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  1. A Tale of Two Reds.Dena Shottenkirk - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):289-307.
    The question regarding how to characterize aesthetics has been revived with the publication of Bence Nanay’s _Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception_. This paper takes seriously Dustin Stokes’ criticisms of Nanay’s book regarding Nanay’s inability to distinguish between ordinary expert visual tasks (e.g., sorting for sock color or ornithology) and aesthetic experience. Using empirical research on gist perception and its reliance on low-level features in visual experience, I develop a theory that distinguishes expert visual tasks and aesthetic experiences by differentiating two (...)
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  • The Naïve Conception of Properties.Benjamin Schnieder - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):322-342.
    The semantic rules that govern ordinary property discourse appear to give rise to a version of Russell's antinomy. Do we therefore have an inconsistent conception of properties? This paper firstly develops a consistent conception of properties and secondly argues that we may indeed interpret ordinary property discourse as expressing the consistent conception rather than an inconsistent one.
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  • The Indeterminacy of the Distinction between Objects and Ways of Being.Julio De Rizzo - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2923-2941.
    Few if any distinctions are more easily recognisable and assented to than that between _objects_, that is, things which are some ways, and that which they are, that is, _ways for objects to be_ (‘ways of being’ for short). In this paper I present an argument designed to show that this distinction is indeterminate in the sense that the truth-conditions of predicational sentences leave open what should count as an object and a way of being. The bulk of the argument (...)
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  • A Deflationist Error Theory of Properties.Arvid Båve - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):23-59.
    I here defend a theory consisting of four claims about ‘property’ and properties, and argue that they form a coherent whole that can solve various serious problems. The claims are (1): ‘property’ is defined by the principles (PR): ‘F-ness/Being F/etc. is a property of x iff F’ and (PA): ‘F-ness/Being F/etc. is a property’; (2) the function of ‘property’ is to increase the expressive power of English, roughly by mimicking quantification into predicate position; (3) property talk should be understood at (...)
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  • Features and Bugs in Schnieder’s Theory of Properties.Arvid Båve - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-6.
    Although Benjamin Schnieder’s theory of the “ordinary conception” of properties successfully handles paradoxical properties—particularly, the property of non-self-instantiation—it fails to account for ordinary, non-pathological cases. The theory allows the inference of ‘a has the property of being F’ only given F(a) and the prior assertibility of ‘the property of being F can exist’. While this allows us to block an inference to a contradiction, it also blocks all of the non-pathological instances of the inference from ‘a is F’ to ‘a (...)
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