- The minimal self hypothesis.Timothy Lane - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 85:103029.details
|
|
Conscious-state Anti-realism.Pete Mandik - 2015 - In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited: With Replies by Daniel Dennett. Cham: Springer. pp. 184-197.details
|
|
I—Dean Zimmerman: From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism.Dean Zimmerman - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119-150.details
|
|
Consciousness and false HOTs.Jonah Wilberg - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):617-638.details
|
|
Not in the Mood for Intentionalism.Davide Bordini - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):60-81.details
|
|
The Pragmatist's Troubles with Bivalence and Counterfactuals.Sean Allen Hermanson - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (4):669-690.details
|
|
Anomalous Dualism: A New Approach to the Mind-Body Problem.David Bourget - 2019 - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.details
|
|
Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs: How Peircean Semiotics Combines Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Effects.Marc Champagne - 2018 - Cham: Springer.details
|
|
Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor.Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):161-181.details
|
|
Befuddling the mind: radical Enactivism (Hutto-Myin style) and the metaphysics of experience.Itay Shani - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):39-56.details
|
|
From design to self-organization, or: A proper structure for a proper function. [REVIEW]Inna Semetsky - 2005 - Axiomathes 15 (4):575-597.details
|
|
Introspection and the Elementary Acts of Mind.William Seager - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (1):53-76.details
|
|
There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.details
|
|
Blurring two conceptions of subjective experience: Folk versus philosophical phenomenality.Anthony F. Peressini - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):862-889.details
|
|
Dennett on qualia: The case of pain, smell and taste.Drakon Nikolinakos - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):505 – 522.details
|
|
Chaos and qualia.David Newman - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-21.details
|
|
Easy's gettin' harder all the time: The computational theory and affective states.Jason Megill & Jon Cogburn - 2005 - Ratio 18 (3):306-316.details
|
|
Novel colours and the content of experience.Fiona Macpherson - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.details
|
|
Grounding Individuality in Illusion: A Philosophical Exploration of Advaita Vedānta in light of Contemporary Panpsychism.Mikael Leidenhag - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (3).details
|
|
Higher Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):69-98.details
|
|
Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):420-442.details
|
|
Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.details
|
|
Building Blocks for the Development of a Self-Consistent Electromagnetic Field Theory of Consciousness.Joachim Keppler - 2021 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 15:723415.details
|
|
Critique du programme de naturalisation en philosophie de l’esprit.J. Kaufmann - 2008 - Philosophiques 35 (2):483-512.details
|
|
Self-consciousness and phenomenal character.Greg Janzen - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (4):707-733.details
|
|
Limited engagements and narrative extensions.Daniel D. Hutto - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):419 – 444.details
|
|
A quantum theory of consciousness.Shan Gao - 2007 - Minds and Machines 18 (1):39-52.details
|
|
Using Wittgenstein to Respecify Constructivism.David Francis - 2005 - Human Studies 28 (3):251-290.details
|
|
Computing machinery and emergence: The aesthetics and metaphysics of video games.Jon Cogburn & Mark Silcox - 2004 - Minds and Machines 15 (1):73-89.details
|
|
Why we should lower our expectations about the explanatory gap.Neil Campbell - 2009 - Theoria 75 (1):34-51.details
|
|
Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.David Bourget - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.details
|
|
Toward an ontological interpretation of Dennett's theory.Michael V. Antony - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):343-369.details
|
|
Superdupersizing the mind: Extended cognition and the persistence of cognitive bloat.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):791-806.details
|
|
Moods and the Salience of Subjectivity.Anna Giustina - forthcoming - In Self and Affect. Palgrave Macmillan.details
|
|
Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
The Semiotic Mind: A Fundamental Theory of Consciousness.Marc Champagne - 2014 - Dissertation, York Universiydetails
|
|
Going Out of My Head: An Evolutionary Proposal Concerning the “Why” of Sentience.Stan Klein, Bill N. Nguyen & Blossom M. Zhang - forthcoming - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice.details
|
|
Representationalism about consciousness.William E. Seager & David Bourget - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 261-276.details
|
|
Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness?Antonios Kaldas - 2019 - Dissertation, Macquarie Universitydetails
|
|
Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum. pp. 209-235.details
|
|
The transparencies and the opacities of experience. Intentionalism, phenomenal character, and moods.Davide Bordini - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Milandetails
|
|
The Mind-Body Problem and Whitehead’s Nonreductive Monism.Anderson Weekes - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):40-66.details
|
|
Meaning and abduction as process-structure: a diagraM of reasoning.Inna Semetsky - 2009 - Cosmos and History 5 (2):191-209.details
|
|
The Knowledge Argument.Luca Malatesti - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Stirlingdetails
|
|
The Cognitive View in Cognitive Science.Wolfram Schmitt - unknowndetails
|
|