I take it as obvious that attempts to justify the criminal law must be sensitive to matters of criminalization—to what conduct is proscribed or permitted. I discuss three additional matters that should be addressed in order to justify the criminal law. First, we must have a rough idea of what degree of deviation is tolerable between the set of criminal laws we ought to have and the set we really have. Second, we need information about how the criminal law at (...) any given time and place is administered, since the law in action is bound to differ radically from the law on the books. Finally, we must have some basis for speculating what life would be like in the absence of a system of criminal justice—if the state ceased to impose punishments. (shrink)

Lycurgus' "Against Leocrates" has long been seen as an anomaly in the oratorical corpus by scholars of ancient rhetoric. Its extensive use of quotations from the poets and of personification are two features regularly picked out as especially odd and inexplicable by critics. This paper argues that these and other features of the speech are central to Lycurgus' attempt to persuade his jury to accept his radically un-Athenian political views. In fact, Lycurgus has rejected Athenian approaches to punishment, prosecution, and (...) politics in favor of Platonic views, which bear the taint of the elite philosophical schools. The quotation and the personification are two techniques that Lycurgus uses to craft a "new prosecutorial voice" that will overcome his audience's objections to his elitist and even Platonic political positions. I contend that the whole speech may be read as a study in how to craft a "voice" or form of oratorical self-presentation that will persuade an audience to accept heterodox political views. (shrink)

ABSTRACTI argue that the degree to which a criminal should be punished is determined by three elements: a baseline amount that proportionally compensates the victim and an additional penalty that, first, reforms the criminal and, second, deters others from becoming unjust. My interpretation provides a solution to the interpretive puzzle that has most vexed commentators: the alleged tension between Plato's philosophical theory of punishment and the content of his penal code. I defend a two-step solution to the puzzle. First, on (...) my interpretation, because of the broad role that deterrence must play, this alleged tension is—to a degree—merely apparent. Second, the actual tension can be explained by Plato's commitment to the rule of law, given the epistemic limitations of actual people. (shrink)