The aim of the Schematism chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason is to solve the problem posed by the “inhomogeneity” of intuitions and categories: the sensible properties of objects represented in intuition are of a different kind than the properties represented by categories. Kant's solution is to introduce what he calls “transcendental schemata,” which mediate the subsumption of objects under categories. I reconstruct Kant's solution in terms of two substantive premises, which I call Subsumption Sufficiency (i.e., that subsuming an (...) object under a transcendental schema is sufficient to subsume it under the corresponding category) and Real Possibility (i.e., that it is really possible to subsume objects under each of the transcendental schemata). These two principles, together with a trivial modal one (the Subsumption-Possibility Link), entail that it is possible to subsume objects under categories; in other words, the argument of the Schematism is valid. The main work of the paper consists in reconstructing Kant's arguments for, and explanations of, these premises. I argue that they hinge on Kant's claim that transcendental schemata are “time-determinations,” which I interpret to mean: rules for reflexively representing the temporal relations among our own representational states. On the basis of this reading, I reconstruct Kant's argument for Subsumption Sufficiency, category by category. I also explain why Real Possibility follows almost immediately. Granting Kant the argument up to this point in the Critique, the argument of the Schematism is sound. (shrink)

Nietzsche consistently valorizes artistic falsehoods. On standard interpretations, this is because art provides deceptive yet salutary fictions that help us affirm life. This reading conflicts, however, with Nietzsche’s insistence that life-affirmation requires untrammeled honesty. I present an alternative interpretation which navigates the interpretive impasse. With special attention to the influence of Friedrich Schiller, the paper argues for three claims: (1) Nietzsche does not hold that art is false because it “beautifies,” but because it produces mere semblances of, its objects; (2) (...) these semblances are essentially non-deceptive; (3) he values artistic illusions because they dispose us positively to illusion more generally. Such ‘evaluative reorientation,’ I argue, is not merely consistent with, but integral to, achieving Nietzsche’s ideal of honesty. (shrink)

Death is an unavoidable fact of human life, which cannot be totally ignored in education. Children reflect on death and raise questions that deserve serious answers. If an educator completely evades the issue, children will seek other conversation partners. It is possible to find arguments both from secular and religious sources, which alleviate the anguish that death awakens in the mind of a child.

I would like to know who of mycontemporaries should be more competent inKantian philosophy than me.(Schopenhauer in a letter to Rosenkranz and Schubert, 18371)In this paper the attempt is made to show how Schopenhauer's critique of Kant leads from initial disagreements to a fundamental modification, even a new formation, of the Kantian concepts of understanding, reason, imagination, perception, idea and thing-in-itself. The starting point and the core of his critique is the demand for the appreciation of intuitive knowledge which is (...) apart from and independent of reason. The intuitive knowledge goes back to images and its highest form is aesthetic contemplation. Without a participation of concepts it is sufficient to explain objective reality. Particularly on the basis of Schopenhauer's critical examination of Kant's schematism it can be shown that his alternative conception of an image-based objectivity of experience is to be taken seriously, even if the way he presents it sometimes gives the impression of a mere misunderstanding of Kant's theory of cognition. (shrink)

Schopenhauer asserts that ‘the will, which is objectified in human life as it is in every appearance, is a striving without aim and without end’. The article rejects some recent readings of this claim, and offers the following positive interpretation: however many specific aims of my specific desires I manage to attain, none is a final aim, in the sense that none terminates my ‘willing as a whole’, none turns me into a non-willing being. To understand Schopenhauer’s claim we must (...) recognize his central contrast between happiness and will-lessness. Happiness is the satisfaction of individual desire, but no act of will that succeeds in satisfying individual desire is the attainment of a final aim, in that none brings about a conscious state in which the subject experiences no more unfulfilled desires. Such a state is the ultimate goal of existence, in Schopenhauer’s view, but happiness does not provide a route along which it can be attained. (shrink)

One major challenge of the 21st century is the increasingly rapid development of new technologies and their evaluation. In this article we argue for an interdisciplinary approach to meet this demand for evaluating new and specifically bioinspired technologies. We combine the consideration of normative principles in the field of ethics with psychological-empirical research on attitudes. In doing so, the paper has a twofold concern: first, we discuss how such an interdisciplinary collaboration can be implemented by using the method of Cognitive-Affective (...) Mapping. Cognitive-Affective Maps (CAMs) enable a graphical representation of attitudes, including cognitive and affective aspects. Second, we argue that CAMs can be helpful to remedy the deficits of traditional ethical approaches. We applied CAMs in the context of an ethics seminar in which students were instructed to create CAMs based on bioinspired technologies twice – prior to the seminar to assess their evaluation on bioinspired technologies per se (pre-assessment) and after the seminar to assess how their evaluation might have changed and especially which normative ethical principles might have been additionally considered (post-assessment). As could be shown, CAMs can visualize the students’ attitudes, including the valence of ethical principles. Further, comparing pre- and post-CAMs indicated students’ attitude change. (shrink)

Mental and neural states are related to one another by vertical interlevel relations and by horizontal intralevel relations. For particular choices of such relations, problems arise if causal efficacy is ascribed to mental states. In a series of influential papers and books, Kim has presented his much discussed “supervenience argument,” which ultimately amounts to the dilemma that mental states either are causally inefficacious or they hold the threat of overdetermining neural states. Forced by this disjunction, Kim votes in favor of (...) overdetermination and, ultimately, reduction. We propose a perspective on mental causation that dissolves the assumption of a tension between horizontal and vertical determination. For mental states to be causally efficacious, they must be dynamically stable. This important requirement can be implemented by combining a key idea of supervenience, multiple realization, with the recently introduced vertical interlevel relation of contextual emergence. Both together deflate Kim's dilemma and reflate the causal efficacy of mental states. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Resumo: O artigo investiga os dois diferentes modelos de "observação psicológica" que Arthur Schopenhauer e Paul Rée elaboraram, enquanto parte de suas filosofias morais, pretendendo elucidar as críticas do último à moralidade e à psicologia empírica do primeiro. Para tanto, num primeiro momento, a investigação pauta alguns dos principais conceitos da filosofia moral schopenhaueriana, para, com isso, especificar os principais momentos da elaboração da referida psicologia empírica e o seu alcance no interior dessa filosofia. Destaca-se o caráter descritivo - mas, (...) ainda assim, moral e crítico - atribuído por Schopenhauer a tal psicologia, no sentido de Psychologische Bemerkungen. Num segundo momento, indicam-se elementos conceituais que permitem pensar a recepção e as críticas de Rée a essa mesma noção, a partir da sua obra Psychologische Beobachtungen, que, mesmo declarada pelo autor como sendo de inspiração schopenhaueriana, apresenta suas "observações" com uma conotação diversa, mediante a recusa de elementos fundamentais daquele pensamento, notadamente no que tange ao âmbito da moralidade.: This article investigates the two different models of "psychological observation" that Arthur Schopenhauer and Paul Rée elaborated as part of their moral philosophies. We intend to elucidate former's empirical psychology and the latter's critique of morality. The investigation first addresses the main concepts of the moral philosophy of Schopenhauer, so as to specify the principal aspects of his empirical psychology and its reach within his philosophy. We emphasize the descriptive - but still moral and critical - character attributed by Schopenhauer to this psychology in the sense of Psychologische Bemerkungen. Second, we discuss Rée's critique of this notion in his Psychologische Beobachtungen, a work which, even though declared by the author as being inspired by Schopenhauer, presents its "observations" with a rejection of fundamental elements of Schopenhauer's thought, especially with regard to morality. (shrink)

Husserl’s concept of subjectivity doesn’t bound to its logical and episte­­mological aspects, but it extends to its ethic und aesthetic dimensions. The external perception constitutes the original and founding experience of transcendental life. Moreover the per­­ception’s trend to a complete vision of the things moves the whole subject and explains its dynamism. This trend is just an ideal, which any kind of sub­­jective effort could realize. However Husserl considers some experiences, which imply the subject’s “liberation” from the passivity of a (...) tendency to a total intuition of the objects. That’s the case of the aesthetic consideration of the images. Beside she announces a peculiar way of relationship with the world and the others, but in another way as the perception. (shrink)

resumo No artigo que se segue, iremos relacionar o tema „intuição“ e „pensamento“ ao problema, virulento no idealismo alemão, da sistemática filosófica. Depois que a concepção kantiana de sistema assente na “Arquitetônica da razão” foi criticada como formalista e que, ao mesmo tempo, se propagou no século XVIII a crítica aos sistemas racionalistas, exercida antes pelo empirismo, irrompeu no final desse século uma crise na filosofia, expressa talvez de modo mais marcante em um “fragmento” de Friedrich Schlegel: "É igualmente mortal (...) ao espírito ter um sistema e não ter nenhum". Fichte e Schopenhauer tratam da questão do sistema reportando-a à relação entre intuição e pensamento. palavras-chave Schopenhauer; Fichte; pensamento; intuição. (shrink)