Because moral understanding involves a distinctly first-personal grasp of moral matters, there is a temptation to think of its value primarily in terms of achievements that reflect well on its possessor: the moral worth of one's action or the virtue of one's character. These explanations, I argue, do not do full justice to the importance of moral understanding in our moral lives. Of equal importance is the value of moral understanding in our relations with other moral agents. In particular, I (...) argue that an understanding of moral matters is of central importance within relations of solidarity. In addition to highlighting an overlooked aspect of moral understanding's value, this view also has important implications for what solidarity requires of those who stand in that relationship. (shrink)

This essay offers a motivational conception of solidarity that can be employed across the entire range of sciences and humanities, while also filling a gap in the motivational spectrum conceived by decision theorists and economists—and expanding the two-part division between altruistic and selfish motivations into a tripartite analysis that suggests a spectrum instead. According to the present proposal, solidarity is a condition of action-readiness on behalf of a group or its interests. The proposal will admit of measuring the extent to (...) which Prisoner’s Dilemmas are overcome in real life via acts of solidarity. (shrink)

Solidarity is one of the central concepts in social theory and has gained much attention due to the multiple challenges that the EU has been facing the last decade and due to the most recent COVID-19 pandemic. Although the debate on the nature and conditions of solidarity has been revitalized, there remains a large variety in how to conceptualize solidarity. In contrast to other approaches, we do not conceive solidarity as normative concept, but as descriptive–analytical one. Therefore, we provide a (...) theory-based definition that is prone to capture the empirical dimensions of solidarity. Accounting for the dynamic and interactive character of solidarity as subject to permanent societal and political renegotiation, we conceptualize solidarity from a discourse perspective and follow a multilevel design breaking down the understandings of solidarity on different levels. This approach contributes to the research of solidarity that is interested to capturing the ‘real world’ dimensions of solidarity. (shrink)

I propose a new concept of solidarity, which I call “solidarity from below,” that highlights an aspect of solidarity widely recognized in popular uses of the term, but which has hitherto been neglected in the philosophical literature. Solidarity from below is the collective ability of otherwise powerless people to organize themselves for transformative social change. I situate this concept with respect to four distinct but intertwined questions that have motivated extant theorizing about solidarity. I explain what it means to conceptualize (...) solidarity from below as a form of power, rather than as a feeling, disposition, duty, or scheme of social arrangements. Finally, I suggest that the moral-relational aspects of solidarity emerge secondarily from the process of collective power, and not the other way around. (shrink)

The workers’ compensation system in Taiwan cannot provide sufficient coverage for all workers. This essay adopts a solidaristic approach to address this issue by analyzing the reasons why workers’ compensation is underdeveloped in Taiwan and what could be done to persuade more key actors to support the reform for a more just policy arrangement. First, through comparison with the healthcare system, it is argued that the lack of solidarity and the perception of relevant similarities could explain the underdevelopment of workers’ (...) compensation. Second, the essay turns to the normative aspect of the issue. Compared with other normative political theories, Iris M. Young’s social connection model provides specific normative guidance that is useful for justifying the allocation of responsibility for a more just workers’ compensation reform. (shrink)

Allies of those experiencing injustice or oppression face a dilemma: to be neutral in the face of calls to solidarity risks siding with oppressors, yet to speak or act on behalf of others risks compounding the injustice. We identify what we call ‘a normative demand for deference’ (NDD) to those with lived experience as a response to this dilemma. Yet, while the NDD is prevalent, albeit sometimes implicitly so, in contemporary solidarity theory and activist practice, it remains under-theorised. In this (...) article, we analyse the potential benefits of adhering to the NDD, highlighting both a commonly accepted epistemic benefit, and a neglected but important good in bearing witness. Yet adhering to the NDD also raises real challenges. While the literature focuses on a gold standard model of direct engagement, we defend a valuable role for a second-order form of engagement through reading, films, and similar media, which, we argue, is particularly salient for global and transnational solidarity, an important element of contemporary global politics. (shrink)

Punishment involves deliberating harming individuals. How, then, if at all, is it to be justified? This, the first of three papers on the philosophy of punishment (see also 'Punishment: Nonconsequentialism' and 'Punishment: The Future'), examines attempts to justify the practice or institution according to its consequences. One claim is that punishment reduces crime, and hence the resulting harms. Another is that punishment functions to rehabilitate offenders. A third claim is that punishment (or some forms of punishment) can serve to make (...) restitution to victims, and a fourth is that it can strengthen social values. The paper examines these claims, and finally considers pluralist theories which combine retributive and harm-reductive or utilitarian considerations. (Retributive theories are examined in their own right in 'Punishment: Nonconsequentialism'.). (shrink)

The Trump Administration's recent attempts to repeal the Affordable Care Act have reignited long‐running debates surrounding the nature of justice in health care provision, the extent of our obligations to others, and the most effective ways of funding and delivering quality health care. In this article, I respond to arguments that individualist systems of health care provision deliver higher‐quality health care and promote liberty more effectively than the cooperative, solidaristic approaches that characterize health care provision in most wealthy countries apart (...) from the United States. I argue that these claims are mistaken and suggest one way of rejecting the implied criticisms of solidaristic practices in health care provision they represent. This defence of solidarity is phrased in terms of the advantages solidaristic approaches to health care provision have over individualist alternatives in promoting certain important personal liberties, and delivering high‐quality, affordable health care. (shrink)

For much of the 20th century, vulnerability to deprivations of health has often been defined by geographical and economic factors. Those in wealthy, usually ‘Northern’ and ‘Western’, parts of the world have benefited from infrastructures, and accidents of geography and climate, which insulate them from many serious threats to health. Conversely, poorer people are typically exposed to more threats to health, and have lesser access to the infrastructures needed to safeguard them against the worst consequences of such exposure. However, in (...) recent years the increasingly globalized nature of the world’s economy, society and culture, combined with anthropogenic climate change and the evolution of antibiotic resistance, has begun to shift the boundaries that previously defined the categories of person threatened by many exogenous threats to health. In doing so, these factors expose both new and forgotten similarities between persons, and highlight the need for global cooperative responses to the existential threats posed by climate change and the evolution of antimicrobial resistance. In this article, we argue that these emerging health threats, in demonstrating the similarities that exist between even distant persons, provides a catalyst for global solidarity, which justifies, and provides motivation for, the establishment of solidaristic, cooperative global health infrastructures. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 5, June 2020, Page 77-79.

This article defends an account of collective hope that arises through solidarity in the pursuit of justice. I begin by reviewing recent literature on the nature of hope. I then explore the relationship between hope and solidarity to demonstrate the ways in which solidarity can give rise to hope. I suggest that the hope born of solidarity is collective when it is shared by at least some others, when it is caused or strengthened by activity in a collective action setting, (...) and when the reciprocal hopeful expressions of individual group members result in an emotional atmosphere of hope that extends across the group. In the context of social movements, collective hope emerges alongside the collective intentions and actions of the solidarity group; namely, in the pursuit of a form of social justice that inspires the movement. I then suggest that the object of collective hope born of solidarity is the guiding ideal of justice and reflect on what it might mean to hope well for justice. (shrink)

The commonly occurring metaphors and models of the doctor–patient relationship can be divided into three clusters, depending on what distribution of power they represent: in the paternalist cluster, power resides with the physician; in the consumer model, power resides with the patient; in the partnership model, power is distributed equally between doctor and patient. Often, this tripartite division is accepted as an exhaustive typology of doctor–patient relationships. The main objective of this paper is to challenge this idea by introducing a (...) fourth possibility and distribution of power, namely, the distribution in which power resides with neither doctor nor patient. This equality in powerlessness—the hallmark of “the age of bureaucratic parsimony”—is the point of departure for a qualitatively new doctor–patient relationship, which is best described in terms ofsolidaritybetweencomrades. This paper specifies the characteristics of this specific type of solidarity and illustrates it with a case study of how Swedish doctors and patients interrelate in the sickness certification practice. (shrink)

It is foundational to ethics and bioethics that individuals will have to make hard decisions, frequently in challenging circumstances. But the scenarios and standard modes of theorizing in bioethics may fail to address important ethical questions, in part because of a paradigmatic focus on individual rights and freedoms in the context of decision making. There is a growing conviction that theorists of ethics and bioethics must reframe our core units of analysis to attend to health in public, collective, relational terms.1 (...) This would involve a move from an approach that focuses primarily on the relation between doctors and patients or between researchers and research subjects to something very different— something .. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 5, June 2020, Page 75-77.

Using relations of solidarity in global contexts, this article explores some of the debates about what constitutes solidarity. Three primary forms of solidarity are discussed, with particular attention to the different nature of the solidaristic relations and their moral obligations.

Iris Marion Young took a strong stance against humanitarian intervention and other so-called legitimate instances of what she calls ‘official violence’. Nevertheless, she was also aware that there may be some situations for which military humanitarian intervention should at least be considered. Young was concerned that some states will use their obligation to defend against human rights violations as a mechanism in securing or maintaining global dominance. In addition, she recognized that what counts as a violation of human rights is (...) not uncontroversial; human rights norms and conventions are interpreted, negotiated, and otherwise contested. In this article, I build on Young’s arguments for a social connection model of responsibility by applying it to a situation where a forceful response to violence might be justified. I juxtapose Young’s position with the emerging international standard called ‘the responsibility to protect’ in order to suggest an account of intervention for global governance relations. (shrink)

Is it necessary and is it possible to develop and justify a meaningful concept of women’s solidarity? In this contribution, I will answer both of these questions in the affirmative. Starting by developing a concept of solidarity, I then move on to discussing the intricate question of a consistent and meaningful concept of ‘woman’. After suggesting a solution to the semantic as well as ontological problems, I turn to the idea of collective experiences of oppression as a possible basis or (...) at least a starting point for women’s solidarity. The idea of collective experiences has tobe enriched, however, by referring to the idea of political imagination in order to demonstrate a way of providing convincing interpretations of shared experiences. In a last step, I discuss – following Habermas – the relation between solidarity and justice, since it is solely the idea of justice which can motivate as well as justify claims to solidarity. I end by having a brief look at conflicting claims of solidarity and the problem of intersectionality. (shrink)

Solidarity is a contested concept whose definition needs to be clarified, especially in the context of the recent pandemic and in a world in permanent crisis. It is necessary to review certain stages of how solidarity develops and to relate the stages to the current status of solidarity in this post-pandemic period, with the aim of establishing some lines of approach to proposals for viable bioethics in the context of a post-foundational philosophy as the present one.

COVID-19 and its social and political consequences have led to increased attention to the sometimes philosophically neglected concept of solidarity. This paper reflects the discourse on solidarity in times of COVID-19 from the viewpoint of the philosophical debate on solidarity. We argue that currently – regarding this debate – the critical potential of solidarity as a political concept is often undermined. Solidarity should rather be used as a social-diagnostic lens to focus on and criticise problematic exclusions caused by current political (...) developments. This applies especially to the cross-border and transnational dimension of political solidarity, which is often neglected in the national constrictions of political COVID-19 strategies. The paper concludes with observations on which levels and in which directions the reflection on solidarity could stimulate both the political and the philosophical debate on global crises such as COVID-19. (shrink)

Vulnerabilität und Solidarität sind in den vergangenen Jahren zu zwei Kernbegriffen der praktischen Philosophie geworden. Sie markieren nicht nur einen neuen thematischen Fokus, sondern auch eine Verschiebung theoretischer Grundannahmen, beispielsweise hinsichtlich des Verständnisses von Normativität oder dem Politischen. Innerhalb des Pragmatismus spielen beide Begriffe, bis auf Rortys Rekurs auf Solidarität, keine zentrale Rolle, obgleich die Grundintuitionen, die beiden Begriffen zugrunde liegen, eng mit dieser Strömung verbunden sind. Der Beitrag will vor dem Hintergrund dieser pragmatistischen Grundannahmen zentrale Argumentationsfiguren der Debatte über (...) Vulnerabilität und Solidarität in den pragmatistischen Theorierahmen übersetzen, um Leerstellen und Probleme des Diskurses aufzudecken und zu diskutieren. Es zeigt sich, dass der pragmatistische Zugriff in verschiedener Hinsicht Potenzial für die Klärung der beiden Begriffe hat. Impulse liegen u.a. in der Klärung des relationalen Charakters des Sozialen, dem Erfahrungsbezug und der Verschränkung der normativen und politischen Dimension. Durch eine pragmatistische Re-Konzeptualisierung kann deshalb der Diskurs über Vulnerabilität und Solidarität geschärft und damit innerhalb der praktischen Philosophie gestärkt werden. Zugleich kann damit pragmatistische Forschung in aktuelle Debatten der praktischen Philosophie stärker eingebracht werden. (shrink)

This article provides a concise overview of the history of scholarship on solidarity in Europe and North America. While recent decades have seen an increase in conceptual and scholarly interest in solidarity in North America and other parts of the Anglo-Saxon world, the concept is much more strongly anchored in Europe. Continental European politics in particular have given rise to two of the most influential traditions of solidarity, namely, socialism and Christian ethics. Solidarity has also guided important public instruments and (...) institutions in Europe. Despite the much stronger affinity of continental European societies to solidaristic thinking, we argue that solidarity has much to offer for addressing societal challenges on both sides of the Atlantic and beyond. After proposing a working definition of solidarity that highlights its utility for guiding policy and practice, we give an example of how a solidarity-based perspective can shape instruments for the governance of data use. (shrink)

In this article, I apply the concept of solidarity to collective knowledge practices in healthcare. Generally, solidarity acknowledges that people are dependent on each other in many respects, and it captures those support practices that people engage in out of concern for others in whom they recognise a relevant similarity. Drawing on the rich literature on solidarity in bioethics and beyond, this article specifically discusses the role that epistemic solidarity can play in healthcare. It thus focuses, in particular, on solidarity’s (...) relationship with justice and injustice. In this regard, it is argued (1) that justice and solidarity are two equally important and complementary values that should both be considered in healthcare practices and institutions and (2) that solidarity often arises in unjust situations and can be a means to bring about justice. I transfer these ‘general’ insights about solidarity to knowledge practices in healthcare and link them to the discussion about epistemic injustices in healthcare and how to overcome them. I argue that epistemic solidarity can play an important role in overcoming epistemic injustices as well as—and independently from its contribution to justice—in knowledge production in medicine more generally. To demonstrate how epistemic solidarity can add to our understanding of collective knowledge practices, I discuss two examples: patients sharing their medical data for research purposes and healthcare professionals’ engagement with patients to better understand their afflictions. (shrink)

This paper examines Nuti’s accounts of structural injustice and historical injustice in the light of a political dilemma that confronted Young’s work on structure injustice. The dilemma emerges from a paradox that can be stated simply: justly addressing structural injustice would require that those subject to structural injustice enjoy the kind of privileged position of decision-making power that their being subject to structural injustice denies them. The dilemma thus concerns how to justly address structural injustice. I argue that Nuti’s account (...) is currently unable to provide an adequate theorization of how to address this dilemma because it lacks an account of political solidarity, but also that her account provides important resources for dissolving a dispute between two competing theories of solidarity in a way that facilitates the articulation of an account of political solidarity that is adequate to addressing the political dilemma. (shrink)

Solidarity has been a key topic for feminist thinkers of different times, schools and places. More than other disciplines, feminist theorists have dwelled upon the role of theory in the achievement of political and social goals. Calls for global sisterhood have incited proliferating debates as to the basis for solidarity between women and feminists. Theoretical disputes arising from the spread of deconstructionist ideas since the 1990s have led to a practical perplexity as to how to set feminist political goals if (...) the category of woman is no longer straightforward. This article looks at how expectations for practical usefulness have resonated in feminist debates on solidarity and, drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s ideas of textuality and interpretation, reflects on the process of interaction between feminist theory and feminism as a social movement. It argues that in spite of the apparent lack of unanimity, or even outright hostility, that theoretical controversies might seem to indicate, the multiplicity of viewpoints and positions that various feminist theories collectively entail is a necessary vehicle for creating more solidarity between women in and outside academia in the contemporary world. Looking towards the future of feminist theory, the article invokes the metaphor of a sisterhood of letters to reflect on the value of shared intellectual endeavour in building solidarities between women of different social, racial, religious and cultural backgrounds. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with Gadamer’s reflections on solidarity and practice as found in several of his later writings. While Gadamer offers a robust explanation of practice, practical reason, and how both are operative in solidarities, his investigations of solidarity are in no way systematic. He does, however, distinguish two aspects of solidarity, viz. what one might call “natural solidarity” and “avowed solidarity”. In contrast to natural solidarities, avowed solidarities require an intentional decision and commitment to act with others for (...) a common cause. Since Gadamer’s writings on solidarity are more sketches than detailed treatises, we will bring his work into dialogue with feminist and political philosopher Sally Scholz. Scholz has devoted significant research to the concept of political solidarity. Like Gadamer, Scholz too is concerned with how we engage natural others and how our present practices harm and exploit them. By bringing Scholz’s and Gadamer’s work into dialogue, we gain a better understanding of different facets and types of solidarity, how they interrelate and influence one other, and how their interrelations might help to effect positive social and political changes for all who inhabit this world. (shrink)

This paper builds on previous research about the potential downsides of food sovereignty activism in relatively wealthy societies by developing a three-part taxonomy of harms that may arise in such contexts. These are direct opposition, false equivalence, and diluted goals and methods. While this paper provides reasons to resist complacency about wealthy-world food sovereignty, we are optimistic about the potential for food sovereignty in wealthy societies, and we conclude by describing how wealthy-world food sovereignty can be a location of either (...) transnational solidarity or nonharmful forms of cooptation. (shrink)

We argue that an unqualified use of the term solidarity in public health is not only equivocal but problematic toward the ends of public health. The term may be deployed normatively by public health advocates to strengthen the bonds among public health practitioners and refer to an ideal society in which the importance of interdependence among members ought to be acknowledged throughout the polity. We propose an important distinction between partisan solidarity and societal solidarity. Because any moralized belief in a (...) vision of a broad societal solidarity will be a contested political ideal, political reality would limit solidarity based on such a vision to partisan solidarity. An idealized vision of societal solidarity is simply not politically feasible in pluralistic, liberal, democratic societies. However, although societal solidarity is unlikely with respect to any particular policy, it might be hoped for with respect to constitutional procedures that provide boundaries for the agon of the political process. We suggest that moralizing assertions of a solidaristic ideal in a pluralistic society might be counterproductive to generating the political support necessary for public health per se and establishing legitimate public health policy. A pragmatic political approach would be for public health advocates to generate sufficient strong political support for those public health policies that are most amenable to the political and social realities of a time and place. (shrink)

Reshaping our methodological research tools for adequately capturing injustice and domination has been a central aspiration of feminist philosophy and social epistemology in recent years. There has been an increasingly empirical turn in recent feminist and political theorization, engaging with case studies and the challenges arising from conducting research in solidarity with unequal partners. I argue that these challenges cannot be resolved by merely adopting a norm and stance of deference to those in the struggle for justice. To conduct philosophical (...) research in an engaged and solidaristic manner, I suggest that deference be supplemented by three methodological and normative principles: 1) epistemic humility, 2) accountability, and 3) co-producing knowledge. I situate these principles within contemporary philosophical work on solidarity, and show how they might help confront power imbalances and other methodological hazards that arise when conducting research in solidarity with others. I arrive at these principles in part by critically reflecting on my own attempt to conduct research in solidarity with women’s rights activists in Senegal. (shrink)

n this paper, I argue that political solidarity is important to justice. At its core, political solidarity is a relational concept. To be in a relation of political solidarity, is to be in a relation of connection or unity with one’s fellow citizens. I argue that fellow citizens can be said to stand in such a relation when they have attitudes of collective identification, mutual respect, mutual trust, and mutual support and loyalty toward one another. I argue that political solidarity, (...) so conceived, is an integral element of a theory of justice. I argue that there are distinctly social bases for political solidarity and that justice requires that we promote these. Furthermore, as an example of the sort of social and political arrangements that might encourage political solidarity, I discuss Canada’s response to the recent H1N1 pandemic and the failings of this response with respect to members of the Aboriginal community within Canada. I argue that ensuring that members of the Aboriginal community had equal access to the goods they needed to protect themselves against H1N1 infection would have promoted relations of political solidarity and, in turn, would have promoted justice more effectively. (shrink)

Solidarity is a significant but poorly understood feature of political life. It is typically conceived, in “associative and teleological” terms, as working together for common political aims. But this conception misses the fact that solidarity requires individuals to will collective ends despite incompletely shared interests. Careful consideration of these elements reveals four “dynamics of solidarity”: its characteristic duties, the durability of commitments made in solidarity, the deference it involves, and its effects over time on agents’ habits and capacities. In this (...) article I describe these dynamics, first contrasting solidarity-given duties with duties of beneficence, justice, and loyalty. These contrasts lay bare the distinctive durability of solidarity, which differs from both the liberal’s commitment to justice and the loyalist’s commitment to the group. I then discuss deference, a feature of solidarity that has implications for individual engagement in political life more generally. Finally, I discuss the effects of solidarity on agents’ intellectual and physical capacities. I conclude by drawing out implications of these dynamics, challenging Tommie Shelby’s influential conception and justification of black solidarity and buttressing Philip Soper’s rejection of the Principle of Autonomy. (shrink)

This article examines the ways in which the self-responsibilized individualism underpinning contemporary concepts of the ideal European citizen, on the one hand (Frericks, 2014), and the inequalities and anti-democratic politics that characterize contemporary neoliberal capitalism, on the other, are co-constituent elements in creating an antipathy to forms of solidarity that are affective as opposed to calculative. The active citizenship framework lacks a full appreciation of the interdependency of the human condition and is antithetical to universalistic, affectively-led forms of solidarity. The (...) deep relationality that is endemic to both social production and reproduction, and that impels an affective, morally-led form of solidarity needs to be recognized academically and intellectually, and politically sustained, if we are to move beyond a narrow, calculative, self-interested vision of solidarity in Europe. (shrink)

Maternal health has become a top global priority. In contrast to the decline of the maternal subject (Stephens, 2011), and despite previous evidence that maternal health has struggled to find a place on the global policy agenda (Shiffman and Smith, 2007), it is now clear that the promotion of health for mothers and children is a staple of both government and private donor commitments. On humanitarian grounds, it makes sense to focus on maternal health and survival in the Global South. (...) Death related to pregnancy or childbirth is a disheartening example of needless suffering. But beyond the initial impulse to reduce suffering, what motivates and/or requires action for addressing injustice in the form of distributional inequities for maternal and reproductive health? In this article, I make a case for the necessity and validity of transnational cooperation to address maternal mortality and morbidity in the Global South. The first component of my argument addresses the transnational elements of both global interconnectedness and responsibility to act. These elements are drawn from Iris Marion Young’s philosophical justification for North-South responsibility-taking. The second component of my argument adds the concept of affective solidarity to that of transnational responsibility. My argument in this section draws from Iris Marion Young’s earlier work on identity (Young, 1990) and embodiment (Young, 1984) and expands the analysis of affective solidarity as a form of both embodiment and political commitment in order to explain the mechanism for transnational connection and understanding. And the final component of my argument explains how both of these elements – transnational responsibility and affective solidarity – support a theory of transnational maternal feminism. (shrink)

This paper is the introduction to a collection I guest-edited called Positive Duties to Wild Animals. The collection contains single-authored contributions from Catia Faria, Josh Milburn, Eze Paez, and Jeff Sebo; and co-authored contributions from Mara-Daria Cojocaru and Alasdair Cochrane, and Oscar Horta and Dayrón Terán. It was published as a special issue of Ethics, Policy and Environment.

The complexities of how justice comes to be realized, and by which agents, is a relatively neglected element in contemporary theories of justice. This has left several crucial questions about agency and justice undertheorized, such as why some particular agents are responsible for realizing justice, how their contribution towards realizing justice should be understood, and what role agents such as activists and community leaders play in realizing justice. We aim to contribute towards a better understanding of the landscape of these (...) kinds of questions. First, we argue that theorists should distinguish between (i) agents who are responsible for realizing justice, but not committed to it, (ii) agents who are not responsible for realizing justice, but who are committed to it, and (iii) agents who are both responsible for and committed to realizing justice. Second, we discuss how to incorporate agents of justice more robustly into theorizing about justice. (shrink)

This article aims to refute the “incompatibility thesis” that nationalism is incompatible with transnational feminist solidarity, as it fosters exclusionary practices, xenophobia, and racism among feminists with conflicting nationalist aspirations. I examine the plausibility of the incompatibility thesis by focusing on the controversy regarding just reparation for Second World War “comfort women,” which is still unresolved. The Korean Council at the center of this controversy, which advocates for the rights of Korean former comfort women, has been criticized for its strident (...) nationalism and held responsible for the stalemate. Consequently, the case of comfort women has been thought to exemplify the incompatibility thesis. I argue against this common feminist perception in three ways: first, those who subscribe to the incompatibility thesis have misinterpreted facts surrounding the issue; second, the Korean Council's nationalism is a version of “polycentric nationalism,” which avoids the problems of essentialist nationalism at the center of feminist concerns; and, third, transnational feminist solidarity is predicated on the idea of oppressed/marginalized women's epistemic privilege and enjoins that feminists respect oppressed/marginalized women's epistemic privilege. To the extent that oppressed/marginalized women's voices are expressed in nationalist terms, I argue that feminists committed to transnational feminist solidarity must accommodate their nationalism. (shrink)

Although previous treatments of affective injustice have identified some particular types of affective injustice, the general concept of affective injustice remains unclear. This article proposes a novel articulation of this general concept, according to which affective injustice is defined as a state in which individuals or groups are deprived of “affective goods” which are owed to them. On this basis, I sketch an approach to the philosophical investigation of affective injustice that begins by establishing which affective goods are fundamental, and (...) then considers which subsidiary goods—such as freedoms, resources, opportunities, and forms of recognition—may be necessary for the provision of those fundamental affective goods. Drawing from and developing ideas in the extant literature, I argue that two such fundamental affective goods include subjective well-being and emotional aptness. I then show that by analyzing deprivations of the subsidiary goods that enable a person to pursue and attain subjective well-being and emotional aptness, it is possible to shed new light on the cases of affective injustice that have been described in the extant literature, while also identifying other kinds of cases that have not been theorized to the same extent. (shrink)

This paper reclaims the concept of solidarity for democratic theory. It does this by proposing a theory of solidarity as social involvement that is construed through the integration of three better known conceptions of solidarity that have played an influential role in the political thought of the last two centuries. The paper begins by explaining why solidarity should receive more sustained attention from political theorists with an interest in democracy, and proceeds by presenting two indispensability arguments. Section three outlines the (...) three rival conceptions of solidarity and contends that whilst individually incomplete, each provides an important insight, so that a fuller and more satisfying conception of solidarity can be developed by weaving together some features of these three conceptions. This task is undertaken in section four, which introduces the theory of solidarity as social involvement, defining solidarity in terms of acting-for and acting-with. Section five briefly discusses some of its potential implications for democratic theory, before bringing the article to a close. (shrink)

In der aktuellen philosophischen Solidaritätsdebatte wird Solidarität meist in der systematischen Gegenüberstellung von sozialer und politischer Solidarität verstanden. Gegen diese klassische Einteilung entwickelt der Beitrag ein Verständnis radikaler Solidarität – Solidarität ist entweder eine radikale politische Praxis oder sie ist gar keine Solidarität. Zu diesem Zweck wird im Anschluss an die Kritische Theorie Stephan Lessenichs und Christoph Menkes eine Kritik des Konzepts der sozialen Solidarität entfaltet: Der Begriff der sozialen Solidarität versteht unter Solidarität eine soziale Praxis unter Gleichen und Ähnlichen, (...) in der bestehende soziale Herrschaftsstrukturen und Ausschlussmechanismen stabilisiert und verstärkt werden. Soziale Solidarität wird auf dieser Grundlage in ihrem widersprüchlichen und pathologischen Charakter herausgearbeitet. Darauf aufbauend wird dafür plädiert, Solidarität von Anfang an als radikale Praxis der Politisierung und Transformation der in modernen, kapitalistischen Gesellschaften herrschenden Machtformen und Gewaltdynamiken zu begreifen. Dies wird durch eine systematische Zusammenschau der Kritischen Theorie mit José Medinas Konzeption eines radikalen Pragmatismus geleistet, in deren Rahmen der Begriff der radikalen Solidarität vorgeschlagen wird. Im Zentrum der Idee radikaler Solidarität steht dabei die Überbrückung und gleichzeitige Bewahrung von gesellschaftlichen Differenzen: Solidarität kann als soziale Praxis stets nur zwischen Subjektpositionen radikaler Differenz verwirklicht werden. Ziel radikaler solidarischer Praktiken ist es, die Erfahrungen und Perspektiven der Ausgeschlossenen und Unterdrückten, die als radikal anders und different konstruiert werden, auf widerständige Weise hörbar und damit die radikale Pluralität gesellschaftlicher Standpunkte und Subjektivitäten sichtbar zu machen. Solidarität geht, so verstanden, notwendig von der Vulnerabilität der Subalternen und Marginalisierten aus und zielt auf die grundlegende Kritik und Veränderung des sozialen status quo. (shrink)

Volume 16, Issue 1, April 2020, Page 99-104.

ABSTRACT‘Solidarity’ is a key concept in political movements and usually bears on matters of labour, health and social justice. As such, it is essential in the reproduction and transformation of communities that support their members and protect their interests. It is sometimes overlooked that interspecies solidarity already pertains with a number of domesticated animals, and that people are willing to carry substantial emotional, financial and social burdens to benefit them. There has been even more reluctance to acknowledge wild animals as (...) fellow members of our political communities with whom we might stand in solidarity. The purpose of this paper is to propose that solidaristic relations with certain wild animals are not only possible, but also already exist in some contexts. It explores three different understandings of solidarity, and in probing to what extent they can be applied to wild animals, it identifies some important different roles they can play in ‘animal politics’, and shows how they can help us reconceive our communities in less anthropocentric terms. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis symposium brings together normative and empirical scholars in dialogue on Brooke Ackerly’s innovative and compelling recent monograph, Just Responsibility. Contributors discuss the book’s distinctive grounded normative theory methodology, its arguments for how individuals can take appropriate responsibility for global structural injustices, and its potential for practical impact.

While it is largely agreed upon that solidarity is a kind of unity among persons, this agreement is short-lived – for if solidarity involves unity, what kind of unity is this? That is, does solidarity coalesce around shared identity or simply fellow-feeling? Shared action or fate? Or is solidarity merely a matter of commitment to a particular cause to achieve certain ends? Below, I look to examples of Mutual Aid to reject a piece-meal model of solidarity (where solidarity is this (...) but not that) in favor of a more pluralistic account. The notion of solidarity need not be constrained, all or nothing, by a specific strain of interpretation. Instead, we should recognize that solidarity is a matter of variety and degree. (shrink)

In my thesis, I consider Jean Harvey’s account of moral solidarity. Harvey claims that solidarity only occurs between people who share a personal relationship. I raise a concern regarding the limited scope of Harvey’s account of moral solidarity. I challenge the view that one cannot extend the concerns they have for a friend experiencing injustice to a stranger who is also experiencing the same injustice. In order to address this concern and defend Harvey’s account of solidarity, I offer a friendly (...) amendment to her account. By drawing on Samuel Scheffler’s account of relational egalitarianism, and in light of the relationships citizens may share with one another, I expand the types of relationships that should be considered solidarity under an account such as Harvey’s My account thus defends a more expansive view of solidarity than that of Harvey. (shrink)

Collective intentionality is one of the most fundamental notions in social ontology. However, it is often thought to refer to a capacity which does not presuppose the existence of any other social facts. This chapter critically examines this view from the perspective of one specific theory of collective intentionality, the theory of Margaret Gilbert. On the basis of Gilbert’s arguments, the chapter claims that collective intentionality is a highly contingent achievement of complex social practices and, thus, not a basic social (...) phenomenon. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, Gilbert’s thesis that certain kinds of collective intentionality presuppose joint normative commitments is introduced. Second, it is argued that, on this view, individual commitments can only constitute the relevant kinds of collective intentional states if there are socially shared “principles of membership” that connect the force of individual commitments to a shared content. Third, it is shown that strong collective intentionality depends on the practical acceptance of shared norms and on the establishment of authority relations through mutual recognition. (shrink)

This dissertation addresses the question of how to reconceptualize “women” in order to do a more intersectional feminism. Intersectionality—the idea that gender, race, class, sexuality, and so on operate not as separate entities but as mutually constructing phenomena—has become a gold standard in contemporary feminist scholarship. In particular, intersectionality has achieved success in showing that the old conception of women as a single, uniform concept marginalizes women and others who exist at the intersecting axes of multiple oppressions (e.g., women of (...) color, women in the global South, working-class women, and/or queer and trans people), and thus, demonstrating the need to develop a new way of conceptualizing women. However, the question of what such a new conception would be remains unanswered. Specifically, if feminist theory today is to destabilize the old notion of “women” that relegates multiply oppressed women to the margin of feminism, and yet still needs to use some notion of “women” to critically analyze how the social structure of sexist oppression operates to subordinate women and to dismantle this oppression, how should the concept “women” be reformulated? In this dissertation, I argue that we need to understand women as a concept that is open to constant redefinition, which is socio-historically situated in the actualities of oppression. This is what I refer to as the “situated redefinition” model of women, which is formulated in more detail as follows: -/- The Situated Redefinition Model of Women (SR) – The concept “women” should be always open to being redefined in a way that it could better serve political goals grounded in the actual, daily lives of the marginalized. That is, “women” should be always open to new meanings and provisional definitions that the marginalized would find more useful to achieve political goals, which grow out of their concrete experiences in the current intersecting structures of oppression. -/- My central argument is that we need to understand the concept “women” according to the situated redefinition model, in order to employ this concept for doing intersectional feminism. To support this thesis, the dissertation is divided into two main parts. By engaging with the intersectionality literature, critical race feminisms, Asian/American feminisms, and recent critiques of intersectionality, the first part of the dissertation elucidates what exactly it means for feminism to be more “intersectional.” The second part develops the situated redefinition model and articulates why this model is needed to do intersectional feminism, drawing on the social/political philosophy literature on non-ideal theory, postmodern discussions of universality, and feminist discussions of identity politics. Broadly, this dissertation seeks to shed new light on how we understand and use the concept women for feminist ends. My conceptual model offers a way for feminist scholar-activists to subvert the essentialist/exclusionary notion of “women” without abandoning altogether feminist-political deployments of the concept “women” for the purpose of ending sexist and intersecting oppressions. (shrink)