In this paper, I argue that Plato conceives self-motion as non-spatial in Laws X. I demonstrate this by focusing on the textual evidence and by refuting interpretations according to which self-motion either is a specific type of spatial motion or is said to require space as a necessary condition for its occurrence. Moreover, I show that this non-spatial understanding differs from the identification of the soul’s motion with locomotion in the Timaeus. Consequently, I provide an explanation for this difference between (...) the Timaeus and Laws X by considering developmentalist and contextualist viewpoints. (shrink)

This paper makes the claim that the overall structure of Plato’s Laws follows the principle of indirect access to the knowledge of human soul, which consists in the understanding that a philosophical approach to the soul is only possible initially through an image of it. The structure of the Laws can be interpreted as a movement towards the soul’s interior, beginning with the famous image of the puppet. According to this image, the movement opens with the analysis of the non-rational (...) elements of the soul, which are capable of an harmonic relation with the rational element, and advances bit to bit to the rational or epistemic element. The political necessity of undertaking the dialectical investigation in order to attain a philosophical knowledge of the human soul and its specific excellence appears only at the end of the dialogue. In this way, the structure of the Laws dramatizes the progressive birth of philosophy, conceived as the dialectical investigation of the unity of virtue, starting from the initial understanding of the human soul contained in the myth of the puppet. (shrink)

Book 1 of Plato’s Laws, and particularly the image of the puppet introduced near its end, has been traditionally interpreted as presenting the moral psychology model that underlies the educational system delineated by the Athenian Stranger, which construes virtue as consonance between the non–rational and the rational elements of the soul. But a different and competing conception of virtue looms large in Laws 1, virtue as victory of the best part of the soul in psychic conflict. This paper argues that (...) the Athenian’s conception of education as the correct conformation of originally conflicting psychic forces requires the simultaneous presence of the harmony and the conflict models of virtue in Laws 1. Education is in turn defined by calculation, the rational activity which persuasively leads the conflicting non–rational forces towards a consonant reciprocal rapport. By strategically developing his understanding of education and calculation in Laws 1, the Athenian shows how the harmony model of virtue overcomes the conflict model, while at the same time recognising that there is some truth to the conflict model after all and integrating it within the harmony model. (shrink)