Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 4, Page 490-511, October 2022.

Perceptual similarity is one of the most fiercely debated topics in the philosophy and psychology of perception. The documented history of the issue spans all the way from Plato – who regarded similarity as a key factor for human perceptual experience and cognition – through to contemporary psychologists – who have tried to determine whether, and if so, how similarity relationships can be established between stimuli both within and across the senses. Recent research on cross-sensory associations, otherwise known as crossmodal (...) correspondences – that is, the existence of observable consensual associations, or mappings, between stimuli across different senses – represents an especially interesting field in which to study perceptual similarity. In fact, most accounts of crossmodal association that have been put forward in the literature to date evoke perceptual similarity as a key explanatory factor mediating the underlying association. At the same time, however, these various accounts raise several important theoretical questions concerning the very nature of similarity, with, for example, the sensory, affective, or cognitive underpinnings of similarity judgements remaining unclear. We attempt to shed light on these questions by examining the various accounts of crossmodal associations that have been put forward in the literature. Our suggestion is that perceptual similarity varies from being phenomenologically-based to conceptually-based. In particular, we propose that the nature of the associations underlying similarity judgements – whether these associations are phenomenologically-, structurally-, emotionally-, or conceptually-based – may be represented in a two-dimensional space with associative strength on one axis, and cognitive penetrability on the other. (shrink)

Introduction -- Aesthetic judgements, aesthetic principles, and aesthetic properties -- Aesthetic essence -- The acquaintance principle -- The intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgements -- The pure judgement of taste as an aesthetic reflective judgement -- Understanding music -- The characterization of aesthetic qualities by essential metaphors and quasi-metaphors -- Musical movement and aesthetic metaphors -- Aesthetic realism and emotional qualities of music -- On looking at a picture -- The look of a picture -- Wollheim on correspondence, projective properties, and (...) expressive perception -- Wittgenstein on aesthetics. (shrink)

Disagreeing with Jerrold Levinson's claim that being conscious of broad-span musical form is not essential to understanding music, I will argue that our awareness of musical architecture is significant to achieve comprehension. I will show that the experiential model is not incompatible with the analytic model. My main goal is to show that these two models can be reconciled through the identification of a broader notion of understanding. After accomplishing this reconciliation by means of my new conception, I will close (...) the paper by discussing some reasons to accept an enhancing notion of musical understanding that includes levels and degrees of understanding. /// En desacuerdo con la afirmación de Jerrold Levinson: que ser consciente de la forma musical a gran escala no es esencial para comprender la música, sostendré que nuestra conciencia de la estructura musical es significante para alcanzar comprensión. Mostraré que el modelo experiencial no es incompatible con el modelo analítico y que ambos pueden ser reconciliados mediante una noción de comprensión más amplia. Después de llevar a cabo está reconciliación mediante la nueva concepción que propongo, concluiré discutiendo algunas razones para aceptar una noción de comprensión musical enriquecida que incluye niveles y grados de comprensión. (shrink)

The present work aims at providing an evaluation of musical formalism, as it was intended by Eduard Hanslick in his treatise On the Musically Beautiful, in the light of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on aesthetics and music. After a short historical introduction concerning the origins of the concept of absolute music within the framework of Romantic aesthetics and the writings of authors such as Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, E. T. A. Hoffmann and Arthur Schopenhauer, I suggest a definition of formalism on the (...) basis of Hanslick's account of music. I compare, then, Hanslick's view on music with Wittgenstein's reflections on music and aesthetics, referring to both Wittgenstein's early philosophy – especially to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – and to the later writings – namely to the Philosophical Investigations and the Lectures on Aesthetics. The outcome of the comparison between Hanslick's and Wittgenstein's views on music leads the discussion to an evaluation of the plausibility of the dichotomy between formalism and anti-formalism, and to a reflection on the objects, aims and methods of aesthetics. (shrink)

This article challenges a widespread assumption, arguing that Wittgenstein and the Austrian composer Arnold Schoenberg had little in common beyond their shared cultural heritage, overlapping social circles in fin-de-ciecle Vienna. The article explores Wittgenstein's aesthetic inclinations and the intellectual and philosophical influences that may have reinforced them. The article culminates in an attempt to form a Wittgensteinian response to Schoenberg's dodecaphonic language and to answer the question as to why Wittgenstein and Schoenberg arrived at very different ideas about contemporary music (...) and the music of the future. (shrink)

The purpose of this research is to show the relevance of the notion of 'skepticism' for the philosophy of art. From Modernism on, art is plagued by a lack of confidence in the traditional conventions and by an instability of the criteria governing the membership of an object to the category of 'art'. The notion of 'skepticism' is linked to the concept of 'expression': if art faces a form of skepticism, then the emphasis on the personal expression of artists and (...) audiences leads to a solution to the skeptical problem. The dissertation is divided into two parts: The first part, entitled 'Cavell, philosophy and skepticism', is a long Overture. With constant reference to the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Cavell, all the main themes of the dissertation are introduced: modernity and tradition, style and method, skepticism and ordinary, skepticism towards other minds (skepticism and expression). The second part, entitled 'Philosophy of Art and Modernism', isolates a line of thought from the writings of Tolstoy, Wittgenstein and Cavell. The three thinkers apply to art the concepts discussed in the previous part. Tolstoy, Wittgenstein and Cavell are linked by an awareness of a rupture in the relationship between contemporary art and tradition - a fracture that will be easy to recognize as skepticism in the art - and by the discovery of a similar solution. In particular, the notion of 'expression' will solve the skeptical problem. The first part is preparatory to the second because it contains all the themes and the concepts to be applied to art. The second part is analogue to the first: skepticism in the art, in fact, has a profound analogy with skepticism towards other minds. This analogy is made explicit in the conclusion, with a reference to attempts to define art. (shrink)