There is no single ancient Greek word in the surviving fragments and testimonies of Hellenistic philosophy that is directly translatable by the term ‘intuition’. But if we are in search of intuitions in the context of Hellenistic epistemology, it could be said that both the Stoics and the sceptics made use of them in their philosophical debates; for intuitions seem to be closely connected with the formation of conceptions, which were abundantly used by all Hellenistic philosophers. It is important to (...) understand, though, that the Stoics’ and the sceptics’ attitude towards the epistemic status of intuitions would greatly differ: The Stoics would explain intuitions by invoking a rational capacity of human beings, which based on experience would put them in touch with the reality of things, so that their intuitions could be thought of as somehow rationally admissible. The sceptics, on the other hand, would suggest that intuitions guide our everyday life merely on the basis of our previous experiences, and thus their intuitions could be regarded as empirically justified, although they would not guarantee any access to how things actually are. (shrink)

This text analyzes Diogenianus’ testimony (apud Eus., Praep. Ev. VI 8) as a source for Chrysippus’ reply to an objection leveled against Stoic Fate-determinism. I argue that the objection addressed by Chrysippus in the testimony bears relation to the Idle Argument as reported by both Cicero and Origen but, unlike the Idle Argument, deals with the notions of “that which depends on us” (τὸ παρ’ ἡμᾶς), “that which proceeds from us” (τὸ ἐξ ἡμῶν), and the issue of accountability.