Invited review of the anthology of new papers _Philosophy of Chemistry: Growth of a New Discipline_.

How do chemists assign numbers to chemicals properties? What do these numbers refer to? To answer these questions, we will first point out both the context-dependence of chemicals and the epistemic limitations of chemistry. We will then investigate how chemists use various procedures to stabilize measurements and how they use mixtures of samples as “references” in order to determine the amount of different chemicals in a sample. This study will enable us to query how it is possible for chemists to (...) change one factor while holding others constant at each step of the measurement procedure. This part of our work which will lead us to query the meaning of the ceteris paribus clause and the very possibility of making holistic inferences in the domain of chemistry. To conclude, we will highlight how methodological pluralism developed by chemists makes it possible for a relational type of consistency to emerge. (shrink)

This work utilizes examples from chemical sciences to present fundamentals of dialectics and synergetics. The laws of dialectics remain appropriate at the level of atoms, at the level of molecules, at the level of the reactions, and at the level of ideas. The law of the unity and conflict of opposites is seen, for instance, in the relationships between the ionization energy and electron affinity of atoms, between the forward and back reactions, as well as in the differentiation and integration (...) between the various areas of chemistry. The law of the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes describes the transformation properties of the compounds when the number and arrangement of atoms in the molecule undergoes changes. According to this law, the development is accompanied by breaks and jumps. This paper suggests equations for the description of these relationships. The law of the negation of the negation is manifested in the Periodic Law, in the evolution of ideas about the mutual transformation of chemical elements, in the development the concept of triads of elements, etc. Small changes in the conventional Periodic Table on the basis of previously rejected versions allow reflecting secondary and additional periodicity. Synergetics, similarly to dialectics, is dedicated to the studies of general laws of evolution. Synergetics includes highly advanced and specified ideas of dialectics. The cornerstone of synergetics is the principles of self-organization and nonlinearity. Mathematical development of these concepts was substantially facilitated by considering oscillating chemical reactions as an example. These reactions are quite complex and therefore provide adequate models for self-organization. Oscillations may exist only upon execution of specific thermodynamic, mathematical, and chemical conditions. Mechanisms of several oscillatory reactions are briefly reviewed. The construction of novel biomimetic or smart materials based on oscillating reactions is described. (shrink)

In this article, from the characterization of technoscience of the English historian J. Pickstone and the recognition of the importance of models and modelling in research and teaching of chemistry, the term technochemistry is introduced as a way of chemical knowledge. With the above new possibilities, rethinking the chemistry curriculum is opened.

A new chronology is introduced to address the history of chemistry, with educational purposes, particularly for the end of the twentieth century and here identified as the fifth chemical revolution. Each revolution are considered in terms of the Kuhnian notion of ‘exemplar,’ rather than ‘paradigm.’ This approach enables the incorporation of instruments, as well as concepts and the rise of new subdisciplines into the revolutionary process and provides a more adequate representation of such periods of development and consolidation. The fifth (...) revolution developed from 1973 to 1999 and is characterized by a deep transformation in the very heart of chemistry. That is to say, the size and type of objects, the way in which they must be done and the time in which they are transformed. In one way or another, chemistry’ limits had been set out. (shrink)

At first glance twentieth-century philosophy of science seems virtually to ignore chemistry. However this paper argues that a focus on chemistry helped shape the French philosophical reflections about the aims and foundations of scientific methods. Despite patent philosophical disagreements between Duhem, Meyerson, Metzger and Bachelard it is possible to identify the continuity of a tradition that is rooted in their common interest for chemistry. Two distinctive features of the French tradition originated in the attention to what was going on in (...) chemistry.French philosophers of science, in stark contrast with analytic philosophers, considered history of science as the necessary basis for understanding how the human intellect or the scientific spirit tries to grasp the world. This constant reference to historical data was prompted by a fierce controversy about the chemical revolution, which brought the issue of the nature of scientific changes centre stage.A second striking—albeit largely unnoticed—feature of the French tradition is that matter theories are a favourite subject with which to characterize the ways of science. Duhem, Meyerson, Metzger and Bachelard developed most of their views about the methods and aims of science through a discussion of matter theories. Just as the concern with history was prompted by a controversy between chemists, the focus on matter was triggered by a scientific controversy about atomism in the late nineteenth-century.Keywords: France; Epistemology; Chemistry; Revolution; Atomism; Realism. (shrink)

Continental philosophy of science has developed alongside mainstream analytic philosophy of science. But where continental approaches are inclusive, analytic philosophies of science are not–excluding not merely Nietzsche’s philosophy of science but Gödel’s philosophy of physics. As a radicalization of Kant, Nietzsche’s critical philosophy of science puts science in question and Nietzsche’s critique of the methodological foundations of classical philology bears on science, particularly evolution as well as style (in art and science). In addition to the critical (in Mach, Nietzsche, Heidegger (...) but also Husserl just to the extent that continental philosophy of science tends to depart from a reflection on the crisis of foundations), other continental philosophies of science include phenomenology (Husserl, Bachelard, Merleau‐Ponty, etc.) and hermeneutics (Heidegger, Gadamer, Heelan, etc.), especially incorporating history of science (Nietzsche, Mach, Duhem, Butterfield, Feyerabend, etc.). Examples are drawn from the philosophy of sciences (chemistry, geology, and biology) other than physics. (shrink)

This inaugural handbook documents the distinctive research field that utilizes history and philosophy in investigation of theoretical, curricular and pedagogical issues in the teaching of science and mathematics. It is contributed to by 130 researchers from 30 countries; it provides a logically structured, fully referenced guide to the ways in which science and mathematics education is, informed by the history and philosophy of these disciplines, as well as by the philosophy of education more generally. The first handbook to cover the (...) field, it lays down a much-needed marker of progress to date and provides a platform for informed and coherent future analysis and research of the subject. -/- The publication comes at a time of heightened worldwide concern over the standard of science and mathematics education, attended by fierce debate over how best to reform curricula and enliven student engagement in the subjects There is a growing recognition among educators and policy makers that the learning of science must dovetail with learning about science; this handbook is uniquely positioned as a locus for the discussion. -/- The handbook features sections on pedagogical, theoretical, national, and biographical research, setting the literature of each tradition in its historical context. Each chapter engages in an assessment of the strengths and weakness of the research addressed, and suggests potentially fruitful avenues of future research. A key element of the handbook’s broader analytical framework is its identification and examination of unnoticed philosophical assumptions in science and mathematics research. It reminds readers at a crucial juncture that there has been a long and rich tradition of historical and philosophical engagements with science and mathematics teaching, and that lessons can be learnt from these engagements for the resolution of current theoretical, curricular and pedagogical questions that face teachers and administrators. (shrink)

Chemists do not aim at testing preconceptions or theoretical hypotheses only; they first and foremost produce and determine the object of chemical investigation: they learn through making. They never cease to create and stabilize heterogeneous devices, methods, models, and theories in order to act upon the world. Chemical bodies cannot be studied in isolation; their properties constitutively depend on what surrounds and acts upon them. Starting from the specificity of chemical practices, this paper investigates the meaning of consistency, inconsistency, and (...) that of the ceteris paribus clause, in this domain of science. In so doing, it defends the idea that studying what we call ‘a lack of consistency’ should always include the scrutiny of: the way a particular scientific practice is stabilized, and the ontological or pragmatic assumptions about the entities and processes upon which this practice revolves. (shrink)

The past decade or so has witnessed an increase in the number of philosophical discussions about emergence and reduction in science. However, many of these discussions (though not all) remain too abstract and theoretical, and are wanting with respect to concrete examples taken from the sciences. This dissertation studies the topics of reduction and emergence in the context of a case study. I focus on the case of chemistry and investigate how emergentism can help us secure the autonomy of this (...) discipline in relation to the underlying microphysics. I develop an account of emergence (called functional emergence) that is, I argue, capable of answering the question of why we have chemistry instead of just applied quantum mechanics. I argue that functionally emergent properties in chemistry -- properties that are defined by their behaviour, not by some shared microphysical constituent -- can help us defend the autonomy of chemistry; they allow for the existence of sui generis chemical regularities, which can be used in sui generis chemical explanations. Functional emergence generates difficulties for some accounts of inter-theoretic reduction, but unlike other theories of emergence it is compatible with weaker forms of reductionism. (shrink)

Nowadays it is well known among historians of science that Francis Bacon, one of the modern defender of the experimental method, owed much of his thoughts to the chemical or alchemical tradition (cf. e.g., Gregory 1938, West 1961, Linden 1974, and Rees 1977). In fact, alchemy, particularly in the Arabic tradition, was always based on laboratory investigations by carefully examining the results of controlled manipulation of materials.1 It is also well known that Francis Bacon’s appeal to the experimental method was (...) severe criticism of scholasticism in philosophy of nature and, in particular, of authority as the basis of knowledge.2 If we compare philosophy of nature in the early 17th century with phi-. (shrink)

Continental philosophies of science tend to exemplify holistic themes connecting order and contingency, questions and answers, writers and readers, speakers and hearers. Such philosophies of science also tend to feature a fundamental emphasis on the historical and cultural situatedness of discourse as significant; relevance of mutual attunement of speaker and hearer; necessity of pre-linguistic cognition based in human engagement with a common socio-cultural historical world; role of narrative and metaphor as explanatory; sustained emphasis on understanding questioning; truth seen as horizonal, (...) aletheic, or perspectival; and a tolerance for paradoxical and complex forms of expression. Continental philosophy of science is thus more comprehensive than philosophy of science in the analytic tradition, including (and as analytic philosophy of science does not tend to include) perspectives on the history of science as well as the social and practical dimensions of scientific discovery. Where analytic philosophy is about reducing or, indeed, eliminating the perennial problems of philosophy, Continental philosophy is all about thinking and that will mean, as both Heidegger and Nietzsche emphasize, making such problems more not less problematic. (shrink)

Philosophie ist konkret und abstrakt. Sie ist konkret im Gespür für Probleme, die jeden – oder jeden in einem bestimmten Bereich – betreffen. Sie ist abstrakt in der kritischen Formulierung und Lösung von Problemen, indem sie von besonderen Bedingungen und Voreingenommenheiten abstrahiert. Philosophie erfordert Kreativität, Phantasie und die Bereitschaft zu Unkonventionellem in der Wahl der Problemzugangsweisen. Wie alle Wissenschaften ist sie als Methode lehr- und entwickelbar, sofern ein gewisses Talent vorhanden ist. Philosophie beginnt dort, wo Wissenschaftler nicht mehr weiter fragen. (...) Was heute Philosophie ist, kann morgen Wissenschaft sein – Naturwissenschaft, Sozialwissenschaft oder Geisteswissenschaft –, Philosophie hat keine Vorlieben. (shrink)