Section 1 of this essay distinguishes between four interpretations of Socratic intellectualism, which are, very roughly: a version in which on any given occasion desire, and then action, is determined by what we think will turn out best for us, that being what we all, always, really desire; a version in which on any given occasion action is determined by what we think will best satisfy our permanent desire for what is really best for us; a version formed by the (...) assimilation of to, labelled the ‘standard’ version’ by Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, and treated by them as a single alternative to their own interpretation; and Brickhouse and Smith’s own version. Section 2 considers, in particular, Brickhouse and Smith’s handling of the ‘appetites and passions’, which is the most distinctive feature of interpretation. Section 3 discusses Brickhouse and Smith’s defence of ‘Socratic studies’ in its historical context, and assesses the contribution made by their distinctive interpretation of ‘the philosophy of Socrates’. One question raised in this section, and one that is clearly fundamental to the existence of ‘Socratic studies’, is how different Brickhouse and Smith’s Socrates turns out to be from Plato himself, i.e., the Plato of the post-‘Socratic’ dialogues; to which the answer offered is that on Brickhouse and Smith’s interpretation Socratic moral psychology becomes rather less distinguishable from its ‘Platonic’ counterpart—as that is currently understood—than it is on the interpretation they oppose. (shrink)

This paper examines Plato’s views about the unity of argument and drama, and asks why Plato never made his views on this unity fully explicit. Taking the Gorgias as a case study it is argued that unity rests on the conception of refutative dialectic as justice and on the principle of self-consistency of thought and desire. As compared to the treatise, the dialogue form has the advantage of being able to defend these substantive views in action and thus to demonstrate (...) the performative contradictions in the ideas of one’s opponents. (shrink)

I argue that Plato distinguishes between personal immortality and immortality of the soul. I begin by criticizing the consensus view that Plato identifies the person and the soul. I then turn to the issue of immortality. By considering passages from 'Symposium' and 'Timaeus', I make the case that Plato thinks that while the soul is immortal by nature, if a person is going to be immortal, they must become so. Finally, I argue that Plato has a psychological continuity approach to (...) personal identity. Thus, for Plato, a person becomes immortal by avoiding reincarnation and securing for themselves psychological continuity forever. (shrink)

Desde una lectura del diálogo Gorgias de Platón, la tesis del presente artículo es que, según la aproximación socrática a la justicia, el arte político propende por la asunción de la vulnerabilidad como apertura a la alteridad y al ejercicio de autonomía. La argumentación consta de tres partes. En primer lugar, se muestra que el reconocimiento de la vulnerabilidad conduce al reconocimiento del otro y, consiguientemente, a la valoración positiva de sus necesidades. En segundo lugar, se plantea que la justicia (...) supone la autonomía, pues expresa el deseo de un bien común como ley autoimpuesta. La tercera parte expone cómo el conocimiento de lo justo se deriva de un trabajo dialéctico con el lenguaje, enfatizando su performatividad y su capacidad para movilizar emociones y deseos. Se concluye así que el saber político surge como un rapto hacia los límites de nuestras aspiraciones y posibilidades. (shrink)

The inclusion of De astrologia in the Lucianic corpus has been disputed for centuries since it appears to defend astrological practices that Lucian elsewhere undercuts. This paper argues for Lucian’s authorship by illustrating its masterful subversion of a captatio benevolentiae and subtle rejection of Stoic astrological practices. The narrator begins the text by blaming phony astrologers and their erroneous predictions for inciting others to “denounce the stars and hate astrology” (ἄστρων τε κατηγοροῦσιν καὶ αὐτὴν ἀστρολογίην μισέουσιν, 2). The narrator assures (...) readers that he, the knowledgeable astrologer, will correct for the “stupidity and laziness” (ἀμαθίῃ καὶ ῥαθυμίῃ, ibid.) that bring about false predictions. The narrator’s credibility quickly decays when he attempts to recast Orpheus, Bellerophon, Icarus, Daedalus, and a host of other mythological figures as Greek astrologers. Lucian’s audience would expect such far-fetched interpretations of myth from the stereotypical Stoic philosopher, a character lampooned elsewhere in the Lucianic corpus. (shrink)

The great speech of the Protagoras still leaves many questions open. Particularly striking is the presence of doctrines that later on will be taken up and further developed by Plato in such dialogues as the Politicus, the Timaeus and the Laws. For this reason, many scholars tend to think that the words of Protagoras are just a product of Plato’s invention that bear no relation to Protagoras’ actual doctrines. Nevertheless, it is possible to propose a different interpretation. At the beginning (...) of the Protagoras, Socrates develops the image of the sophist as the merchant of various μαθήματα: to sell his products, the sophist praises them all indiscriminately without knowing which of them are useful and which are harmful. But he who has the ability to make this distinction can still purchase the μαθήματα from Protagoras or anyone else. Through the dialectic, Plato is able to examine them without any danger in the Protagoras and then take them up and further develop in new ways in his later dialogues. (shrink)

Príspevok sa venuje problematike mýtu v závere dialógu Gorgias, v súvislosti s funkciou trestu v Platónových dialógoch. Gorgias je jedným z dialógov, ktoré sú kľúčové pre porozumenie problematike trestu. Zameraním pozornosti na záverečný eschatologický mýtus by sa mohlo zdať, že autor v súvislosti s daným otázkami zastáva nejednoznačné stanovisko. K protirečeniu dochádza na úrovni mythos – logos: na jednej strane je v celom priebehu dialógu prezentovaný nápravný účel trestu. V závere však nastáva obrat a Platónov eschatologický mýtus prezentuje na prvý (...) pohľad odlišné stanovisko. Je možné že mýtus odporuje Platónovej téze o nápravnom účele trestu a do popredia tu vystupuje jeho retributívny charakter? Alebo v skutočnosti k žiadnemu protirečeniu nedochádza a jednotlivé prvky dialógu sa navzájom dopĺňajú? Cieľom príspevku je demonštrovať, že zmena pohľadu na formu trestu a uvažovanie o treste ako o metóde elenchos by mohlo byť kľúčom k porozumeniu vzťahu mythos – logos v predmetnom dialógu. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of the concluding myth of the Phaedo in the context of the dialogue as a whole, arguing that the myth's exploration of the relationship between action, condition of soul and form of life provides valuable information about Plato's conception of the kind of political environment necessary for human flourishing. It identifies three features of the myth essential to this exploration: its self-critical construction of the perspective of the makers of this myth, its focus on the (...) conditions under which violent deeds are committed and its envisaging of the form of human community necessary for the expiation of such deeds. El artículo examina el papel del mito final del Fedón dentro del contexto de la totalidad del diálogo y argumenta que la exploración que hace el mito de la relación entre acción, condición del alma y forma de vida brinda importante información acerca de la concepción platónica del tipo de entorno político que favorece el florecimiento del ser humano. Identifica tres rasgos del mito que son esenciales para dicha exploración: su construcción autocrítica de la perspectiva de los creadores del mito, su enfoque en las condiciones en las que se cometen actos violentos y su visión de una forma de comunidad humana necesaria para la expiación de tales actos. (shrink)