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  1. Evidence and experimental design in sequential trials.Jan Sprenger - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):637-649.
    To what extent does the design of statistical experiments, in particular sequential trials, affect their interpretation? Should postexperimental decisions depend on the observed data alone, or should they account for the used stopping rule? Bayesians and frequentists are apparently deadlocked in their controversy over these questions. To resolve the deadlock, I suggest a three‐part strategy that combines conceptual, methodological, and decision‐theoretic arguments. This approach maintains the pre‐experimental relevance of experimental design and stopping rules but vindicates their evidential, postexperimental irrelevance. †To (...)
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  • Hypothesis Testing, “Dutch Book” Arguments, and Risk.Daniel Malinsky - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (5):917-929.
    “Dutch Book” arguments and references to gambling theorems are typical in the debate between Bayesians and scientists committed to “classical” statistical methods. These arguments have rarely convinced non-Bayesian scientists to abandon certain conventional practices, partially because many scientists feel that gambling theorems have little relevance to their research activities. In other words, scientists “don’t bet.” This article examines one attempt, by Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane, to progress beyond such apparent stalemates by connecting “Dutch Book”–type mathematical results with principles actually endorsed (...)
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  • Adjusting Inferential Thresholds to Reflect Nonepistemic Values.Kim Kaivanto & Daniel Steel - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (2):255-285.
    Many philosophers have challenged the ideal of value-free science on the grounds that social or moral values are relevant to inferential thresholds. But given this view, how precisely and to what extent should scientists adjust their inferential thresholds in light of nonepistemic values? We suggest that signal detection theory provides a useful framework for addressing this question. Moreover, this approach opens up further avenues for philosophical inquiry and has important implications for philosophical debates concerning inductive risk. For example, the signal (...)
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  • Stopping rules as experimental design.Samuel C. Fletcher - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):1-20.
    A “stopping rule” in a sequential experiment is a rule or procedure for deciding when that experiment should end. Accordingly, the “stopping rule principle” states that, in a sequential experiment, the evidential relationship between the final data and an hypothesis under consideration does not depend on the experiment’s stopping rule: the same data should yield the same evidence, regardless of which stopping rule was used. In this essay, I reconstruct and rebut five independent arguments for the SRP. Reminding oneself that (...)
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  • Measuring inconsistency in probabilistic logic: rationality postulates and Dutch book interpretation.Glauber De Bona & Marcelo Finger - 2015 - Artificial Intelligence 227 (C):140-164.
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