The periodic table is one of the best-known systems of classification in science. Because of the information it contains, it raises explanation-seeking questions. Quantum mechanical models of the behaviour of electrons may be seen as providing explanations in response to these questions. In this paper we first address the question ‘Do quantum mechanical models of atoms provide legitimate explanations?’ Because our answer is positive, our next question is ‘Are the explanations provided by quantum mechanical models of atoms mechanistic explanations?’. This (...) question is motivated by the fact that in many scientific disciplines, mechanistic explanations are abundant. Because our answer to the second question is negative, our last question is ‘What kind of explanation do quantum mechanical models of atom provide?’ By addressing these questions, we shed light on the nature of an important type of chemical explanation. (shrink)

The Periodic Table of Elements is one of the greatest achievements of the human intellect but is far from a finished work. Generations of chemists and physicists have improved on it, in light of the discovery of new elements and advancements in the domain of Quantum Mechanics. Specially, the role of the four quantum numbers that dictates the distribution of the elements throughout the Table has been clarified. However, as the Table grew older and venerable, a tradition developed that froze (...) its overall shape, obfuscating somewhat the comprehension of its underlying principles. Proposals of reforming it has been made but face the opposition of scientists, professionals and educators who are comfortable with the Table as it has been for several decades. Here, the author advocates for possible alternatives, discuss potential advantages and answer to some criticisms on them. (shrink)

Kripke-Putnam argument for natural kind essentialism can be said to depend on placeholder essentialist intuitions. But some argue that such philosophical intuitions are merely preschooler cognitive biases which are not supported by scientific knowledge of natural kinds. Chemical substances, for instance, whether elements or compounds do not have such privileged set of underlying properties (‘same substance’ relation) which are present in all members of the kind and which provide necessary and sufficient condition for kind membership. In this paper, I argue (...) that placeholder essentialism works for at least some of the scientific natural kinds especially for the basic chemical natural kind, i.e., element. I argue that the dual sense of the element (the basic substance and the simple substance) along with microstructuralism helps explain the essence of an element not only at the abstract level but also at the more concrete level. Based on this essentialist account of element, I conclude that placeholder essentialism is not completely without merit, and it fits nicely with at least some of our scientific natural kinds. (shrink)