In his writings on teaching, Isreal Scheffler has argued for the close connection between teaching and reason, an argument which can be summarized by, Teaching is. . an initiation into open rational discussion. This essay examines Schefflier's thesis in the light of criticisms drawn from feminist writings on teaching. It is argued that Scheffler's thesis is consistent with a view of teaching in which it can be achieved through kindness, good example and the efficacy of unconscious imitation, characteristics of the (...) private, reproductive processes typical of women. It is then argued that Scheffler's concept of teaching is compatible with views of education that try to do justice to both reason and emotion, mind and feeling. (shrink)

Intellectual virtues like open-mindedness, clarity, intellectual honesty and the willingness to participate in rational discussions, are conceived as important aims of education. In this paper an attempt is made to clarify the specific nature of intellectual virtues. Firstly, the intellectual virtues are systematically compared with moral virtues. The upshot is that considering a trait of character to be an intellectual virtue implies assuming that such a trait can be derived from, or is a specification of, the cardinal virtue of concern (...) and respect for truth. Secondly, several (possible) misconceptions of intellectual virtues are avoided by making the required distinctions. For example, it is argued that our concept of an intellectual virtue should not be confused with a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness. (shrink)

In his recent work in social epistemology, Alvin Goldman argues that truth is the fundamental epistemic end of education, and that critical thinking is of merely instrumental value with respect to that fundamental end. He also argues that there is a central place for testimony and trust in the classroom, and an educational danger in over‐emphasizing the fostering of students’ critical thinking. In this paper I take issue with these claims, and argue that (1) critical thinking is a fundamental end (...) of education, independently of its instrumental tie to truth, and (2) it is critical thinking, rather than testimony and trust, that is educationally basic. (shrink)

Recent work in epistemology has focused increasingly on the social dimensions of knowledge and inquiry. Education is one important social arena in which knowledge plays a leading role, and in which knowledge-claims are presented, analyzed, evaluated, and transmitted. Philosophers of education have long attended to the epistemological issues raised by the theory and practice of education . While historically philosophical issues concerning education were treated alongside other philosophical issues, in recent times the former set of issues have been largely neglected (...) by philosophers working in the core areas of the discipline. Interestingly, the rise of social epistemology has been accompanied by a renewed interest by mainstream philosophers in philosophical questions concerning education. Whether or not this accompaniment is accidental, or is legitimately explainable in terms of broad intellectual, philosophical, or social/political currents and movements, I will not endeavor to address here. The increasing respectability of and philosophical interest in both social epistemology and philosophy of education are in any case salutary developments, each signaling both a broadening of the set of interests and issues deemed legitimate by practitioners of the parent discipline, and an increased willingness to take seriously the philosophical problems raised by the ubiquitous social/communal effort to transmit/transform culture by way of education. (shrink)

Compassion is often understood as central to nursing and as important to ensure quality nursing and healthcare. In recent years, there has been a focus on strategies in nursing education to ensure compassionate nurses. However, it is not always clear how the concept of compassion is understood. Theoretical conceptualisations that lie behind various understandings of compassion have consequences for how we approach compassion in nursing education. We present some ways in which compassion is often understood, their philosophical underpinnings and the (...) consequences these understandings can have for nursing education. We argue that it is useful for nursing education to understand compassion as a cognitive emotion and discuss how such an understanding can inform educational approaches to compassion. (shrink)

In his writings on teaching, Isreal Scheffler has argued for the close connection between teaching and reason, an argument which can be summarized by, “Teaching is.. an initiation into open rational discussion.” This essay examines Schefflier's thesis in the light of criticisms drawn from feminist writings on teaching. It is argued that Scheffler's thesis is consistent with a view of teaching in which it can be achieved through “kindness, good example and the efficacy of unconscious imitation,” characteristics of the private, (...) reproductive processes typical of women. It is then argued that Scheffler's concept of teaching is compatible with views of education that try to do justice to both reason and emotion, mind and feeling. (shrink)

Israel Scheffler's "In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions" (1977, 1991) extends earlier analyses of the role of emotions in rational undertakings. It shows that some emotions – "rational passions," "perceptive feelings," "theoretical imagination" and "cognitive emotions" – are essentially cognitive in origin and may serve cognitive purposes. Though it analyszes the interplay of emotion and cognition, cognition is the focus and the emotions that are examined revolve about it. This prompts us to wonder about the effect of a "Copernican revolution." (...) If emotion were to be put in the center, would there also be cognitions which are essentially emotional in origin and/or serve emotional purposes? Here we explore the possibility of "informed expression," "emotional cognizance" and "emotional cognitions," drawing primarily from aesthetic, religious, spiritual, and ethical experience. (shrink)

Inconsistencies in science take several forms. Some occur at the level of substantive claims about the world. Others occur at the level of methodology, and take the form of dilemmas, or cases of conflicting epistemic or cognitive values. In this article, I discuss how methodological dilemmas arise. I then consider how scientists resolve them. There are strong grounds for thinking that emotional judgement plays an important role in resolving methodological dilemmas. Lastly, I discuss whether and under what conditions this reliance (...) on emotional judgement is rationally warranted. I consider two possible mechanisms, based on coherence and induction, able to ensure that scientists’ emotional responses to methodological dilemmas are rationally warranted. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 40.4 (2006) 1-20 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]"This-with-That": A Dialectical Approach to Teaching for Musical ImaginationEstelle R. JorgensenAmong the various approaches to music education, my dialectical and epistemological view offers a way of thinking about music and education and deciding how to go forward in teaching and learning music. 1 In this article I show how this particular philosophical perspective can play out in (...) teaching for the development of musical imagination in a particular musical piece, in particular, Johannes Brahms's Intermezzo, op. 118, no. 2. Three questions lie at the center of this analysis: What is meant by my dialectical approach? 2 How is musical imagination implicated, for example, in a performer's reading of this Intermezzo? How ought one to teach for the development of musical imagination?My response to the first of this trio of questions is predicated on my previous writing, most recently in Transforming Music Education and an essay, "Four Philosophical Models of the Relationship of Theory and Practice." 3 My response to the second applies Mary Reichling's model of images of imagination to a reflection on my approach to this Brahms Intermezzo—a piece I have played over a musical lifetime—with reference to a few of its more obvious features. 4 And my response to the third builds on my extension of Vernon Howard's analysis of learning in Transforming Music Education by drawing on Alfred North Whitehead's elegant model of teaching and learning formulated almost a century ago in his The Aims of Education and Other Essays, again with reference to the self-same piece. 5 In addressing these questions, I show how my dialectical approach can work practically and how the various tensions between aspects of imagination can play out in opposite, even paradoxical, modes of teaching for musical imagination. [End Page 1]What Is Meant by My Dialectical Approach?In choosing a "this-with-that" approach rather than a both/and synthesis or either/or approach to the choices between alternatives in music education, I recognize that in the phenomenal world, educational decisions (as with decisions in other areas of life) are often difficult to arrive at and problematic in their outcomes. I see dialectics as seepages and tensions that arise between alternatives viewed comparatively. 6 These alternatives are not always logically compatible, equally feasible, or easily reconcilable. Rather, resolutions are made on the basis of incomplete information, consequences that flow from decisions are often unexpected, some things are easier to meld than others, and constituent value judgments are sometimes dissonant, even impossible, to reconcile logically and practically. My interest is in describing the epistemological quandaries in which musician-teachers and their students sometimes find themselves practically speaking. I do not seek a "one-size-fits-all" approach because it is impossible to realize practically even if it could be shown to be desirable. Music instruction takes place in the phenomenal world—a world of sometimes messy or fuzzy categories in which the teacher's and student's interests often lie at the margins, where one thing seems to become another 7 —and I seek to describe my own approach to tackling the sorts of practical dilemmas in which I find myself as teacher and student. As such, I am preoccupied with the question, How does one decide what to do as a music teacher or learner?For me, the best angle from which to address this question has been from a dialectical perspective. I came to this position as I reflected on my experience as a music teacher. 8 Things in the phenomenal world were never as simple as the theoretical models upon which I drew supposed. I was often faced with choices, and these choices were sometimes easily made and sometimes not. This practical experience resonated with that of others on a similar journey. For example, I. A. Richards remarks that Socrates enjoyed the friendship of those who were able to see both the "one-and-the-many... (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists sometimes categorize emotions like surprise and curiosity as specifically epistemic. Is there some reasonably unified and interesting class of emotions here? If so, what unifies it? This paper proposes and defends an evaluative account of epistemic emotions: what it is to be an epistemic emotion is to have fittingness conditions that distinctively involve some epistemic evaluation. We argue that this view has significant advantages over alternative proposals and is a promising way to identify a limited and interesting (...) class of emotions. (shrink)

In this paper, I forge a strong educational bond between opera and the humanities: opera as liberal education, not just additional to or exemplary of. After rehearsing the well-known present-day criticisms of liberal education, I first make the diagnosis that the trouble with liberal education as teaching and learning the humanities is not so much its theoretical justification as its practical implementation. To neutralize the criticisms and to solve the problem of how to practically realize a theoretically defensible goal, my (...) proposal is, next, to exploit opera as the vehicle of liberal education. Finally, I detail my proposal, offering suggestions about the way opera as liberal education can function on the curriculum. (shrink)

Israel Scheffler views moral education as having two major objectives: inculcating minimum standards of decent conduct and developing rationality in moral deliberation and judgment. The latter is to be achieved by engaging students in discussions of moral issues in such a way that they come to appreciate and follow standards of rational deliberation and judgment – standards that Scheffler explicates primarily in terms of impartiality. This paper argues that the conception of rational moral deliberation and discussion underlying Scheffler's approach to (...) moral education is inadequate, and suggests an alternative conception that gives far more prominence to the problem of interpreting the meaning of substantive moral concepts and determining how they apply to particular cases. (shrink)

Controversial view agnosticism is the thesis that we are rationally obligated to withhold judgment about a large portion of our beliefs in controversial subject areas, such as philosophy, religion, morality and politics. Given that one’s social identity is in no small part a function of one’s positive commitments in controversial areas, CVA has unsurprisingly been regarded as objectionably ‘spineless.’ That said, CVA seems like an unavoidable consequence of a prominent view in the epistemology of disagreement—conformism—according to which the rational response (...) to discovering that someone you identify as an epistemic peer or expert about p disagrees with you vis-à-vis p is to withhold judgment. This paper proposes a novel way to maintain the core conciliatory insight without devolving into an agnosticism that is objectionably spineless. The approach offered takes as a starting point the observation that–for reasons that will be made clear—the contemporary debate has bypassed the issue of the reasonableness of maintaining, rather than giving up, representational states weaker than belief in controversial areas. The new position developed and defended here explores this overlooked space; what results is a kind of controversial view. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the reasons for which we may consider wonder an epistemic emotion. I defend the thesis for which a specific type of wonder is aporia-based and that since it is aporia-based, this wonder is epistemic. The epistemic wonder is thus an interrogating wonder which plays the epistemic function of motivation to questioning in processes of inquiry. I first introduce the contemporary debate on epistemic emotions, and then I analyze the characteristics that make of wonder an epistemic (...) emotion, from a data-based, phenomenological, and conceptual perspective. (shrink)

In this paper I ask how educational researchers can believe the subjective perceptions of qualitative participant-observers given the concern for objectivity and generalisability of experimental research in the behavioural and social sciences. I critique the most common answer to this question within the educational research community, which posits the existence of two (or more) equally legitimate epistemological paradigms—positivism and constructivism—and offer an alternative that places a priority in educational research on understanding the purposes and meanings humans attribute to educational practices. (...) Only within the context of what I call a transcendent view from somewhere—higher ideals that govern human activities—can we make sense of quantitative as well as qualitative research findings. (shrink)

In this paper I ask how educational researchers can believe the subjective perceptions of qualitative participant-observers given the concern for objectivity and generalisability of experimental research in the behavioural and social sciences. I critique the most common answer to this question within the educational research community, which posits the existence of two (or more) equally legitimate epistemological paradigms—positivism and constructivism—and offer an alternative that places a priority in educational research on understanding the purposes and meanings humans attribute to educational practices. (...) Only within the context of what I call a transcendent view from somewhere—higher ideals that govern human activities—can we make sense of quantitative as well as qualitative research findings. (shrink)

Of what use is philosophy to education? What do philosophical purposes, skills, and attitudes bring to educational practice? What might they accomplish? My concern in this paper is not with any particular set of philosophical doctrines, nor am I inquiring after the educational implications of this or that philosophical viewpoint. Rather, my questions pertain to philosophical activity itself. The questions are thus quite general and they are certainly not new. But they take on special urgency when viewed in the perspective (...) of current trends that are likely to affect our future circumstances of life and our operative conceptions of education. (shrink)

At first glance, happiness and objectivity seem to have little in common. I claim, however, that subjective and eudaimonic happiness promotes arguer objectivity. To support my claim, I focus on connections between happiness, social intelligence, and intellectual virtue. After addressing objections concerning unhappy objective and happy unobjective arguers, I conclude that communities should value happiness in argumentative contexts and use happiness as an indicator of their capacity for objective argumentation.

Cet article se base sur des résultats d’enquête récents montrant que, chez des adolescents marocains âgés de dix à dix-huit ans, les manifestations de pensée critique dialogique se si-tuent majoritairement dans une « perspective épistémologique » appelée « relativisme » par un modèle développemental élaboré dans les quinze dernières années avec la méthode de la théorie ancrée. Pour comprendre ces résultats de recherche, qui contrastent avec ceux obte-nus auprès d’adolescents québécois et français appartenant aux mêmes groupes d’âge, nous décrivons, dans (...) un premier temps, le modèle développemental dans lequel ils prennent sens. Nous illustrons ensuite les manifestations de « perspective épistémologique relativiste » chez les adolescents marocains à l’aide d’extraits de verbatim. Les élèves ont tendance à se décen-trer de leur vécu personnel, à se représenter le point de vue d’autrui en général et à co-construire des points de vue convergents avec les pairs. Dans un deuxième temps, prenant appui sur une approche de la représentation sociale en tant que « scène », et sur la littérature touchant aux rôles des aînés dans les sociétés africaines, nous éclairons ces résultats de re-cherche par l’analyse d’une représentation sociale fréquemment mobilisée par les jeunes Ma-rocains interviewés : celle de la hiérarchie des âges et du devoir d’écoute envers les plus âgés. L’analyse de cette « scène » met en lumière des attitudes sociales inculquées aux adolescents en contexte culturel marocain, susceptibles de favoriser le développement d’une « perspective épistémologique relativiste » en matière de pensée critique dialogique. (shrink)