Ferdinand Pöhlmann argues that a sense of one’s own basic abilities to move is a constitutive condition on the ability to perceive the world spatially. This constitutive relation explains why egocentric spatial representation is to be regarded as a kind of self-representation. In arguing for these claims, conceptual as well as empirical questions are discussed and an overview of accounts that take action as a constitutive condition on spatial representation is given. The picture that emerges is linked to the phenomenological (...) (Scheler) as well as to the analytic (Evans) tradition in the Philosophy of Mind.​. (shrink)

In this article, I address problems associated with ‘Modernity’ and those encountered at the impasse of post-modernity and the newly named phenomenon of ‘post-secularism’. I consider more specifically what I call ‘moral emotions’ or essentially interpersonal emotions can tell us about who we are as persons, and what they tell us about our experience and concepts of freedom, normativity, power, and critique. The moral emotions, and retrieving the evidence of the ‘heart’, point to the possibility of contributing to the social (...) imaginary of the Modern and its post-modern variants, playing a significant role in shaping civic life and relations of power. (shrink)

Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler’s view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he explicitly argues that perceptions and (...) hallucinations differ in nature. Second, his version of the position is philosophically interesting in its own right. This is so primarily, though not exclusively, in virtue of the positive story he tells us about perceptual content. Third, Scheler’s case proves particularly instructive to the question of whether intentionalism and disjunctivism constitute a fundamental, unbridgeable divide. (shrink)

Šiame straipsnyje atliekama lyginamoji Maxo Schelerio ir Vosyliaus Sezemano vaizduotės sampratos analizė, parodoma, kad jų estetikoje yra atskleidžiama vaizduotės ir pasaulio fenomenų koreliacija, kuri nustato apriorinius reikalavimus vaizduotės veiklai. Pirmiausia nagrinėjama koreliacijos problema Husserlio ir Schelerio frenomenologijoje, paskui – vaizduotės samprata Schelerio filosofijoje ir galiausiai – vaizduotės samprata Sezemano estetikoje. Scheleris pabrėžė dvasinės veiklos koreliatyvų sąryšį su pasauliu. Vaizduotės sampratą jis susiejo su praktiniu buvimu pasaulyje. Sezemano estetikoje taip pat buvo svarstomas įkūnytos vaizduotės vaidmuo meninėje kūryboje ir estetinių objektų suvokime. (...) Abu autoriai teigė, kad vaizduotės sąryšį su esminiais pasaulio duoties būdais užtikrina kūniškasis vaizduotės pobūdis. Abu pripažino, kad vaizduotė yra susijusi su nesąmoningais troškimais ir vara. Abu autoriai teigė, kad vaizduotės schematizmai išreiškia pasaulio suvokimo stilių. Scheleris pažymėjo, kad vaizduotė atskleidžia esminius fenomenų raiškos aspektus ir taip grindžia abstrakcijų galimybę. Sezemanas šią tezę išplėtojo ir analizavo abstrahavimo vaidmenį ir simbolių-schemų sudarymą kūrybiniame vaizduotės procese. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a reconstruction of one of Husserl’s various anti-materialist arguments. Husserl hints at this argument in Ideas II & III where he exposes essential differences between mental and material reality (Realität). At its core, Husserl claims that mental entities by their very essence can never be in the same qualitative condition at different times. By sharp contrast, for purely material or physical entities such a cyclical development is not essentially excluded. Accordingly, I will speak of Husserl’s (...) argument from irreversibility. I argue that this argument is modal in nature, and that it can be used to make a case against materialism based on the necessary supervenience of the mental on the physical. My primary goal is to elucidate this argument, and to offer a logical reconstruction using basic modal logic and contemporary notions of supervenience. I conclude that Husserl’s argument is formally valid, and that it can even held to be sound, although the premise regarding the necessary irreversibility of the mental requires further clarification. (shrink)