Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Trauma: Phenomenological Causality and Implication.Lillian Wilde - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (3):689-705.
    The relationship between traumatic experiences and subsequent distress is not well understood, and little research focuses on the lived experience of psychological trauma. I draw on Louis Sass’s phenomenological taxonomy to address this lacuna. I present his differentiation between relations of phenomenological causality and implication and demonstrate that his taxonomy can be applied to experiences of trauma. Relations of phenomenological causality and implication can be identified in the genesis and constitution of post-traumatic distress. My adaptation of Sass’s taxonomy will furthermore (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Introspection and Schizophrenia: A Comparative Investigation of Anomalous Self Experiences.Louis Sass, Elizabeth Pienkos & Barnaby Nelson - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):853-867.
    This paper offers a comparative investigation of anomalous self-experiences common in schizophrenia instrument) and those of normal individuals in an intensely introspective orientation. The latter represent a relatively pure manifestation of certain forms of exaggerated self-consciousness, one facet of the disturbance of core- or minimal-self postulated as central in schizophrenia. Significant similarities with schizophrenia-like experience were found but important differences also emerged. Affinities included feelings of passivity, fading of self or world, and alienation from thoughts, feelings, or lived-body. Differences involved (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Beyond Words: Linguistic Experience in Melancholia, Mania, and Schizophrenia. [REVIEW]Louis Sass & Elizabeth Pienkos - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):475-495.
    In this paper, we use a phenomenological approach to compare the unusual ways in which language can be experienced by individuals with schizophrenia or severe mood disorders, specifically mania and melancholia. Our discussion follows a tripartite/dialectical format: first we describe traditionally observed distinctions ; then we consider some apparent similarities in the experience of language in these conditions. Finally, we explore more subtle, qualitative differences. These involve: 1, interpersonal orientation, 2, forms of attention and context-relevance, 3, underlying mutations of experience, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • “Robbed of My Life”: The Felt Loss of Familiar and Engaged Presence in Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder.Elizabeth Pienkos & Louis Sass - 2022 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 53 (1):51-81.
    Depersonalization/derealization disorder is classified as a dissociative disorder in the DSM5. It is noteworthy that the symptoms of depersonalization and derealization are commonly found in many other psychological disorders, including schizophrenia spectrum disorders, while phenomenological features of schizophrenia are commonly found in DPDR. The current study attempts to clarify these apparent similarities via highly detailed phenomenological interviews with four persons diagnosed with DPDR. The data revealed four interrelated facets: 1, Loss of resonance, 2, Detachment from experience, 3, Loss of self, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-Induced Ego Dissolution.Raphaël Millière - 2017 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 11:1-22.
    There is converging evidence that high doses of hallucinogenic drugs can produce significant alterations of self-experience, described as the dissolution of the sense of self and the loss of boundaries between self and world. This article discusses the relevance of this phenomenon, known as “drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)”, for cognitive neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. Data from self-report questionnaires suggest that three neuropharmacological classes of drugs can induce ego dissolution: classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists of the kappa opioid (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • The Relationship Between Different Types of Dissociation and Psychosis-Like Experiences in a Non-Clinical Sample.Clara S. Humpston, Eamonn Walsh, David A. Oakley, Mitul A. Mehta, Vaughan Bell & Quinton Deeley - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 41:83-92.
  • The Paradoxical Self: Awareness, Solipsism and First-Rank Symptoms in Schizophrenia.Clara S. Humpston - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):210-231.
    Schizophrenia as a pathology of self-awareness has attracted much attention from philosophical theorists and empirical scientists alike. I view schizophrenia as a basic self-disturbance leading to a lifeworld of solipsism adopted by the sufferer and explain how this adoption takes place, which then manifests in ways such as first-rank psychotic symptoms. I then discuss the relationships between these symptoms, not as isolated mental events, but as end-products of a loss of agency and ownership, and argue that symptoms like thought insertion (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Cotard Syndrome, Self-Awareness, and I-Concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.
    Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have argued in previous work that a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Rational Role of the Perceptual Sense of Reality.Paweł Gładziejewski - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Increasing the Role of Phenomenology in Psychiatric Diagnosis–The Clinical Staging Approach.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2020 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 45 (6):683-702.
    Recent editions of diagnostic manuals in psychiatry have focused on providing quick and efficient operationalized criteria. Notwithstanding the genuine value of these classifications, many psychiatrists have argued that the operationalization approach does not sufficiently accommodate the rich and complex domain of patients’ experiences that is crucial for clinical reasoning in psychiatry. How can we increase the role of phenomenology in the process of diagnostic reasoning in psychiatry? I argue that this could be done by adopting a clinical staging approach in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Pre-Reflective Situational Self.Robert W. Clowes & Klaus Gärtner - 2018 - Topoi 39 (3):623-637.
    It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • I Overthink—Therefore I Am Not: An Active Inference Account of Altered Sense of Self and Agency in Depersonalisation Disorder.Anna Ciaunica, Anil Seth, Jakub Limanowski, Casper Hesp & Karl J. Friston - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 101:103320.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Introduction: The Relational Self: Basic Forms of Self-Awareness.Anna Ciaunica - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):501-507.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Exploration of Self- and World Experiences in Depersonalization Traits.Anna Ciaunica, Elizabeth Pienkos, Estelle Nakul, Luis Madeira & Harry Farmer - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-33.
  • Fractionating the Unitary Notion of Dissociation: Disembodied but Not Embodied Dissociative Experiences Are Associated with Exocentric Perspective-Taking.Jason J. Braithwaite, Kelly James, Hayley Dewe, Nick Medford, Chie Takahashi & Klaus Kessler - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
  • Why Are We Certain That We Exist?Alexandre Billon - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):723-759.
    Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • What is the Point of Persistent Disputes? The Meta-Analytic Answer.Alexandre Billon & Philippe Vellozzo - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    Many philosophers regard the persistence of philosophical disputes as symptomatic of overly ambitious, ill-founded intellectual projects. There are indeed strong reasons to believe that persistent disputes in philosophy (and more generally in the discourse at large) are pointless. We call this the pessimistic view of the nature of philosophical disputes. In order to respond to the pessimistic view, we articulate the supporting reasons and provide a precise formulation in terms of the idea that the best explanation of persistent disputes entails (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Leibnizin pienet havainnot ja tunteiden muodostuminen.Markku Roinila - 2018 - Havainto.
    Keskityn siihen miten Leibnizilla yksittäiset mielihyvän tai mielipahan tiedostamattomat havainnot voivat kasautua tai tiivistyä ja muodostaa vähitellen tunteita, joista tulemme tietoisiksi.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Anomalous Experience of Self and World: Administration of EASE and EAWE Scales to Four Subjects with Schizophrenia.Jérôme Englebert, François Monville, Caroline Valentiny, Françoise Mossay, Elizabeth Pienkos & Louis Sass - forthcoming - Psychopathology.
    The aim of this paper is to study anomalies of self- and world-experience in schizophrenia from a phenomenological perspective, through the use of the EASE and the EAWE interviews. Four patients with diagnoses of schizophrenia were interviewed with both EASE and EAWE. A qualitative analysis of these interviews was carried out on all the data; quantitative scores were also assigned based on the frequency and intensity of items endorsed by the subjects. For the EASE, subjects endorsed an average frequency of (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54.
    According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations