ObjectiveTo provide insights on emergent ethical tensions experienced by mental health practitioners during system re-organisation, which is sufficiently grounded in empirical data at the local level to inform policy on recovery at institutional and provincial levels.MethodEthnographic methods using narrative and critical phenomenological resources over 24 months.FindingsEveryday ethical tensions emerged at the confluence of different experiences of time, for example, how a context of increasing pressure to decrease patients’ length of stay at the hospital challenged efforts to listen to and advocate (...) for what mattered to patients and maintain the integrity of interventions. In this context, practitioners drew on clinical language and that of personal recovery to strategically ‘push back’, ‘play with’ or ‘take back’ time.DiscussionExamining everyday practices through ethnographic methods can illuminate the everyday ethical tensions that arise when mental health professionals and psychiatrists grapple with, often competing, goods. Critical phenomenological resources can help expand the structural considerations in empirical ethics, excavate underground practices and raise questions about the conceptual categories undergirding normative ethics. Experiencing-with practitioners in clinical contexts as they encounter and creatively resolve ethical tensions also propose a normative ethics of possibility, to help bridge the gap between empirical and normative ethics.ConclusionFocus on the relationship between policy, temporal practices and ethics suggests a reconfiguration of time and re-imagination of ethics in institutional settings in ways that can ultimately benefit patients and professionals alike. (shrink)

The first editorial in the Journal of Medical Ethics described an ambition to be a ‘forum for the reasoned discussion of moral issues arising from the provision of medical care’.1 While that statement of intent might seem broad, it is one that has been reaffirmed by successive editors of the journal.2–4 It is an aim that aligns with the mission statement of JME and The Institute of Medical Ethics, to promote ‘ethical reflection and conduct in scientific research and medical conduct.’ (...) It is an end worthy of some reflection because it illuminates how the journal has developed and implies a conception of what good medical ethics is. During his time as editor, Raanan Gillon was a champion for philosophical medical ethics and he wrote an excellent and influential book on that topic.5 In the July issue of JME, Julian Savulescu, Tom Douglas and Dominic Wilkinson affirm the importance of philosophical medical ethics and ably demonstrate why it matters in the Charlie Gard case.6 Does that mean papers published in the JME must be philosophical? In one sense, clearly no and in another yes. Good medical ethics is not philosophy. The degree of scepticism, the narrow focus on a search for truth, the technical nature of some philosophy and it not needing to deliver normative or practical ethical conclusions mean that a narrowly philosophical approach is unlikely to be good medical ethics. JME has never been a narrowly philosophical journal and the perils of this were described well by its first editor: > We therefore intend to put editorial weight behind what we consider to be carefully argued and well informed judgments and not to allow every value …. (shrink)