It is commonly accepted that voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide can be allowed, if at all, only in the cases of patients whose conditions are incurable. Yet, there are different understandings of when a patient’s condition is incurable. In this article, I consider two understandings of the notion of an incurable condition that can be found in the recent debate on physician-assisted dying. According to one of them, a condition is incurable when it is known that there is no (...) cure for it. According to the other, a condition is incurable when no cure is known to exist for it. I propose two criteria for assessing the conceptions and maintain that, in light of the criteria, the latter is more plausible than the former. (shrink)

By issuing an advance treatment directive, an autonomous person can formally express what kinds of treatment she wishes and does not wish to receive in case she becomes ill or injured and unable to autonomously decide about her treatment. While many jurisdictions and medical associations endorse them, advance treatment directives have also been criticized. According to an important criticism, when a person irreversibly loses her autonomy what she formerly autonomously desired ceases to be of importance in deciding about her treatment. (...) The medical ethical debate regarding different possible ways of solving the problem on which the criticism is based has grown exceedingly intricate. Instead of assessing the developments made in the debate so far, I present a thought experiment—built around a suicide case—which suggests that the problem is not as intractable as it has generally been deemed to be. (shrink)

Treatment-resistant depression (TRD) holds centrality in many debates regarding psychiatric euthanasia. Among the strongest reasons cited by opponents of psychiatric euthanasia is the uncertainty behind the irremediability of psychiatric illnesses. According to this argument, conditions that cannot be considered irremediable imply that there are possible remedies that remain for the condition. If there are possible remedies that remain for the condition, then patients with that condition cannot be considered for access to euthanasia. I call this the irremediability requirement (IR). I (...) argue that patients with TRD can, indeed, meet the operationalisation of irremediability in the IR. This is because the irremediability it asks for is not some global or absolute irremediability, but rather a present irremediability based on the current state of medical science. I show this by considering irremediability relating to (1) possible future treatments and (2) not trying presently available alternative treatments. I extend Schuklenk nd van de Vathorst’s argument from parity to terminal malignancies, to show that (1) is an unreasonable expectation for all cases of euthanasia. Taking (2) as a more serious opponent to psychiatric euthanasia, I show how the IR, based on how it is presently operationalised, can be realistically applied to cases of TRD. I do this by further developing Tully’s argument on broad-sense treatment resistance with the robust empirical data from the STAR*D trials. If my argument from Tully’s is valid, then we have reasons to, again, seek parity between the operationalisations of irremediability in terminal malignancies and TRD. (shrink)

Should people suffering from untreatable psychiatric conditions be eligible for physician-assisted death? This is possible in Belgium and the Netherlands, where PAD for psychiatric conditions is permitted, though rare, so long as the criteria of due care are met. Those opposed to all instances of PAD point to Belgium and the Netherlands as a dark warning that once PAD is legalized, restricting it will prove impossible because safeguards, such as the requirement that a patient be terminally ill, will inevitably be (...) eroded or discarded. However, some supporters respond that limiting PAD to those suffering from terminal illness, or physical illnesses generally, is arbitrary and illogical. In addition, precisely because such patients are not terminally ill, their suffering may last for years, even the rest of their lives. Finally, severe depression may not be treatable. If PAD is justifiable under some conditions—as I shall assume in this article—then why wouldn't it be justifiable for these patients? Why shouldn't psychiatrists who have nothing else to offer their suffering patients be able to help them to die, if that is what they want? (shrink)

Some jurisdictions that have decriminalized assisted dying exclude psychiatric patients on the grounds that their condition cannot be determined to be irremediable, that they are vulnerable and in need of protection, or that they cannot be determined to be competent. We review each of these claims and find that none have been sufficiently well-supported to justify the differential treatment psychiatric patients experience with respect to assisted dying. We find bans on psychiatric patients’ access to this service amount to arbitrary discrimination. (...) Proponents of banning the practice ignore or overlook alternatives to their proposal, like an assisted dying regime with additional safeguards. Some authors have further criticized assisted dying for psychiatric patients by highlighting allegedly problematic practices in those countries which allow it. We address recent evidence from the Netherlands, showing that these problems are either misrepresented or have straightforward solutions. Even if one finds such evidence troubling despite our analysis, other jurisdictions need not adopt every feature of the Dutch system. (shrink)

The current empirical research and normative arguments on physician-assisted dying in the Netherlands seem insufficient to provide ethical guidance to general practitioners in the practice of PAD, due to a gap between the evidence and arguments on the one hand and the uncertainties and complexities as found in everyday practice on the other. This paper addresses the problems of current ethical arguments and empirical research and how both seem to be profoundly influenced by the Dutch legislative framework on PAD and (...) a certain view on ethics. Furthermore, the paper elaborates on how other approaches to empirical research in bioethics, such as found in the broad field of narrative research, could supplement the empirical and ethical evaluation of PAD in the Netherlands. This paper also addresses the challenging question of how empirical data—in this case narratives—relate to normativity. The paper is written in the form of a personal narrative of the author, a young Dutch general practitioner and researcher in bioethics. This style is intentionally chosen, to illustrate how work context and professional background influence the observations one makes and the questions one may ask about the topic of PAD. In addition, by using this style, this paper not only gives a different perspective on a much-contested bioethical issue, but also on the challenges faced when a physician–bioethicist has to navigate different disciplinary fields and epistemological paradigms, especially since the ‘empirical turn’ in bioethics. (shrink)

Medical assistance in dying, which includes voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, is legally permissible in a number of jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Canada. Although medical assistance in dying is most commonly provided for suffering associated with terminal somatic illness, some jurisdictions have also offered it for severe and irremediable psychiatric illness. Meanwhile, recent work in the philosophy of psychiatry has led to a renewed understanding of psychiatric illness that emphasises the role of the relation between the person (...) and the external environment in the constitution of mental disorder. In this paper, I argue that this externalist approach to mental disorder highlights an ethical challenge to the practice of medical assistance in dying for psychiatric illness. At the level of the clinical assessment, externalism draws attention to potential social and environmental interventions that might have otherwise been overlooked by the standard approach to mental disorder, which may confound the judgement that there is no further reasonable alternative that could alleviate the person’s suffering. At the level of the wider society, externalism underscores how social prejudices and structural barriers that contribute to psychiatric illness constrain the affordances available to people and result in them seeking medical assistance in dying when they otherwise might not have had under better social conditions. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 3-7.

Drawing the line on physician assistance in physician-assisted death continues to be a contentious issue in many legal jurisdictions across the USA, Canada and Europe. PAD is a medical practice that occurs when physicians either prescribe or administer lethal medication to their patients. As more legal jurisdictions establish PAD for at least some class of patients, the question of the proper scope of this practice has become pressing. This paper presents an argument for restricting PAD to the terminally ill that (...) can be accepted by defenders as well as critics of PAD for the terminally ill. The argument appeals to fairness-based paternalism and the social meaning of medical practice. These two considerations interact in various ways, as the paper explains. The right way to think about the social meaning of medical practice bears on fair paternalism as it relates to PAD and vice versa. The paper contends that these considerations have substantial force when directed against proposals to extend PAD to non-terminally ill patients, but considerably less force when directed against PAD for the terminally ill. The paper pays special attention to the case of non-terminally ill patients who suffer from treatment-resistant depression, as these patients present a potentially strong case for extending PAD beyond the terminally ill. (shrink)

Maung argues that an externalist understanding of mental disorder exposes how, if society was more just for the most deprived, patterns of access to assisted dying might be different. I counter that reducing inequality lacks relevance to the immediate permissibility of assisted dying for mental disorder, owing to the need for solutions for those in distress. I suggest that the question of assistance in death for mental disorders is one of pragmatic politics, not for obfuscatory philosophy.

Physician-assisted death (PAD) of patients whose suffering does not stem from terminal conditions has become more prevalent during the last few decades. This paper is focused on decision-making competence for PAD, specifically in situations in which PAD is related solely to psychiatric illness. First, a theoretical analysis presents the premises for the argument that competence for physician-assisted death for psychiatric patients (PADPP) should be determined based on a higher threshold in comparison to the required competence for conventional medical interventions. Second, (...) the higher threshold for decision-making competence for PADPP is illustrated. Third, several real PADPP cases are critically discussed, as an illustration to decision-making competence evaluations that would not have met the higher standard. Finally, a short summary of practical suggestions regarding the assessment of decision-making competence for PADPP is presented. Psychiatrists are called to address the ethical, legal, societal and clinical challenges related to PADPP and should be prepared for its probable expansion. (shrink)

Background Medical assistance in dying (MAiD) sparks debate in several countries, some of which allow or plan to allow MAiD where a mental disorder is the sole underlying medical condition (MAiD-MD). Since MAiD-MD is becoming permissible in a growing number of jurisdictions, there is a need to better understand the moral concerns related to this option. Gaining a better understanding of the moral concerns at stake is a first step towards identifying ways of addressing them so that MAiD-MD can be (...) successfully introduced and implemented, where legislations allow it. Methods Thus, this article aims (1) to better understand the moral concerns regarding MAiD-MD, and (2) to identify potential solutions to promote stakeholders’ well-being. A qualitative thematic review was undertaken, which used systematic keyword-driven search and thematic analysis of content. Seventy-four publications met the inclusion criteria. Results Various moral concerns and proposed solutions were identified and are related to how MAiD-MD is introduced in 5 contexts: (1) Societal context, (2) Healthcare system, (3) Continuum of care, (4) Discussions on the option of MAiD-MD, (5) MAiD-MD practices. We propose this classification of the identified moral concerns because it helps to better understand the various facets of discomfort experienced with MAiD-MD. In so doing, it also directs the various actions to be taken to alleviate these discomforts and promote the well-being of stakeholders. Conclusion The assessment of MAiD-MD applications, which is part of the context of MAiD-MD practices, emerges as the most widespread source of concern. Addressing the moral concerns arising in the five contexts identified could help ease concerns regarding the assessment of MAiD-MD. (shrink)

Schuklenk and van de Vathorst's paper is a very welcome addition to the literature on the assisted dying debate and will be of great interest to clinicians working in the field of mental health.1 Many psychiatrists will have had patients who have asked them to allow them to die, to desist in their efforts to prevent their suicide, and one of us has had personal experience, outside of professional life, of being asked to aid in someone's attempt to end their (...) life in the context of an episode of mood disorder. The person with depression asking professionals, friends and family members to aid them in ending their life is a very real phenomenon. In their discussion, Schuklenk and van de Vathorst's paper uses two principles that we endorse and add weight to their argument: namely, the reality of suffering in depression and the parity of mental and physical illness. Indeed, the case Schuklenk and van de Vathorst make is a strong one and our commentary will focus on the premise of the argument around choosing death and some empirical clarification about competence in depression and the nature of treatment-resistant depression (TRD) and its prognosis. The conceptual concern we wish to discuss in relation to assisted dying, endorsed by the state and legislature, is not linked to any moral or religious concern, or even on grounds related to ‘slippery slope’ or ‘abuse’ arguments. Rather the worry is how one could operationalise decisions around assisted dying as based on competence and capacity and view such decisions as rational. I think this concern is not limited to depressive illness, but to all decisions regarding choosing non-existence. Schuklenk and van de Vathorst offer the following useful criteria to regulate assisted suicide:1. (shrink)

Recently, several authors have argued that assisted dying may be ethically appropriate when requested by a person who suffers from serious depression unresponsive to treatment. We here present four arguments to the contrary. First, the arguments made by proponents of assisted dying rely on notions of “treatment-resistant depression” that are problematic. Second, an individual patient suffering from depression may not be justified in believing that chances of recovery are minimal. Third, the therapeutic significance of hope must be acknowledged; when mental (...) healthcare opens up the door to admitting hopelessness, there is a danger of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Finally, proponents of assisted dying in mental healthcare overlook the dangers posed to mental-health services by the institutionalization of assisted dying. (shrink)

BackgroundFollowing several landmark rulings and increasing public support for physician-assisted death, in 2016, Canada became one of a handful of countries legalising medical assistance in dying (MAiD) with Bill C-14. However, the revised Bill C-7 proposes the specific exclusion of MAiD where a mental disorder is the sole underlying medical condition (MAiD MD-SUMC).AimThis review explores how some persons with serious and persistent mental illness (SPMI) could meet sensible and just criteria for MAiD under the Canadian legislative framework.MethodsWe review the proposed (...) Bill C-7 criteria (capacity, voluntariness, irremediability and suffering) as well as the nuances involved in separating a well-reasoned request for assisted suicide from what might be solely a manifestation of a SPMI.FindingsIn this paper, we argue against the absolute exclusion of patients with SPMIs from accessing MAiD. Instead, we propose that in some circumstances, MAiD MD-SUMC may be justifiable while remaining the last resort. Conducting MAiD eligibility assessments removes the need to introduce diagnosis-specific language into MAiD legislation. Competent psychiatric patients who request MAiD should not be treated any differently from other eligible candidates. Many individuals with psychiatric disorders will be incapable of consenting to MAiD. The only ethical option is to assess eligibility for MAiD on an individual basis and include as legitimate candidates those who suffer solely from psychiatric illness who have the decisional capacity to consent to MAiD. (shrink)

In many Western jurisdictions, the law presumes that adult persons, and sometimes children that meet certain criteria, are capable of making their own health care decisions; for example, consenting to a particular medical treatment, or consenting to participate in a research trial. But what exactly does it mean to say that a subject has or lacks the requisite capacity to decide? This last question has to do with what is commonly called “decisional capacity,” a central concept in health care law (...) and ethics, and increasingly an independent topic of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

Decision-Making Capacity First published Tue Jan 15, 2008; substantive revision Fri Aug 14, 2020 In many Western jurisdictions the law presumes that adult persons, and sometimes children that meet certain criteria, are capable of making their own medical decisions; for example, consenting to a particular medical treatment, or consenting to participate in a research trial. But what exactly does it mean to say that a subject has or lacks the requisite capacity to decide? This question has to do with what (...) is commonly called “decisional capacity”, a central concept in health care law and ethics, and increasingly an independent topic of philosophical inquiry. -/- Decisional capacity can be defined as the ability of subjects to make their own medical decisions. Somewhat similar questions of capacity arise in other contexts, such as capacity to stand trial in a court of law and the ability to make decisions that relate to personal care and finances. However, the history behind the more general legal notions of capacity to stand trial and capacity to manage one’s life is different and operates somewhat differently in law (Roth, Meisel, & Litz 1977; Zapf & Roesch 2005). For the purposes of this discussion the notion of decisional capacity will be limited to medical contexts only; most notably, those where decisions to consent or to refuse treatment or participation in clinical research are concerned. (shrink)