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Minds, Brains and Science

Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1984)

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  1. The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.
  • Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • The architectonic of the ethics of liberation: On material ethics and formal moralities.Enrique Dussel - 1997 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 23 (3):1-35.
    This contribution is a critical and constructive engage ment with discourse ethics. First, it clarifies why discourse ethics has difficulties with the grounding and application of moral norms. Second, it turns to a positive appropriation of the formal and proce dural aspects of discourse ethics. The goal is the elaboration of an ethics that is able to incorporate the material aspects of goods and the formal dimension of ethical validity and consensuability. Every morality is the formal application of some substantive (...)
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  • Eric Alden Smith and Bruce winterhalder, eds., Evolutionary ecology and human behavior. Aldine de gruyter, new York, 1992. Pp. XV, 470, tables, boxes, figures, bibliography, author index, subject index. $59.95 (cloth), $29.95 (paper. [REVIEW]Andrew P. Vayda - 1995 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (2):219-249.
  • Is It All Really Biological?Raymond M. Bergner - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):30-49.
    The hypothesis that our current psychological forms of description and explanation will one day be replaced by biological ones, while not universally held, is wide-spread and highly influential in both the scientific community and the broader culture. The purpose of this paper is to examine this hypothesis. It will be argued that, while biology has had and will undoubtedly continue to have many extremely valuable and illuminating findings, it cannot and will not replace psychological explanations and concepts in our understanding, (...)
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  • The logic of Searle’s Chinese room argument.Robert I. Damper - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (2):163-183.
    John Searle’s Chinese room argument is a celebrated thought experiment designed to refute the hypothesis, popular among artificial intelligence scientists and philosophers of mind, that “the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind”. Since its publication in 1980, the CRA has evoked an enormous amount of debate about its implications for machine intelligence, the functionalist philosophy of mind, theories of consciousness, etc. Although the general consensus among commentators is that the CRA is flawed, and not withstanding the popularity of the (...)
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  • Modularity need not imply locality: Damaged modules can have nonlocal effects.Edgar Zurif & David Swinney - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):89-90.
  • The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.
  • Direction of fit and normative functionalism.Nick Zangwill - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (2):173-203.
    What is the difference between belief and desire? In order to explain the difference, recent philosophers have appealed to the metaphor of.
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  • Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.
  • What counts as local?Andrew W. Young - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):88-89.
  • Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.
  • Searles verpatzte Lösung des Freiheitsproblems.Wolfgang Lenzen - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):35-68.
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  • Agential Knowledge, Action and Process.Ben Wolfson - 2012 - Theoria 78 (4):326-357.
    Claims concerning processes, claims of the form “x is φing”, have been the subject of renewed interest in recent years in the philosophy of action. However, this interest has frequently limited itself to noting certain formal features such claims have, and has not extended to a discussion of when they are true. This article argues that a claim of the form “x is φing” is true when what is happening with x is such that, if it is not interrupted, a (...)
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  • The representational theory of learning and its pedagogic relevance.Christopher Winch - 1997 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 29 (2):67–82.
  • Representation redux.Hugh Wilder - 1988 - Metaphilosophy 19 (July-October):185-195.
  • Against naive mentalism.Hugh Wilder - 1991 - Metaphilosophy (October) 281 (October):281-291.
  • Against Naive Mentalism.Hugh Wilder - 1991 - Metaphilosophy 22 (4):281-291.
  • Machine mentality and the nature of the ground relation.Darren Whobrey - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (3):307-346.
    John Searle distinguished between weak and strong artificial intelligence (AI). This essay discusses a third alternative, mild AI, according to which a machine may be capable of possessing a species of mentality. Using James Fetzer's conception of minds as semiotic systems, the possibility of what might be called ``mild AI'' receives consideration. Fetzer argues against strong AI by contending that digital machines lack the ground relationship required of semiotic systems. In this essay, the implementational nature of semiotic processes posited by (...)
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  • Context-Dependence in Searle’s Impossibility Argument: A Reply to Butchard and D’Amico.Elijah Weber - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):433-444.
    John Searle claims that social-scientific laws are impossible because social phenomena are physically open-ended. William Butchard and Robert D’Amico have recently argued that, by Searle’s own lights, money is a social phenomena that is physically closed. However, Butchard and D’Amico rely on a limited set of data in order to draw this conclusion, and fail to appreciate the implications of Searle’s theory of social ontology with regard to the physical open-endedness of money. Money is not physically open-ended in the strong (...)
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  • The localization/distribution distinction in neuropsychology is related to the isomorphism/multiple meaning distinction in cell electrophysiology.Gerald S. Wasserman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):87-88.
  • Searle's causal powers.T. A. Warfield - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):29-32.
  • Forking Paths and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Robyn Repko Waller & Russell L. Waller - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1199-1212.
    The aim of this paper is to challenge libertarian accounts of free will. It is argued that there is an irreconcilable tension between the way in which philosophers motivate the incompatibilist ability to do otherwise and the way in which they formally express it. Potential incompatibilist responses in the face of this tension are canvassed, and it is argued that each response is problematic. It is not claimed that incompatibilist accounts in general are incoherent, but rather that any incompatibilist account (...)
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  • Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.
    A commentary on a target article by Alison Gopnik (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Focusing on evidence of how children acquire a theory of mind, this commentary argues that there are internal inconsistencies in theories that both argue for the functional role of conscious experiences and the irreducibility of those experiences to third-person viewable information processing.
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  • The symbolic brain or the invisible hand?René van Hezewijk & Edward H. F. de Haan - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):85-86.
  • The philosophical–anthropological foundations of Bennett and Hacker’s critique of neuroscience.Jasper van Buuren - 2015 - Continental Philosophy Review 49 (2):223-241.
    Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a “part” of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the “mereological fallacy”. Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical (...)
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  • Playing Flourens to Fodor's Gall.Tim van Gelder - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):84-84.
  • Prosopagnosia, conscious awareness and the interactive brain.Robert Van Gulick - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):84-85.
  • Embedding Values in Artificial Intelligence (AI) Systems.Ibo van de Poel - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (3):385-409.
    Organizations such as the EU High-Level Expert Group on AI and the IEEE have recently formulated ethical principles and (moral) values that should be adhered to in the design and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI). These include respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, fairness, transparency, explainability, and accountability. But how can we ensure and verify that an AI system actually respects these values? To help answer this question, I propose an account for determining when an AI system can be said to embody (...)
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  • The functional architecture of visual attention may still be modular.Carlo Umiltà - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):82-83.
  • Voices and noises in the theory of speech acts.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2004 - Pragmatics and Cognition 12 (1):105-151.
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  • The theory of international politics? An analysis of neorealist theory.Keith Topper - 1998 - Human Studies 21 (2):157-186.
    In recent years a number of writers have defended and attacked various features of structural, or neo-realist theories of international politics. Few, however, have quarrelled with one of the most foundational features of neorealist theory: its assumptions about the nature of science and scientific theories. In this essay I assess the views of science underlying much neorealist theory, especially as they are articulated in the work of Kenneth Waltz. I argue not only that neorealist theories rest on assumptions about science (...)
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  • Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.
  • The concept of voluntary motor control in the recent neuroscientific literature.Paul Tibbetts - 2004 - Synthese 141 (2):247-76.
    The concept of voluntary motor control(VMC) frequently appears in the neuroscientific literature, specifically in the context of cortically-mediated, intentional motor actions. For cognitive scientists, this concept of VMC raises a number of interesting questions:(i) Are there dedicated, modular-like structures within the motor system associated with VMC? Or (ii) is it the case that VMC is distributed over multiple cortical as well as subcortical structures?(iii) Is there any one place within the so-calledhierarchy of motor control where voluntary movements could be said (...)
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  • Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.
  • Wholes that cause their parts: Organic self-reproduction and the reality of biological teleology.Thomas Teufel - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (2):252-260.
    A well-rehearsed move among teleological realists in the philosophy of biology is to base the idea of genuinely teleological forms of organic self-reproduction on a type of causality derived from Kant. Teleological realists have long argued for the causal possibility of this form of causality—in which a whole is considered the cause of its parts—as well as formulated a set of teleological criteria of adequacy for it. What is missing, to date, is an account of the mereological principles that govern (...)
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  • Some ethical implications of neurosciences.Charles Susanne & M. Szente - 1997 - Global Bioethics 10 (1-4):111-121.
    The new methods of modern sciences can contribute to understand the genesis of mental illness, the disturbances in brain chemistry, physiology, anatomy or genetical information underlying different diseases of the nervous system. Understanding mental illness is not only challenging to science, but is also of great social importance. Moreover, the new developments of neurosciences put new lights on discussions such as brain-mind concepts, unity of mind, definition of consciousness and even definition of the person.For the majority of the scientists, it (...)
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  • Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.
  • Culture, biology, and human behavior.Horst D. Steklis & Alex Walter - 1991 - Human Nature 2 (2):137-169.
    Social scientists have not integrated relevant knowledge from the biological sciences into their explanations of human behavior. This failure is due to a longstanding antireductionistic bias against the natural sciences, which follows on a commitment to the view that social facts must be explained by social laws. This belief has led many social scientists into the error of reifying abstract analytical constructs into entities that possess powers of agency. It has also led to a false nature-culture dichotomy that effectively undermines (...)
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  • The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.
  • Free will and the construction of options.Chandra Sripada - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2913-2933.
    What are the distinctive psychological features that explain why humans are free, but many other creatures, such as simple animals, are not? It is natural to think that the answer has something to do with unique human capacities for decision-making. Philosophical discussions of how decision-making works, however, are tellingly incomplete. In particular, these discussions invariably presuppose an agent who has a mentally represented set of options already fully in hand. The emphasis is largely on the selective processes that identify the (...)
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  • Continuities and Discontinuities Between Humans, Intelligent Machines, and Other Entities.Johnny Hartz Søraker - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):31-46.
    When it comes to the question of what kind of moral claim an intelligent or autonomous machine might have, one way to answer this is by way of comparison with humans: Is there a fundamental difference between humans and other entities? If so, on what basis, and what are the implications for science and ethics? This question is inherently imprecise, however, because it presupposes that we can readily determine what it means for two types of entities to be sufficiently different—what (...)
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  • Making up People: On Some Looping Effects of the Human Kind - Institutional Reflexivity or Social Control?Davide Sparti - 2001 - European Journal of Social Theory 4 (3):331-349.
    This paper is an account of the co-construction of categorical identity and personal identity among human beings. As people recognize themselves within a socially sanctioned categorical scheme, they reproduce that scheme, and hence institutional and personal reflexivity occur as a joint movement that, at the same time, can be seen as an exercise in social control. The inspirations for this account are lan Hacking's view about the distinctiveness of social kinds from natural kinds, and Dan Sperber's idea about cultural communication (...)
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  • Book reviews. [REVIEW]John Snapper, Jack Kulas & John Heil - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (2-3):319-329.
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  • The real functional architecture is gray, wet and slippery.Steven L. Small - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):81-82.
  • Knowing children's minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.
  • Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.
  • What next? Ramifications for empirical psychology.Benny Shanon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):197-198.
  • Representations - senses and reasons.Benny Shanon - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):355-74.
    Abstract A survey of different senses of the term ?representation? is presented. The presentation is guided by the appraisal that this key term is employed in the cognitive literature in different senses and that the distinction between these is not always explicitly stated or appreciated. Furthermore, the different senses seem to be associated with different rationales for the postulation of representation. Given that there may be a lack of convergence between the various senses of the construct in question and the (...)
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  • Throwing out the neuropsychological data with the locality bathwater?Philip Servos & Elizabeth M. Olds - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):80-81.