Historians of science and religion usually trace the origins of the “conflict thesis,” the notion that science and religion have been in perennial “conflict” or “warfare,” to the late nineteenth century, particularly to the narratives of New York chemist John William Draper and historian Andrew Dickson White. In this essay, I argue against that convention. Their narratives should not be read as stories to debunk, but rather as primary sources reflecting themes and changes in religious thought during the late nineteenth (...) century. I contend that Draper and White were part of a long liberal Protestant heritage that emphasized history, reason, and religious emancipation against ecclesiastical authority. As an alternative source of origins, however, I suggest that the real “conflict thesis” is to be found in the fledgling discipline of the history of science as it emerged during the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. The real origin of the “conflict thesis” is found in the very discipline that now seeks to condemn it. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, which he developed by focusing on physics, was later applied by other authors to virtually all areas or disciplines of culture. What interests me here, however, is the movement in the opposite direction: the role that one of these disciplines, history of art, played in the conception of Kuhn'stheoryof science.In a 1969 article, his only published text concerning science and art, Kuhn makes a brief and intriguing observation about The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He says (...) the book was a belated product of his discovery of the parallels between science and art. This is a retrospective assertion about Structure, as well as that of the... (shrink)

Depois dos anos 60, e especialmente depois da repercussão da obra kunhiana, tornou-se comum a distinção entre o ponto de vista continuísta e o descontinuísta na avaliação do desenvolvimento científico. Kuhn passou a ser visto como o grande descontinuísta ao lado de Koyré e Butterfield e foi considerado o causador de uma grande mudança no modo de se conceber o desenvolvimento da ciência. Em diversas abordagens, a noção de continuidade tem sido, muito frequentemente, equiparada à acumulação, que implica necessariamente a (...) negação da existência de revoluções científicas. Neste trabalho, buscamos mostrar que o emprego dos adjetivos “cumulativista” ou “continuísta” em oposição ao termo “descontinuísta” pode tanto suscitar interpretações equivocadas de visões históricas quanto estabelecer aproximações entre visões bastante distintas. Isso parece claro quando se analisa, por exemplo, as concepções de Sarton, Conant e Kuhn sobre a acumulação, tarefa a que nos propomos. A análise propicia considerações sobre os papeis desses pensadores na história da ciência. (shrink)

Ausgehend von der Frage George Sartons nach der Bedeutung von Auschwitz und Hiroshima für die Geschichte der Wissenschaften soll hier der Versuch unternommen werden, die Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik einmal von ihrem möglichen und mit naturwissenschaftlich-technischer Perfektion herbeiführbaren Ende her zu bedenken: dem atomaren, biologischen und chemischen Holokaust, der, in Perversion, dann den vollständigsten Triumph über die Natur bedeutete, den Wissenschaft und Technik erringen könnten. Muß daher die Geschichtsschreibung der Naturwissenschaften, wenn sie glaubwürdig und aufrichtig bleiben will, nicht (...) um historiographische Ansätze und Urteile bemüht sein, die sich, wenn denn das Ende politisch und technisch schon jetzt erreichbar ist, auch angesichts solcher Perspektive verantworten lassen? (shrink)

David Hull has demonstrated a marvelous ability to annoy everyone who caresabout science (or should), by forcing us to confront deep truths about howscience works. Credit, priority, precularities, and process weave together tomake the very fabric of science. As Hull's studies reveal, the story is bothmessier and more irritating than those limited by a single disciplinaryperspective generally admit. By itself history is interesting enough, andphilosophy valuable enough. But taken together, they do so much in tellingus about science and by puncturing (...) the comfortable popular illusion abouthow science works. Ultimately, David Hull shows by his example thathistory and philosophy of science can make science better. I agree, and withits focus on the history of science in particular, this paper explores why. (shrink)

Like it or not, a big picture of the history of science is something which we cannot avoid. Big pictures are, of course, thoroughly out of fashion at the moment; those committed to specialist research find them simplistic and insufficiently complex and nuanced, while postmodernists regard them as simply impossible. But however specialist we may be in our research, however scornful of the immaturity of grand narratives, it is not so easy to escape from dependence – acknowledged or not – (...) on a big picture. When we define our research as part of the history of science, we implicitly invoke a big picture of that history to give identity and meaning to our specialism. When we teach the history of science, even if we do not present a big picture explicitly, our students already have a big picture of that history which they bring to our classes and into which they fit whatever we say, no matter how many complications and refinements and contradictions we put before them – unless we offer them an alternative big picture. (shrink)

This article discusses popular and academic debates that turned on the merit of either science or the humanities. The author uses four cases to provide this history: the Huxley-Arnold debate of the 1880s, the science education reformation (and neglect-of-science) debates in Britain in the 1920s, the two-culture debate of the 1960s, and the science wars of recent years. Each of those debates (on one side, at least) sought to establish the supremacy of science for society’s welfare, and the first three (...) (on both sides) necessarily excised interdisciplinary approaches from their proposed solutions. More recently, the science wars have drawn comparison to the two-culture debate, even though this recent skirmish cannot be distinguished from a concern over the effects of interdisciplinary scholarship. The purpose of this article is to trace the relationship of the debates and comment on their role for the future of STS. (shrink)

Today’s conflicts between the views that the humanities hold of science and engineering and the views science and engineering hold of the humanities weaken the very core of our culture. Their cause is lack of integration in today’s education among subjects that hark back to the medieval trivium and quadrivium. A new trivium is needed to provide every educated person with a basic understanding of the endeavors and instruments that help us address our world and shape a new morality—the humanities, (...) in the noblest sense of the word, to civilize, science to understand nature, and engineering, broadly defined, to encompass the kindred activities that modify nature. Integration of these endeavors is urgent. It involves, in turn, an intimate interaction (the “biosoma”) of biological organisms, society, and machines—a new quadrivium. No domain can any longer be considered and learned in isolation. (shrink)

This article describes the author’s model of university of the new humanism, whose foundations were formulated in 2013 (Kokowski 2013a, 2013b). It considers this issue in the context of: a) the science of science, including the growing importance of scientometrics and bibliometrics, b) the current discussion on the reform of the system of science and higher education in Poland, and c) the history of the idea of the university.

The scientific work of Leonardo da Vinci may have served as the main inspiration for the historical research of George Sarton. Although he never produced a work he felt was worthy of its subject, the little that he did write about Leonardo reveals the importance he attributed to him in the history of science. This is especially clear in Sarton´s treatment of Leonardo and a discovery he did not make: William Harvey´s discovery of blood circulation in the 17th Century. In (...) this article, we refer to this particular episode to trace Sarton´s conception of the development of science. It is a conception that illustrates well the traditional historiographic perspective that is the target of Thomas Kuhn´s criticisms. Although Kuhn never wrote about Leonardo or Harvey, we aim to show that he clearly positioned himself contrary to Sarton, albeit indirectly, with respect to this particular historical episode, as well. (shrink)