Switch to: References

Citations of:

Are there insolvable moral conflicts?

, &
In Schaber, Peter (2004). Are there insolvable moral conflicts? In: Baumann, Peter; Betzler, Monika. Practical conflicts. New philosophical essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 279-294. Cambridge. pp. 279-294 (2004)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Las tensiones internas del pluralismo moral.Guillermo Lariguet - 2011 - Isegoría 44:161-184.
    En este trabajo admito como hipótesis de trabajo filosófico que el pluralismo moral podría ser una mejor opción frente al monismo moral . A partir de esta hipótesis de trabajo, caracterizo cuáles son las notas principales que definen un pluralismo —especialmente moral— de carácter «razonable». Sostengo que estas notas definitorias, que forman parte de las premisas de partida del pluralismo razonable, podrían comportar consecuencias que el propio pluralista no estaría fácilmente dispuesto a aceptar: en particular, un fuerte relativismo moral, un (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The denial of moral dilemmas as a regulative ideal.Michael Cholbi - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):268-289.
    The traditional debate about moral dilemmas concerns whether there are circumstances in which an agent is subject to two obligations that cannot both be fulfilled. Realists maintain there are. Irrealists deny this. Here I defend an alternative, methodologically-oriented position wherein the denial of genuine moral dilemmas functions as a regulative ideal for moral deliberation and practice. That is, moral inquiry and deliberation operate on the implicit assumption that there are no genuine moral dilemmas. This view is superior to both realism (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Parity, incomparability and rationally justified choice.Martijn Boot - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):75 - 92.
    This article discusses the possibility of a rationally justified choice between two options neither of which is better than the other while they are not equally good either (‘3NT’). Joseph Raz regards such options as incomparable and argues that reason cannot guide the choice between them. Ruth Chang, by contrast, tries to show that many cases of putative incomparability are instead cases of parity—a fourth value relation of comparability, in addition to the three standard value relations ‘better than’, ‘worse than’ (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations