollo que culminará en la teoría idealista trascendental acerca del espacio como una forma de nuestra sensibilidad. ABSTRACT The article argues that the Kantian theory of space, in the context of transcendental idealism, constitutes an adequate framework to resolve the paradox of incongruent counterparts. Two hypotheses are considered: a) the Kantian solution implies a reference to the awareness of one's corporeity in order to understand how we have the capacity to orient ourselves in space; b) there is no contradiction in the Kantian use of incongruent counterparts throughout the different stages of his thought. The Kantian solution of 1768 is a germinal version of the development leading up to the transcendental idealist theory of space as a form of our sensibility. (shrink)

Kant uses incongruent counterparts in his work before and after 1781, but not in the first Critique. Given the relevance that incongruent counterparts had for his thought on space, and their persistence in his work during the 1780s, it is plausible to think that he had a reason for leaving them out of both editions of the Critique. Two implausible conjectures for their absence are here considered and rejected. A more plausible alternative is put forth, which explains that textual absence (...) as a result of the synthetic method of presentation intended for the Critique. (shrink)

I propose that we interpret Kant’s argument from incongruent counterparts in the 1768 article ‘Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space’ in light of a theory of dynamic absolute space that he accepted throughout the 1750s and 1760s. This force-based or material conception of space was not an unusual interpretation of the Newtonian notion of absolute space. Nevertheless, commentators have continually argued that Kant’s argument is an utter failure that shifts from the metaphysics of space to (...) its epistemology, because he has no way to connect ‘directionality’ and ‘handedness’ to absolute space. This supposed failure is based on an understanding of absolute space in purely mathematical terms and as an absolute void that lacks any qualitative or dynamic features. If we recognize that Kant held that space had an intrinsic directional asymmetry then his argument successfully connects incongruent counterparts to absolute space. The presence of this notion in Kant’s pre-Critical thought is rarely noted, and its necessity in understanding his incongruence argument is novel. (shrink)

Russell’s theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of ‘presentation’, which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell’s theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance (...) with the past falls short of fulfilling Russell’s requirement that knowledge by acquaintance be discriminating knowledge – a shortcoming shared by contemporary externalist accounts of knowledge from memory. (shrink)

This paper develops a novel interpretation of Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts to the effect that the representations of space and time are intuitions rather than concepts. When properly understood, the argument anticipates the contemporary position whereby the meaning of indexicals cannot be captured by descriptive contents.

Duas hipóteses guiaram o desenvolvimento deste trabalho. A primeira afirma o _status_ necessariamente epistêmico e, portanto, não ontológico, do espaço e do tempo na filosofia transcendental. A segunda é a de que o espaço e o tempo como formas _a priori_ da intuição sensível apresentam uma dimensão essencialmente não conceitual da experiência perceptiva. Em vista disso, neste artigo, nossa intenção é trilhar o caminho argumentativo da constituição da idealidade transcendental do espaço e do tempo a fim de compreender esse estatuto (...) epistêmico e não conceitual da intuição. O objetivo é o de analisar as consequências dessas duas hipóteses para a filosofia neo kantiana contemporânea que tenta compatibilizar os argumentos kantianos com os de uma posição não conceitualista. Para tanto, vamos analisar o desenvolvimento das noções de espaço e tempo, no chamado período de transição da filosofia kantiana, da fase pré-crítica à fase crítica, bem como no próprio período crítico, que culmina na doutrina da idealidade transcendental do espaço e do tempo. (shrink)