ABSTRACT:Analytic philosophers have criticized A. N. Whitehead's metaphysics for being obscure, yet several such philosophers have espoused positions in metaphysics and philosophy of mind that were advanced by Whitehead in the 1920s. In this paper, we evaluate the merits and demerits of these criticisms by Bertrand Russell, W. V. Quine, Karl Popper, and others and then demonstrate the affinities and contrasts in the positions advanced by Galen Strawson, David Chalmers, Thomas Nagel, and Whitehead regarding so-called ‘analytic panexperientialism’.

Lorsqu'on examine la vie de Alfred North Whitehead, on est frappé par le nombre d'activités qui l'ont occupé successivement à diverses époques. D'abord on remarque deux grandes périodes: la première, entièrement consacrée aux mathématiques, qui s'étend de 1880 à 1924 et qui culmine dans la publication de Principia Mathematica,œuvre écrite conjointement avec Bertrand Russell; la deuxième consacrée à la philosophic et qui couvre la période allant de 1916 à 1947, année de sa mort. Comme on le voit done, la première (...) période chevauche la deuxième puisque, de 1916 à 1924, Whitehead fait oeuvre, à la fois, de mathématicien et de philosophe. (shrink)

Philosophy becomes speculative when it raises questions about the ultimate nature of being and thought. What does it mean to be? What does it mean to think? How are being and thought related? What does it mean to ask these questions? These questions have occupied a central place in philosophy throughout history, but have led a shadow existence in twentieth-century thought, which has cut the tie between reason and these fundamental questions, leaving the questions in the twilight, and reason instrumentalised. (...) A.N. Whitehead (1861-1947), one of the founders of analytic philosophy and co-author (with Bertrand Russell) of Principia Mathematica, is one of the few contemporary thinkers to have developed an explicit speculative philosophy. Unsurprisingly, his philosophy has played a marginal role in academic debates. In this study, the methodological foundation of Whitehead’s speculative thought is reconstructed. On the basis of a systematic and historical examination of the nature of the question of being, Whiteheads ontology of the event as the passage into novelty emerges in its full scope, allowing the reader to understand why and to what extent Whitehead has walked a different path than other contemporary thinkers. His philosophy contains a conception of reason that is not alien to newness and creativity while being more than procedural or pragmatic, and a mode of understanding existence that brings out the acuteness of freedom, value and legitimacy, as well as the unity of things, of thought and nature. In order to show what is really happening in this philosophy, the received interpretation of Whitehead’s ontology is radically dismantled. The central thought, that to be means to happen, is explained in a process of reiteration and gradual clarification, examining traditional philosophical problems in metaphysics and epistemology (on topics like: nature and matter, knowledge, categorical structure, freedom and necessity, truth and meaning, modality) from its perspective. What emerges is a philosophy in which the temporality of being, when taken seriously, changes the status of familiar problems and dualisms and offers possibilities for thought, which previously did not exist. Whitehead “hears” the classical questions of philosophy in a new way. Beyond the trenches of twentieth-century philosophy, Whitehead’s speculative thinking contains many elements that will be of value to those studying the foundations of thought today and looking for new directions. In a time when the dualism of nature and man is maintained cynically in our economies and dismantled, but only in a biologistic fashion and therefore only seemingly, as a cover-up, in science and philosophy, Whitehead’s new and creative way of hearing, and answering, old questions about ultimate concerns, when understood properly, is more up to date than ever before. (shrink)

En los años veinte del siglo pasado se constituye lo que luego se llamó la escuela de Cambridge en bioquímica. Bajo el liderazgo de Frederick Gowland Hopkins este grupo tenía como objetivo primario la consolidación de la naciente bioquímica. Una característica particular de este grupo fue el intento explícito de vincular el trabajo científico con la discusión filosófica. Sin embargo, algunos historiadores como Nils Roll-Hansen han cuestionado en duros términos la manera en la cual estos científicos apelaban a la filosofía. (...) En particular Roll-Hansen ha sugerido que los aspectos filosóficos del trabajo de estos investigadores tendrían un mero carácter propagandístico vinculado con el proyecto de la constitución de la bioquímica como una disciplina. En este trabajo voy a defender que es posible considerar a los principios filosóficos presentados por la escuela de Cambridge como algo más que una mera propaganda para un proyecto institucional. Para esto voy a comparar la relación entre los principios filosóficos y trabajo metodológico propuesto por la escuela de Cambridge con una propuesta contemporánea: el Análisis de Control Metabólico, una perspectiva en el estudio de la bioquímica cuyo trabajo metodológico se suele defender apelando a “principios filosóficos”. A pesar de la distancia temporal entre ambas escuelas, tanto la actitud de apelar a principios filosóficos como el campo de estudio científico son semejantes.In the twenties of the last century, the Cambridge school in biochemistry was established. Under the leadership of Frederick Gowland Hopkins this group had as its primary objective the consolidation of a new science: biochemistry. A particular feature of this group was the explicit attempt to link scientific work with philosophical discussion. However, some historians like Nils Roll-Hansen have harshly questioned the way in which these scientists appealed to philosophy. In particular Roll-Hansen has suggested that the philosophical aspects of the work of these researchers would have to be considered as propaganda, motivated by attempt stablish the biochemistry as a discipline. In this paper I am going to defend that it is possible to consider the philosophical principles presented by the Cambridge school as something more than a propaganda for an institutional project. To this end I am going to compare the relationship between the philosophical principles and methodological work proposed by the Cambridge school with a contemporary proposal: the Metabolic Control Analysis, a perspective in the study of biochemistry whose methodological work is usually defended by appealing to “philosophical principles”. Despite the temporal distance between the two schools, both the attitude of appealing to philosophical principles and their field of scientific study are similar. Key Words: Philosophy of Biochemistry; Metabolic Control Analysis; Cambridge School ARK: ark:/s18537960/2ak06yaaq. (shrink)