The paper is devoted to the contributions of Helena Rasiowa to the theory of non-classical negation. The main results of Rasiowa in this area concerns–constructive logic with strong (Nelson) negation.

Da Costa's C systems are surveyed and motivated, and significant failings of the systems are indicated. Variations are then made on these systems in an attempt to surmount their defects and limitations. The main system to emerge from this effort, system CC , is investigated in some detail, and dual-intuitionistic semantical analyses are developed for it and surrounding systems. These semantics are then adapted for the original C systems, first in a rather unilluminating relational fashion, subsequently in a more illuminating (...) way through the introduction of impossible situations where and and or change roles. Finally other attempts to break out of impasses for the original and expanded C systems, by going inside them, are looked at, and further research directions suggested. (shrink)

Objects of consideration are various non-classical connectives “hidden” in the classical logic in the form of G˛s with ˛ —a classical connective, and s—a propositional variable. One of them is negation, which is defined as G ⇒ s; another is necessity, which is defined as G ∧ s. The new operations are axiomatized and it is shown that they belong to the 4-valued logic of Lukasiewicz. A 2-point Kripke semantics is built leading directly to the 4-valued logical tables.

A sufficient condition for an extension of positive logic with strong negation to be characterized by a class of finite trees is given.

In a famous and controversial paper, B. H. Slater has argued against the possibility of paraconsistent logics. Our reply is centred on the distinction between two aspects of the meaning of a logical constant *c* in a given logic: its operational meaning, given by the operational rules for *c* in a cut-free sequent calculus for the logic at issue, and its global meaning, specified by the sequents containing *c* which can be proved in the same calculus. Subsequently, we use the (...) same strategy to counter Quine's meaning variance argument against deviant logics. In a nutshell, we claim that genuine rivalry between (similar) logics *L* and *L'* is possible whenever each constant in *L* has the same operational meaning as its counterpart in *L'* although differences in global meaning arise in at least one case. (shrink)

We study unification problem and problem of admissibility for inference rules in minimal Johanssonsʼ logic J and positive intuitionistic logic IPC+. This paper proves that the problem of admissibility for inference rules with coefficients is decidable for the paraconsistent minimal Johanssonsʼ logic J and the positive intuitionistic logic IPC+. Using obtained technique we show also that the unification problem for these logics is also decidable: we offer algorithms which compute complete sets of unifiers for any unifiable formula. Checking just unifiability (...) of formulas with coefficients also works via verification of admissibility. (shrink)

Two logics L1 and L2 are negatively equivalent if for any set of formulas X and any negated formula ¬, ¬ can be deduced from the set of hypotheses X in L1 if and only if it can be done in L2. This article is devoted to the investigation of negative equivalence relation in the class of extensions of minimal logic.

Ishihara's problem of decidable variables asks which class of decidable propositional variables is sufficient to warrant classical theorems in intuitionistic logic. We present several refinements to the class proposed by Ishii for this problem, which also allows the class to cover Glivenko's logic. We also treat the extension of the problem to minimal logic, suggesting a couple of new classes.

N. Kamide introduced a pair of classical and constructive logics, each with a peculiar type of negation: its double negation behaves as classical and intuitionistic negation, respectively. A consequence of this is that the systems prove contradictions but are non-trivial. The present paper aims at giving insights into this phenomenon by investigating subsystems of Kamide’s logics, with a focus on a system in which the double negation behaves as the negation of minimal logic. We establish the negation inconsistency of the (...) system and embeddability of contradictions from other systems. In addition, we attempt at an informational interpretation of the negation using the dimathematical framework of H. Wansing. (shrink)

Two algebraic structures, the contrapositionally complemented Heyting algebra (ccHa) and the contrapositionally |$\vee $| complemented Heyting algebra (c|$\vee $|cHa), are studied. The salient feature of these algebras is that there are two negations, one intuitionistic and another minimal in nature, along with a condition connecting the two operators. Properties of these algebras are discussed, examples are given and comparisons are made with relevant algebras. Intuitionistic Logic with Minimal Negation (ILM) corresponding to ccHas and its extension |${\textrm {ILM}}$|-|${\vee }$| for c|$\vee (...) $|cHas are then investigated. Besides its relations with intuitionistic and minimal logics, ILM is observed to be related to Peirce’s logic and Vakarelov’s logic MIN. With a focus on properties of the two negations, relational semantics for ILM and |${\textrm {ILM}}$|-|${\vee }$| are obtained with respect to four classes of frames, and inter-translations between the classes preserving truth and validity are provided. ILM and |${\textrm {ILM}}$|-|${\vee }$| are shown to have the finite model property with respect to these classes of frames and proved to be decidable. Extracting features of the two negations in the algebras, a further investigation is made, following logical studies of negations that define the operators independently of the binary operator of implication. Using Dunn’s logical framework for the purpose, two logics |$K_{im}$| and |$K_{im-{\vee }}$| are discussed, where the language does not include implication. The |$K_{im}$|-algebras are reducts of ccHas and are different from relevant algebraic structures having two negations. The negations in the |$K_{im}$|-algebras and |$K_{im-{\vee }}$|-algebras are shown to occupy distinct positions in an enhanced form of Dunn’s kite of negations. Relational semantics for |$K_{im}$| and |$K_{im-{\vee }}$| is provided by a class of frames that are based on Dunn’s compatibility frames. It is observed that this class coincides with one of the four classes giving the relational semantics for ILM and |${\textrm {ILM}}$|-|${\vee }$|⁠. (shrink)

LetSKP be the intermediate prepositional logic obtained by adding toI (intuitionistic p.l.) the axiom schemes:S = (( ) ) (Scott), andKP = ()()() (Kreisel-Putnam). Using Kripke's semantics, we prove:1) SKP has the finite model property; 2) SKP has the disjunction property. In the last section of the paper we give some results about Scott's logic S = I+S.

Various natural deduction formulations of classical, minimal, intuitionist, and intermediate propositional and first-order logics are presented and investigated with respect to satisfaction of the separation and subformula properties. The technique employed is, for the most part, semantic, based on general versions of the Lindenbaum and Lindenbaum–Henkin constructions. Careful attention is paid to which properties of theories result in the presence of which rules of inference, and to restrictions on the sets of formulas to which the rules may be employed, restrictions (...) determined by the formulas occurring as premises and conclusion of the invalid inference for which a counterexample is to be constructed. We obtain an elegant formulation of classical propositional logic with the subformula property and a singularly inelegant formulation of classical first-order logic with the subformula property, the latter, unfortunately, not a product of the strategy otherwise used throughout the article. Along the way, we arrive at an optimal strengthening of the subformula results for classical first-order logic obtained as consequences of normalization theorems by Dag Prawitz and Gunnar Stålmarck. (shrink)

In a previous paper [ 21 ] all extensions of Johansson’s minimal logic J with the weak interpolation property WIP were described. It was proved that WIP is decidable over J. It turned out that the weak interpolation problem in extensions of J is reducible to the same problem over a logic Gl, which arises from J by adding tertium non datur. In this paper we consider extensions of the logic Gl. We prove that only finitely many logics over Gl (...) have the Craig interpolation property CIP, the restricted interpolation property IPR or the projective Beth property PBP. The full list of Gl-logics with the mentioned properties is found, and their description is given. We note that IPR and PBP are equivalent over Gl. It is proved that CIP, IPR and PBP are decidable over the logic Gl. (shrink)

Section 1 recalls a point noted by A. N. Prior forty years ago: that a certain formula in the language of a purely implicational intermediate logic investigated by R. A. Bull is unprovable in that logic but provable in the extension of the logic by the usual axioms for conjunction, once this connective is added to the language. Section 2 reminds us that every formula is interdeducible with (i.e. added to intuitionistic logic, yields the same intermediate logic as) some conjunction-free (...) formula. Thus it would seem that any detour going via formulas with conjunction can be avoided, which raises a puzzle: how is this consistent with the point from Section 1? Sections 3 and 4 raise and discuss this puzzle. In fact, the puzzle turns out on closer inspection not to be so puzzling after all, but it does serve as a convenient centrepiece around which to organize a discussion of the phenomenon illustrated by the Bull–Prior example. Section 5 notes that Prior's observation can be extended to the case of the result of adding disjunction to Bull's logic, while Section 6 includes some further remarks aimed at diagnosing one source of possible residual puzzlement. A subtext of our discussion—spanning several of the notes—is that this work by Bull and Prior has been overlooked, their results having to be rediscovered, by many algebraists and logicians in more recent years. (shrink)

A purported axiomatization, by P. Gärdenfors, of intuitionistic propositional logic is shown to be incomplete, and that the mistaken claim to completeness is seen to result from carelessness in the choice of primitive logical vocabulary. This leads to a consideration of various ways of conceiving the distinction between primitive and defined vocabularies, along with the bearing of these differences on such matters as are discussed in connection with Gärdenfors.

Whether assent ("acceptance") and dissent ("rejection") are thought of as speech acts or as propositional attitudes, the leading idea of rejectivism is that a grasp of the distinction between them is prior to our understanding of negation as a sentence operator, this operator then being explicable as applying to A to yield something assent to which is tantamount to dissent from A. Widely thought to have been refuted by an argument of Frege's, rejectivism has undergone something of a revival in (...) recent years, especially in writings by Huw Price and Timothy Smiley. While agreeing that Frege's argument does not refute the position, we shall air some philosophical qualms about it in Section 5, after a thorough examination of the formal issues in Sections 1-4. This discussion draws on - and seeks to draw attention to - some pertinent work of Kent Bendall in the 1970s. (shrink)

We explore a relation we call 'anticipation' between formulas, where A anticipates B (according to some logic) just in case B is a consequence (according to that logic, presumed to support some distinguished implicational connective →) of the formula A → B. We are especially interested in the case in which the logic is intuitionistic (propositional) logic and are much concerned with an extension of that logic with a new connective, written as "a", governed by rules which guarantee that for (...) any formula B, aB is the (logically) strongest formula anticipating B. The investigation of this new logic, which we call ILa, will confront us on several occasions with some of the finer points in the theory of rules and with issues in the philosophy of logic arising from the proposed explication of the existence of a connective (with prescribed logical behaviour) in terms of the conservative extension of a favoured logic by the addition of such a connective. Other points of interest include the provision of a Kripke semantics with respect to which ILa is demonstrably sound, deployed to establish certain unprovability results as well as to forge connections with C. Rauszer's logic of dual intuitionistic negation and dual intuitionistic implication, and the isolation of two relations (between formulas), head-implication and head-linkage, which, though trivial in the setting of classical logic, are of considerable significance in the intuitionistic context. (shrink)

In his 1964 note, ‘Two Additions to Positive Implication’, A. N. Prior showed that standard axioms governing conjunction yield a nonconservative extension of the pure implicational intermediate logic OIC of R. A. Bull. Here, after reviewing the situation with the aid of an adapted form of the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic and intermediate logics, we proceed to illuminate this example by transposing it to the setting of modal logic, and then relate it to the propositional logic of what have been (...) called ‘Hilbert algebras with infimum’. (shrink)

We illustrate, with three examples, the interaction between boolean and modal connectives by looking at the role of truth-functional reasoning in the provision of completeness proofs for normal modal logics. The first example (§ 1) is of a logic (more accurately: range of logics) which is incomplete in the sense of being determined by no class of Kripke frames, where the incompleteness is entirely due to the lack of boolean negation amongst the underlying non-modal connectives. The second example (§ 2) (...) focusses on the breakdown, in the absence of boolean disjunction, of the usual canonical model argument for the logic of dense Kripke frames, though a proof of incompleteness with respect to the Kripke semantics is not offered. An alternative semantic account is developed, in terms of which a completeness proof can be given, and this is used (§ 3) in the discussion of the third example, a bimodal logic which is, as with the first example, provably incomplete in terms of the Kripke semantics, the incompleteness being due to the lack of disjunction (as a primitive or defined boolean connective). (shrink)

Matthew Spinks [35] introduces implicative BCSK-algebras, expanding implicative BCK-algebras with an additional binary operation. Subdirectly irreducible implicative BCSK-algebras can be viewed as flat posets with two operations coinciding only in the 1- and 2-element cases, each, in the latter case, giving the two-valued implication truth-function. We introduce the resulting logic (for the general case) in terms of matrix methodology in §1, showing how to reformulate the matrix semantics as a Kripke-style possible worlds semantics, thereby displaying the distinction between the two (...) implications in the more familiar language of modal logic. In §§2 and 3 we study, from this perspective, the fragments obtained by taking the two implications separately, and – after a digression (in §4) on the intuitionistic analogue of the material in §3 – consider them together in §5, closing with a discussion in §6 of issues in the theory of logical rules. Some material is treated in three appendices to prevent §§1–6 from becoming overly distended. (shrink)

The first part of the paper is a reminder of fundamental results connected with the adequacy problem for sentential logics with respect to matrix semantics. One of the main notions associated with the problem, namely that of the degree of complexity of a sentential logic, is elucidated by a couple of examples in the second part of the paper. E.g., it is shown that the minimal logic of Johansson and some of its extensions have degree of complexity 2. This is (...) the first example of an exact estimation of the degree of natural complex logics, i.e. logics whose deducibility relation cannot be represented by a single matrix. The remaining examples of complex logics are more artificial, having been constructed for the purpose of checking some theoretical possibilities. (shrink)

A proof is given that the set of maximal intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property and the set of maximal intermediate predicate logics with the disjunction property and the explicit definability property have the power of continuum. To prove our results, we introduce various notions which might be interesting by themselves. In particular, we illustrate a method to generate wide sets of pairwise "constructively incompatible constructive logics". We use a notion of "semiconstructive" logic and define wide sets of "constructive" (...) logics by representing the "constructive" logics as "limits" of decreasing sequences of "semiconstructive" logics. Also, we introduce some generalizations of the usual filtration techniques for propositional logics. For instance, "filtrations over rank formulas" are used to show that any two different logics belonging to a suitable uncountable set of "constructive" logics are "constructively incompatible". (shrink)

A modified filtrations argument is used to prove that the relevant logic S of [2] is decidable.

Extant semantic theories for languages containing vague expressions violate intuition by delivering the same verdict on two principles of classical propositional logic: the law of noncontradiction and the law of excluded middle. Supervaluational treatments render both valid; many-Valued treatments, Neither. The core of this paper presents a natural deduction system, Sound and complete with respect to a 'mixed' semantics which validates the law of noncontradiction but not the law of excluded middle.

x1. This paper is a contribution to matrix semantics for sentential logics as presented in Los and Suszko [1] and Wojcicki [3], [4]. A generalization of Lindenbaum completeness lemma says that for each sentential logic there is a class K of matrices of the form such that the class is adequate for the logic, i.e., C = CnK.