The philosophical analysis of chemistry has advanced at such a pace during the last dozen years that the existence of philosophy of chemistry as an autonomous discipline cannot be doubted any more. The present paper will attempt to analyse the experience of philosophy of chemistry at the, so to say, meta-level. Philosophers of chemistry have especially stressed that all sciences need not be similar to physics. They have tried to argue for chemistry as its own type of science and for (...) a pluralistic understanding of science in general. However, when stressing the specific character of chemistry, philosophers do not always analyse the question ‘What is science?’ theoretically. It is obvious that a ‘monistic’ understanding of science should not be based simply on physics as the epitome of science, regarding it as a historical accident that physics has obtained this status. The author’s point is that the philosophical and methodological image of science should not be chosen arbitrarily; instead, it should be theoretically elaborated as an idealization (theoretical model) substantiated on the historical practice of science. It is argued that although physics has, in a sense, justifiably obtained the status of a paradigm of science, chemistry, which is not simply a physical science, but a discipline with a dual character, is also relevant for elaborating a theoretical model of science. The theoretical model of science is a good tool for examining various issues in philosophy of chemistry as well as in philosophy of science or science studies generally. (shrink)

In this paper I present a historiography of the recent emergence of philosophy of chemistry. Special attention is given to the interest in this domain in Eastern Europe before the collapse of the USSR. It is shown that the initial neglect of the philosophy of chemistry is due to the unanimous view in philosophy and philosophy of science that only physics is a proper science (to put in Kant's words). More recently, due to the common though incorrect assumption that chemistry (...) can in principle be reduced to physics, the neglect continued, even when interest in sciences such as biology and psychology entered more strongly in philosophy of science. It is concluded that chemistry is an autonomous science and is perhaps a more typical science than physics. (shrink)

What are the criteria determining the individuation of chemical kinds? Recent philosophical discussion, which puts too much emphasis on microstructure, seems to presuppose a reductionist conception not motivated by the scientific facts. The present article traces the development of the traditional notion of a substance with the rise of modern chemistry from the end of the 18th century with a view to correcting this speculative distortion.

Chemists do not aim at testing preconceptions or theoretical hypotheses only; they first and foremost produce and determine the object of chemical investigation: they learn through making. They never cease to create and stabilize heterogeneous devices, methods, models, and theories in order to act upon the world. Chemical bodies cannot be studied in isolation; their properties constitutively depend on what surrounds and acts upon them. Starting from the specificity of chemical practices, this paper investigates the meaning of consistency, inconsistency, and (...) that of the ceteris paribus clause, in this domain of science. In so doing, it defends the idea that studying what we call ‘a lack of consistency’ should always include the scrutiny of: the way a particular scientific practice is stabilized, and the ontological or pragmatic assumptions about the entities and processes upon which this practice revolves. (shrink)

Given the rich diversity of research fields usually ascribed to chemistry in a broad sense, the present paper tries to dig our characteristic parts of chemistry that can be conceptually distinguished from interdisciplinary, applied, and specialized subfields of chemistry, and that may be called chemistry in a very narrow sense, or 'the chemical core of chemistry'. Unlike historical, ontological, and 'anti-reductive' approaches, I use a conceptual approach together with some methodological implications that allow to develop step by step a kind (...) of cognitive architecture for chemistry, which basically contains: (1) systematic chemical knowledge on the experimental level; (2) clarification of chemical species; (3) chemical classification systems; (4) theoretical foundation through the chemical theory of structural formulas. In a succeeding paper the results will be checked for resisting physicalistic reduction. (shrink)

Part I presents a quantitative-empirical outline of chemistry, esp. preparative chemistry, concerning its dominant role in today's science, its dynamics, and its methods and aims. Emphasis is laid on the poietical character of chemistry for which a methodological model is derived. Part II discusses standard distinction between science and technology, from Aristotle (whose theses are reconsidered in the light of modern sciences) to modern philosophy of technology. Against the background of results of Part I, it is argued that all these (...) distinctions fail, because the underlying concepts of science are either out-dated, one-sided, or arbitrary. A deeper understanding of today's sciences requires, in particular, a philosopical investigation of chemistry. (shrink)

This paper presents an epistemological approach to the investigation of material properties that is opposed both to phenomenalistic epistemology and recent linguistical and ontological accounts of matter/mass terms. Emphasis is laid on the inherent context dependence of material properties. It is shown that, if this is taken seriously, some deep epistemological problems arise, like unavoidable uncertainty, incompleteness, inductivity, nonderivableness. It is further argued that some widely held epistemological accounts, namely that of essentialism, constructivism, and pragmatism, all reveal some serious defects (...) if related to the recognition of materials. In order to responsibly manage our material environment, a more realistic estimation of our epistemic abilities and prospects is suggested. (shrink)

During the twentieth century, the mechanistic worldview came under attack mainly because of the rise of quantum mechanics but some of its basic characteristics survived and are still evident within current science in some form or other. Many scholars have produced interesting studies of such significant mechanistic trends within current physics and biology but very few have bothered to explore the effects of this worldview on current chemistry. This paper makes a contribution to fill this gap. It presents first a (...) brief historical overview of the mechanistic worldview and then examines the present situation within chemistry by referring to current studies in the philosophy of chemistry and determining which trends are still mechanistic in spirit and which are not. (shrink)

Philosophie ist konkret und abstrakt. Sie ist konkret im Gespür für Probleme, die jeden – oder jeden in einem bestimmten Bereich – betreffen. Sie ist abstrakt in der kritischen Formulierung und Lösung von Problemen, indem sie von besonderen Bedingungen und Voreingenommenheiten abstrahiert. Philosophie erfordert Kreativität, Phantasie und die Bereitschaft zu Unkonventionellem in der Wahl der Problemzugangsweisen. Wie alle Wissenschaften ist sie als Methode lehr- und entwickelbar, sofern ein gewisses Talent vorhanden ist. Philosophie beginnt dort, wo Wissenschaftler nicht mehr weiter fragen. (...) Was heute Philosophie ist, kann morgen Wissenschaft sein – Naturwissenschaft, Sozialwissenschaft oder Geisteswissenschaft –, Philosophie hat keine Vorlieben. (shrink)

In this book Ralph Cahn analyzes the logical structure of the periodic system of chemical elements and discusses the differences and similarities between various tables advanced by 19th-century chemists. After a survey of the historical and philosophical literature, the author suggests a more general and philosophically informed approach that allows for a critical epistemological history of the periodic system including its precursors. He argues that the periodic system is essentially a constitutional scheme consisting of relations, and discusses which combinations of (...) scientific relations (atomic weights, elements, chemical similarities, etc.) are sufficient to constitute a law-like system. From such a general epistemological point of view, the development of these relations becomes an integral part of the history of the periodic system. Similarity applied to chemical elements (e.g. by Leopold Gmelin and Alexander Martius) deserves particular attention as an evolving relation as well as the rather neglected chemical system of Gustav Tschermak. (shrink)