We do not always benefit from the expansion of our choice sets. This is because some options change the context in which we must make decisions in ways that render us worse off than we would have been otherwise. One promising argument against paid living kidney donation holds that having the option of selling a ‘spare’ kidney would impact people facing financial pressures in precisely this way. I defend this argument from two related criticisms: first, that having the option to (...) sell one’s kidney would only be harmful if one is pressured or coerced to take this specific course of action; and second, that such forms of pressure are unlikely to feature in a legal market. (shrink)

While different positions on the permissibility of organ markets enjoy support, there is widespread agreement that some benefits to living organ donors are acceptable and do not raise the same moral concerns associated with organ markets, such as exploitation and commodification. We argue on the basis of two distinctions that some benefit packages offered to donors can defensibly surpass conventional reimbursement while stopping short of controversial cash payouts. The first distinction is between benefits that defray the costs of donating an (...) organ and benefits that incentivize donation by offer- ing something in excess of defraying. The second distinction is between benefits that compensate donors and benefits that are non-compensating. We argue that non-compensating benefits are innocent of moral concerns typically associated with controversial cash payouts, and thus may be a morally promising avenue for increasing rates of kidney donation to address the tragic results of undersupply. (shrink)

Due to the shortage of organs, it has been proposed that the ban on organ sales is lifted and a market-based procurement system introduced. This paper assesses four prominent proposals for how such a market could be arranged: unregulated current market, regulated current market, payment-for-consent futures market, and the family-reward futures market. These are assessed in terms of how applicable prominent concerns with organ sales are for each model. The concerns evaluated are that organ markets will crowd out altruistic donation, (...) that consent to sell organs is invalid, that sellers will be harmed, and that commodification of organs will affect human relationships in a negative way. The paper concludes that the family-reward futures market fares best in this comparison but also that it provides the weakest incentive to potential buyers. There is an inverse relationship between how applicable prominent critiques are to organ market models and the increase in available organs they can be expected to provide. (shrink)