In this chapter, I consider the idea that physician-assisted death might come into question in the cases of psychiatric patients who are incapable of making autonomous choices about ending their lives. I maintain that the main arguments for physician-assisted death found in recent medical ethical literature support physician-assisted death in some of those cases. After assessing several possible criticisms of what I have argued, I conclude that the idea that physicianassisted death can be acceptable in some cases of psychiatric patients (...) who lack autonomy ought to be taken into account in assessing the moral and legal acceptability of physician-assisted death. (shrink)

A governing principle in medical ethics is respect for patient autonomy. This principle is commonly drawn upon in order to argue for the permissibility of assisted dying. In this paper I explore the proper role that respect for patient autonomy should play in this context. I argue that the role of autonomy is not to identify a patient’s best interests, but instead to act as a side-constraint on action. The surprising conclusion of the paper is that whether or not it (...) is in the best interests for the patient to die is a morally objective matter. This allows for the possibility that it can be in the best interests of the patient to die even if she autonomously considers it to be in her best interest to continue living. I argue that concerns about ‘mandatory’ euthanasia can be met when patient autonomy is respected as a side-constraint on action. Ultimately, this means that assisted dying is permissible, not because the autonomous patient views her suffering to be unbearable, but because it is in her objective best interests and she permitted it via her consent. (shrink)

During the last decades, shared decision making (SDM) has become a very popular model for the physician-patient relationship. SDM can refer to a process (making a decision in a shared way) and a product (making a shared decision). In the literature, by far most attention is devoted to the process. In this paper, I investigate the product, wondering what is involved by a medical decision being shared. I argue that the degree to which a decision to implement a medical alternative (...) is shared should be determined by taking into account six considerations: (i) how the physician and the patient rank that alternative, (ii) the individual preference scores the physician and the patient (would) assign to that alternative, (iii) the similarity of the preference scores, (iv) the similarity of the rankings, (v) the total concession size, and (vi) the similarity of the concession sizes. I explain why shared medical decisions are valuable, and sketch implications of the analysis for the physician-patient relationship. (shrink)

Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics. Though the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as uncontroversial in this sphere, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient's right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether the reasons underpinning the choice (...) are known and rational, or indeed whether they even exist. Jonathan Pugh brings recent philosophical work on the nature of rationality to bear on the question of how we should understand personal autonomy in contemporary bioethics. In doing so, he develops a new framework for thinking about the concept of autonomy, one that is grounded in an understanding of the different roles that rational beliefs and rational desires have to play in it. Pugh's account allows for a deeper understanding of d the relationship between our freedom to act and our capacity to decide autonomously. His rationalist perspective is contrasted with other prominent accounts of autonomy in bioethics, and the revisionary implications it has for practical questions in biomedicine are also outlined. (shrink)

As the assumptions of perpetual economic and population growth no longer stand, the welfare systems built on such promises are in peril. Policymakers must reallocate the responsibility for providing care between generations. Democratic theories can help establish procedures for finding solutions, particularly in ageing democratic countries. By analysing existing representative and deliberative democratic theories, this paper explores how the interests of future generations could be included in such procedures. A hypothetical social health insurance scheme with the pay-as-you-go financial arrangement is (...) selected as an illustrative case. This paper argues that due to the intrinsic bias towards the current generation, both representative and deliberative democratic health policymaking are limited in making decisions that account for future generations. Instead, their interests could be at best represented by benevolent representatives. (shrink)

BackgroundThe complexity of decision-making in the paediatric context is well recognised. In the majority of cases, parents and healthcare professionals work together to decide which treatments the paediatric patient should receive. On occasions, however, parental wishes conflict with what clinicians think is best for the paediatric patient. Where persistent disagreement between clinicians and parents exists, clinicians must ascertain if they have a moral, professional, and legal obligation to overrule the parents' decision and implement their preferred option.PurposeFew decision-making frameworks to assist (...) in addressing the ethical issues that arise in clinical decision-making relate specifically to the paediatric context. Diekema's Harm Threshold Framework and the Zone of Parental Discretion Framework assist in determining whether parental decisions should or should not be overridden. This paper examines the similarities and differences between these frameworks.MethodsThe frameworks are analysed i... (shrink)

The 2015 UK Supreme Court judgment in Montgomery v Lanarkshire reinforces the importance of informed consent to medical treatment. This paper suggests that Montgomery recognises the challenge faced by vulnerable individuals in choosing between treatment options and making decisions with appreciation of information about material risks. The judgment endorses a form of weak paternalism to safeguard such persons, which is not disrespectful of the aggregate principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. But ethical practice requires professionals to tread carefully between (...) weak and hard paternalism in the context of therapeutic interactions with vulnerable patients, while ensuring their awareness of material risks. (shrink)

Medical tourism—the practice where patients travel internationally to privately access medical care—may limit patients’ regular physicians’ abilities to contribute to the informed decision-making process. We address this issue by examining ways in which Canadian family doctors’ typical involvement in patients’ informed decision-making is challenged when their patients engage in medical tourism.

Publics are key stakeholders in population genomic screening and their perspectives on ethical considerations are relevant to programme design and policy making. Using semi-structured interviews, we explored social views and attitudes towards possible future provision of personalised genomic risk information to populations to inform prevention and/or early detection of relevant conditions. Participants were members of the public who had received information on their personal genomic risk of melanoma as part of a research project. The focus of the analysis presented here (...) is participants’ views regarding ethical considerations relevant to population genomic screening more generally. Data were analysed thematically and four key themes related to ethical considerations were identified: personal responsibility for health: ‘forewarned is forearmed’; perceptions of, and responses to, genetic fatalism; implications for parenting and reproduction; divided views on choosing to receive genomic risk information. Ethical considerations underlying these themes include the valorisation of information and choice, paternalism, non-directiveness and increasing responsibilisation of individuals in health and healthcare. These findings arguably indicate a thin public conceptualisation of population genomic testing, which draws heavily on how these themes tend to be described in existing social discourses. Findings suggest that further public engagement is required to increase complexity of debate, to consider the appropriate place of individual and social interests in population genomic testing. Further discernment of relevant ethical approaches, drawing on ethical frameworks from both public health and clinical settings, will also assist in determining the appropriate implementation of population genomic screening for complex conditions. (shrink)

In patient-centred care, shared decision-making is advocated as the preferred form of medical decision-making. Shared decision-making is supported with reference to patient autonomy without abandoning the patient or giving up the possibility of influencing how the patient is benefited. It is, however, not transparent how shared decision-making is related to autonomy and, in effect, what support autonomy can give shared decision-making. In the article, different forms of shared decision-making are analysed in relation to five different aspects of autonomy: (1) self-realisation; (...) (2) preference satisfaction; (3) self-direction; (4) binary autonomy of the person; (5) gradual autonomy of the person. It is argued that both individually and jointly these aspects will support the models called shared rational deliberative patient choice and joint decision as the preferred versions from an autonomy perspective. Acknowledging that both of these models may fail, the professionally driven best interest compromise model is held out as a satisfactory second-best choice. (shrink)

In recent years the formerly quite strong interest in patient compliance has been questioned for being too paternalistic and oriented towards overly narrow biomedical goals as the basis for treatment recommendations. In line with this there has been a shift towards using the notion of adherence to signal an increased weight for patients’ preferences and autonomy in decision making around treatments. This ‘adherence-paradigm’ thus encompasses shared decision-making as an ideal and patient perspective and autonomy as guiding goals of care. What (...) this implies in terms of the importance that we have reason to attach to (non-)adherence and how has, however, not been explained. In this article, we explore the relationship between different forms of shared decision-making, patient autonomy and adherence. Distinguishing between dynamically and statically framed adherence we show how the version of shared decision-making advocated will have consequences for whether one should be interested in a dynamically or statically framed adherence and in what way patient adherence should be assessed. In contrast to the former compliance paradigm (where non-compliance was necessarily seen as a problem), using observations about (non-)adherence to assess the success of health care decision making and professional-patient interaction turns out to be a much less straightforward matter. (shrink)

Incidental findings and secondary findings, being results that are unrelated to the diagnostic question, are the subject of an important debate in the practice of clinical genomic medicine. Arguments for reporting these results or not doing so typically relate to the principles of autonomy, non-maleficence and beneficence. However, these principles frequently conflict and are insufficient by themselves to come to a conclusion. This study investigates empirically how ethical principles are considered when actually reporting IFs or SFs and how value conflicts (...) are weighed. A qualitative focus group study has been undertaken, including a multidisciplinary group of professionals from Belgian centres for medical genetics. The data were analysed thematically. All eight Belgian centres participated in this study. Ethical values were frequently referred to for disclosure policies on IFs and SFs. Participants invoked respect for patient autonomy to support the disclosure of IFs and opt-out options for IFs and SFs, non-maleficence for the professional delineation of reportable IFs and opt-out options for IFs and SFs and beneficence for the mandatory reporting of actionable IFs, the delineation of reportable IFs and a current decline of actively pursued SFs. Professional assumptions about patients’ genetic literacy were an important factor in the weighing of values. In line with the traditional bioethical discourse, the mandatory reporting of actionable IFs might be interpreted as a “technological, soft paternalism”. Restricting patients’ choices might be acceptable, but then its motives should be valid and its beneficent outcomes highly plausible. Hence, the presuppositions of technological, soft paternalism - patients’ inability to make informed decisions, normative rationality, the efficacy of beneficent outcomes and the delineated spectrum of beneficence - should be approached critically. Moreover, distributive justice should be considered an important value in the delineation of the current scope of the ethical debate on IFs and SFs. This study of guiding values may stimulate the debate on the ethical grounds for a solid policy on IFs and SFs internationally. (shrink)

The concept of futility in medicine refers to the incapability of an intervention to achieve its goal. Futility determinations form the basis for withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining interventions. Criticisms of attempted futility definitions relate to inconstant probability and value judgements concerning the goal pursued. This variability frustrates efforts to define futility. Language modifications and procedural approaches, both important ancillary measures, inherently lack the ability to resolve this difficulty. Beneath the notion of futility lie foundational factors whose revised understanding is required (...) to advance a definition. These factors include autonomy, death and the goals of medicine. Reconsidering the essence and influence of foundational factors is necessary to move beyond a seemingly irresolvable problem. In this essay, I assert that defining futility is not pointless but rather possible, necessary and unavoidable. With this assertion, I respond to the criticisms of futility. These responses together with a corrective understanding of foundational factors lead to a definition of futility. This definition balances respect for patients’ autonomy whilst allowing for interventions that do not undermine the essence of medicine and integrity of those practising it. Defining futility is an exercise in necessity requiring renewed perceptual foundations. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of ‘premature consent’. The term ‘premature consent’ denotes patient decisions that are: formulated prior to discussion with the appropriate healthcare professional ; based on information from unreliable sources ; and resolutely maintained despite the HCP having provided alternative reliable information. HCPs are not obliged to respect premature consent patients’ demands for unindicated treatments. But why? What is it that premature consent patients do or get wrong? Davis has argued that premature consent patients are incompetent and (...) misinformed. We argue that this view is not sustainable. A more plausible position asserts that premature consent threatens the integrity of the medical profession. We argue that this gives rise to a negative patient duty which premature consent patients fail to honour. We argue for a further positive duty of good faith engagement in shared decision-making. This implies willingness to potentially revise or justify one’s evaluative bases. Fundamentally, the problem with premature consent patients is that certain of their evaluative bases are not open to revision. They therefore fail in their duty to participate faithfully in the shared decision-making process. (shrink)

BackgroundPsychiatric staff members have the power to decide the options that frame encounters with patients. Intentional as well as unintentional framing can have a crucial impact on patients’ opportunities to be heard and participate in the process. We identified three dominant ethical perspectives in the normative medical ethics literature concerning how doctors and other staff members should frame interactions in relation to patients; paternalism, autonomy and reciprocity. The aim of this study was to describe and analyse statements describing real work (...) situations and ethical reflections made by staff members in relation to three central perspectives in medical ethics; paternalism, autonomy and reciprocity.MethodsAll staff members involved with patients in seven adult psychiatric and six child and adolescent psychiatric clinics were given the opportunity to freely describe ethical considerations in their work by keeping an ethical diary over the course of one week and 173 persons handed in their diaries. Qualitative theory-guided content analysis was used to provide a description of staff encounters with patients and in what way these encounters were consistent with, or contrary to, the three perspectives.ResultsThe majority of the statements could be attributed to the perspective of paternalism and several to autonomy. Only a few statements could be attributed to reciprocity, most of which concerned staff members acting contrary to the perspective. The result is presented as three perspectives containing eight values.•Paternalism; 1) promoting and restoring the health of the patient, 2) providing good care and 3) assuming responsibility.•Autonomy; 1) respecting the patient’s right to self-determination and information, 2) respecting the patient’s integrity and 3) protecting human rights.•Reciprocity; 1) involving patients in the planning and implementation of their care and 2) building trust between staff and patients.ConclusionsPaternalism clearly appeared to be the dominant perspective among the participants, but there was also awareness of patients’ right to autonomy. Despite a normative trend towards reciprocity in psychiatry throughout the Western world, identifying it proved difficult in this study. This should be borne in mind by clinics when considering the need for ethical education, training and supervision. (shrink)

BackgroundPatient autonomy is a fundamental, yet challenging, principle of professional medical ethics. The idea that individual patients should have the freedom to make choices about their lives, including medical matters, has become increasingly prominent in current literature. However, this has not always been the case, especially in communist countries where paternalistic attitudes have been interwoven into all relationships including medical ones. Patients’ expectations and the role of the doctor in the patient-physician relationship are changing. Croatia, as a transitional country, is (...) currently undergoing this particular process.MethodsQualitative research was conducted by means of six focus group discussions held in the years 2012 and 2013 in Croatia. Focus groups were held separately with each of the following: first year and final year medical students, physicians engaged in medical ethics education, physicians practicing in a clinical hospital, family medicine residents and individuals representing patients with chronic disease. This research specifically addresses issues related to patient autonomy, in particular, the principles of truth telling, confidentiality, and informed consent. All focus group discussions were audio taped and then transcribed verbatim and systematized according to acknowledged qualitative analysis methods.Results and discussionPatient autonomy is much more than a simple notion defined as the patient’s right to make treatment decisions independently. It has to be understood in context of the broader socio-cultural setting. At present, both patients and medical doctors in Croatia are increasingly appreciating the importance of promoting the principle of autonomy in medical decision-making. However, the current views of medical students, physicians and patients reveal inconsistencies.Conclusions Knowing how to respect the various facets of patients’ autonomy should be part of physician’s professional duties, and also be reflected in his or her core clinical competencies. For this reason greater importance should be dedicated to patient autonomy issues in medical education in Croatia. (shrink)

This paper presents a systematic account of ethical issues actualised in different areas, as well as at different levels and stages of health care, by introducing organisational and other procedures that embody a shift towards person centred care and shared decision-making (PCC/SDM). The analysis builds on general ethical theory and earlier work on aspects of PCC/SDM relevant from an ethics perspective. This account leads up to a number of theoretical as well as empirical and practice oriented issues that, in view (...) of broad advancements towards PCC/SDM, need to be considered by health care ethics researchers. Given a PCC/SDM-based reorientation of health care practice, such ethics research is essential from a quality assurance perspective. (shrink)

In health care, the provision of pertinent information to patients is not just a moral imperative but also a legal obligation, often articulated through the lens of obtaining informed consent. Codes of medical ethics and many national laws mandate the disclosure of basic information about diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment alternatives. However, within publicly funded health care systems, other kinds of information might also be important to patients, such as insights into the health care priorities that underlie treatment offers made. While (...) conventional perspectives do not take this as an obligatory part of the information to be shared with patients, perhaps through viewing it as clinically “non-actionable,” we advocate for a paradigm shift. Our proposition diverges from the traditional emphasis on actionability. We contend that honoring patients as equal moral agents necessitates, among other principles, a commitment to honesty. Withholding specific categories of information pertinent to patients’ comprehension of their situation is inherently incompatible with this principle. In this article, we advocate for a recalibration of the burden of proof. Rather than requiring special justifications for adding to the standard set of information items, we suggest that physicians should be able to justify excluding relevant facts about the patient’s situation and the underlying considerations shaping health care professionals’ choices. This perspective prioritizes transparency and empowers patients with a comprehensive understanding, aligning with the ethos of respect for the patient as person. (shrink)

Background Relational autonomy is an alternative concept of autonomy in which an individual is recognized as embedded into society and influenced by relational factors. Social context, including social location, political structure, and social forces, significantly influence an agent to develop and exercise autonomy skills. The relational approach has been applied in clinical practice to identify relational factors impacting patient autonomy and decision-making, yet there is a knowledge gap in how these factors influence the demonstration of relational autonomy in the context (...) of medical decisions of adults. Objective The present study targeted the existing knowledge of what and how relational factors impact individuals making medical decisions using the theoretical framework of relational autonomy. Methods A meta-synthesis study was utilized. Four electronic databases, including Embase, OVID Medline, CINAHL, and PubMed, were searched, along with gray literature and reference lists, to identify relevant studies. Results 23 studies reporting 21 qualitative and two mixed-method studies were reviewed. Four themes emerged from the qualitative findings: (1) supportive relationships facilitate an individual’s relational autonomy; (2) obtaining comprehensive information from broader sources helps individuals exercise relational autonomy; (3) undue family pressure impedes the exercising of patient relational autonomy; and (4) healthcare providers’ dominant voice hampers the demonstration of relational autonomy. Conclusions Applying relational autonomy to assist adults in making well-considered decisions is essential. The meta-synthesis suggests establishing a supportive relationship between individuals, healthcare providers, and family. A supportive relationship will allow healthcare providers to make judgments in line with an individual’s values and wishes with the aim of promoting relational autonomy. Advance care planning was proposed as the effective solution to obtain a consensus between individuals and their families while respecting an individual’s values and preferences. Furthermore, it is considered crucial for healthcare providers to appreciate an individual's values and incorporate their preferences into recommendations. (shrink)

Background Paternalism/overprotection limits communication between healthcare professionals and patients and does not promote shared therapeutic decision-making. In the global north, communication patterns have been regulated to promote autonomy, whereas in the global south, they reflect the physician’s personal choices. The goal of this study was to contribute to knowledge on the communication patterns used in clinical practice in Mexico and to identify the determinants that favour a doctor–patient relationship characterized by low paternalism/autonomy. Methods A self-report study on communication patterns in (...) a sample of 761 mental healthcare professionals in Central and Western Mexico was conducted. Multiple ordinal logistic regression models were used to analyse paternalism and associated factors. Results A high prevalence of paternalism was observed among mental health professionals in Mexico. The main determinants of low paternalism/autonomy were medical specialty and gender, with female physicians being more likely to explicitly share diagnoses and therapeutic strategies with patients and their families. A pattern of highly explicit communication was strongly associated with low paternalism/autonomy. Finally, a modifying effect of age strata on the association between communication pattern or specialty and low paternalism/autonomy was observed. Conclusions Among mental health professionals in Mexico, high paternalism prevailed. Gender, specialty, and a pattern of open communication were closely associated with low paternalism/autonomy. Strengthening health professionals’ competencies and promoting explicit communication could contribute to the transition towards more autonomist communication in clinical practice in Mexico. The ethical implications will need to be resolved in the near future. (shrink)

High-quality doctor-patient communication in end-of-life care results in better quality of life for patients. In linguistically and culturally diverse societies, language discordant consultations become daily practice, leading to difficulties in eliciting patient preferences toward end-of-life care. Although family members invariably act as informal interpreters, this may cause some ethical dilemmas. We present a case of a palliative patient whose son acted as an interpreter. This case generated a triple- layered ethical dilemma: how to safeguard patient autonomy against paternalistic interventions by (...) family members, how to respect the relational context in which patient autonomy can be realized, and how to respect the ethno-cultural values of the patient and his family. These issues are being discussed and reflected upon within the framework shared decision making involving informal- and professional interpreters. The complementary use of professional interpreters next to family members acting as informal interpreters is recommended. (shrink)

This article addresses how health professionals should monitor and safeguard their patients’ ability to participate in making clinical decisions and making subsequent decisions regarding the implementation of their treatment plan. Patient participation in clinical decision-making is essential, e.g. in self-care, where patients are responsible for most ongoing care. We argue that one common, fact-oriented patient education strategy may in practice easily tend to take a destructive form that we call error trawling. Illustrating with empirical findings from a video study of (...) consultations between clinicians and adolescent patients with diabetes, we argue on independent grounds that this strategy not only risks to overlook significant weaknesses in patient decision competence, but also to undermine patient capacity for decision-making and implementing care. In effect, this strategy for clinically monitoring and addressing the problem of fragile decision-making capacity brings hazards in need of address. We clo... (shrink)

This article focuses on patients' participation in decision‐making in meetings with healthcare professionals in a healthcare system, based on neoliberal regulations and ideas. Drawing on two constructed empirical cases, primarily from the perspective of patients, this article analyses and discusses the clinical practice around decision‐making meetings within a Foucauldian perspective. Patients' participation in decision‐making can be seen as an offshoot of respect for patient autonomy. A treatment must be chosen, when patients consult physicians. From the perspective of patients, there is (...) a tendency for healthcare professionals to supply the patients with the information that they think are necessary for them to make their own decision. But patients do not always want to be a ‘customer’ in the healthcare system; they want to be a patient, consulting an expert for help and advice, which creates resistance to some parts of the decision‐making process. Both professionals and patients are subject to the structural frame of the medical field, formed of both neoliberal framework and medical logic. The decision‐making competence in relation to the choice of treatment is placed away from the professionals and seen as belonging to the patient. A ‘projectification’ of the patient occurs, whereby the patient becomes responsible for his/her choices in treatment and care and the professionals support him/her with knowledge, preferences, and alternative views, out of which he/she must make his/her own choices, and the responsibility for those choices now and in the future. At the same time, there is a tendency towards de‐professionalization. In that light, participation of patients in decision‐making can be regarded as a tacit governmentality strategy that shapes the location of responsibility between individual and society, and independent patients and healthcare professionals, despite the basically desirable, appropriate, and necessary idea of involving patients in their own situations from a humanistic perspective. (shrink)

Background Older patients in emergency care often have complex needs and may have limited ability to make their voices heard. Hence, there are ethical challenges for healthcare professionals in establishing a trustful relationship to determine the patient’s preferences and then decide and act based on these preferences. With this comes further challenges regarding how the patient’s autonomy can be protected and promoted. Aim To describe nurses’ experiences of dealing with older patients’ autonomy when cared for in emergency departments (EDs). Research (...) design This study adopted reflective lifeworld theory and a phenomenological design. Participants and research context A total of 13 open-ended interviews were performed with nurses working at two EDs in Sweden. Ethical considerations The study was reviewed by the Ethical Advisory Board in South East Sweden and conducted according to the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave consent. Findings Nurses’ experiences of dealing with older patients’ autonomy in EDs are characterized by moving in a conflicting uphill struggle, indicating obscure thoughts on how patient autonomy can be protected in an ethically challenging context. The phenomenon is further described with its meaning constituents: ‘Being hampered by prioritization under stress’, ‘Balancing paternalism and patient autonomy’, ‘Making decisions without consent in the patient’s best interests’ and ‘Being trapped by notions of legitimate care needs’. Conclusion Stressful work conditions and lacking organizational strategies in EDs contribute to nurses maintaining unjustified paternalistic care, regardless of the patient’s ability and medical condition, and questioning who has legitimacy for participating in decisions about care. The nurses’ protection and promotion of older patients’ autonomy is dependent on the opportunity, ability and willingness to create a patient relationship where the patient’s voice and preferences are valued as important. Consequently, strategies are needed to improve patient autonomy in EDs based on the idea of ‘relational autonomy’. (shrink)

This article proposes a theoretical re-conceptualization of power dynamics and their legitimation in contemporary business–society relations using the prism and metaphor of parentalism. The paper develops a typology of forms of parentalism along two structuring dimensions: care and control. Specifically, four ideal-types of parentalism are introduced with their associated practices and power-legitimation mechanisms. As we consider current private governance and authority through this analytical framework, we are able to provide a new perspective on the nature of the moral legitimation of (...) power dynamics in contemporary business–society relations. And we weave the threads between this conceptual frame and historical antecedents, suggesting that business ethicists need to revive old debates on paternalism in light of the current pervasive trend of modernized and subtler forms of parentalism. Implications for business ethics and political CSR are discussed. (shrink)

Despite enthusiasm for patient-centered care, the practice of patient-centered care is proving challenging. Further, it is curious that the literature about this subject does not explicitly address patient autonomy, since patients guide care in patient-centered care, and respect for patient autonomy is a prominent health-care value. We argue that by explicitly adopting a relational conception of autonomy as an essential component, patient-centered care becomes more coherent, is strengthened, and could help practitioners to make better use of a principle of respect (...) for autonomy. Hence, its use appears promising to narrow the theory–practice gap. (shrink)

Person centered care (PCC) invites ideas of shared responsibility as a direct result of its shared decision making (SDM) process. The intersection of PCC and psychiatric contexts brings about what I refer to as _the responsibility problem_, which seemingly arises when SDM is applied in psychiatric settings due to (1) patients’ potentially diminished capacities for responsibility, (2) tension prompted by professional reasons for and against sharing responsibility with patients, as well as (3) the responsibility/blame dilemma. This paper aims to do (...) away with the responsibility problem through arguing for a functional approach to mental illness, a blameless responsibility ascription to the person with mental illness, as well as a nuanced understanding of SDM as part of an emancipation-oriented PCC model. (shrink)

The use of black box algorithms in medicine has raised scholarly concerns due to their opaqueness and lack of trustworthiness. Concerns about potential bias, accountability and responsibility, patient autonomy and compromised trust transpire with black box algorithms. These worries connect epistemic concerns with normative issues. In this paper, we outline that black box algorithms are less problematic for epistemic reasons than many scholars seem to believe. By outlining that more transparency in algorithms is not always necessary, and by explaining that (...) computational processes are indeed methodologically opaque to humans, we argue that the reliability of algorithms provides reasons for trusting the outcomes of medical artificial intelligence. To this end, we explain how computational reliabilism, which does not require transparency and supports the reliability of algorithms, justifies the belief that results of medical AI are to be trusted. We also argue that several ethical concerns remain with black box algorithms, even when the results are trustworthy. Having justified knowledge from reliable indicators is, therefore, necessary but not sufficient for normatively justifying physicians to act. This means that deliberation about the results of reliable algorithms is required to find out what is a desirable action. Thus understood, we argue that such challenges should not dismiss the use of black box algorithms altogether but should inform the way in which these algorithms are designed and implemented. When physicians are trained to acquire the necessary skills and expertise, and collaborate with medical informatics and data scientists, black box algorithms can contribute to improving medical care. (shrink)

The law of informed consent to medical treatment has recently been extensively overhauled in England. The 2015 Montgomery judgment has done away with the long-held position that the information to be disclosed by doctors when obtaining valid consent from patients should be determined on the basis of what a reasonable body of medical opinion agree ought to be disclosed in the circumstances. The UK Supreme Court concluded that the information that is material to a patient’s decision should instead be judged (...) by reference to a new two-limbed test founded on the notions of the ‘reasonable person’ and the ‘particular patient’. The rationale outlined in Montgomery for this new test of materiality, and academic comment on the ruling’s significance, has focused on the central ethical importance that the law now accords to respect for patient autonomy in the process of obtaining consent from patients. In this paper, we dispute the claim that the new test of materiality articulated in Montgomery equates with respect for autonomy being given primacy in re-shaping the development of the law in this area. We also defend this position, arguing that our revised interpretation of Montgomery’s significance does not equate with a failure by the courts to give due legal consideration to what is owed to patients as autonomous decision-makers in the consent process. Instead, Montgomery correctly implies that doctors are ethically obliged to attend to a number of relevant ethical considerations in framing decisions about consent to treatment, which include subtle interpretations of the values of autonomy and well-being. Doctors should give appropriate consideration to how these values are fleshed out and balanced in context in order to specify precisely what information ought to be disclosed to a patient as a requirement of obtaining consent, and as a core component of shared decision-making within medical encounters more generally. (shrink)

The relationship between a doctor and a patient is taken to be one of the most ethically significant dimensions of good medical care. After all, it is within the interactions that constitute this relationship that information is shared, that choices get determined, that reassurances are provided, that decisions are made and, ultimately, that care is given. Medical ethicists have devoted considerable effort to identifying different types of relationships, and in specifying their ideal components, most usually in general or abstract terms. (...) Indeed, I would suggest that medical ethicists are most comfortable when we are comparing different models of this relationship, or perhaps when advancing one account of this relationship that can provide the foundations for the most optimal approach to shared decision-making, for example by Sandman and Munthe.2 But, in truth, the doctor–patient relationship is most ethically interesting—and intellectually challenging—when scrutinised in its non-ideal forms. Ethicists who turn their attention to the front line of practice have demonstrated a tendency to see this relationship as one that is creaking at the seams, subject to manipulation or side-tracked entirely. So, is it the case that the doctor–patient relationship is under threat in contemporary medical practice? The answer to this question ought, I think, to be answered in the affirmative, though tentatively so. The role of medical ethicists is to identify precisely how such threats are materialising and to capture these in rich, detailed accounts of everyday medical encounters. Medical ethicists then also have a vital role to play in identifying and responding to these changes in a carefully reasoned way. Sometimes this is likely to involve pushing back and protecting those elements of the doctor–patient relationship that have fundamental value, regardless of context, changing social values, …. (shrink)

In debates about genetic testing of children, as well as about disclosing unsolicited findings (UFs) of pediatric exome sequencing, respect for future autonomy should be regarded as a prima facie consideration for not taking steps that would entail denying the future adult the opportunity to decide for herself about what to know about her own genome. While the argument can be overridden when other, morally more weighty considerations are at stake, whether this is the case can only be determined in (...) concrete cases. Importantly, when children grow into adolescents, respect for future autonomy will have to give way to respecting their emerging autonomy. When pediatric exome sequencing is done for complex conditions not involving developmental delay, respect for the child’s future or emerging autonomy should be a primary consideration for those charged with deciding on behalf of the child. Building on what Emanuel and Emanuel have termed the ‘deliberative model’ of shared decision making, we argue that if parents fail to give these considerations their due, professionals should actively invite them to do so. Taking a directive stance may be needed in order to make sure that the future or emerging autonomy of the child are duly considered in the decision-making process, but also to help the parents and themselves to shape their respective roles as responsible care-givers. (shrink)

Professional control in the selection of treatment options for patients is changing. In light of social and legal developments emphasising patient choice and autonomy, and restricting medical paternalism and judicial deference, this article examines how far patients and families can demand NHS treatment in England and Wales. It considers situations where the patient is an adult with capacity, an adult lacking capacity and a child. In all three cases, there is judicial support for professional autonomy, but there are also inconsistencies (...) that have potential to elevate the importance of patient and family preferences. In combination, they may be perceived by healthcare professionals as an obligation to follow patient preferences, even where doing so conflicts with other professional obligations. It is argued that a more nuanced approach to shared decision-making could help clarify the boundaries of decision-making responsibility. (shrink)

In medical practice, the doctrine of informed consent is generally understood to have priority over the medical practitioner’s duty of care to her patient. A common consequentialist argument for the prioritisation of informed consent above the duty of care involves the claim that respect for a patient’s free choice is the best way of protecting that patient’s best interests; since the patient has a special expertise over her values and preferences regarding non-medical goods she is ideally placed to make a (...) decision that will protect her interests. In this paper I argue against two consequentialist justifications for a blanket prioritisation of informed consent over the duty of care by considering cases in which patients have imperfect access to their overall best interests. Furthermore, I argue that there are cases where the mere presentation of choice under the doctrine of informed consent is detrimental to patient best interests. I end the paper by considering more nuanced approaches to resolving the conflict between informed consent and the duty of care and consider the option of permitting patients to waive informed consent. (shrink)

It has been reported as an ethical problem within prehospital emergency care that ambulance professionals administer physiologically futile cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to patients having suffered cardiac arrest to benefit significant others. At the same time it is argued that, under certain circumstances, this is an acceptable moral practice by signalling that everything possible has been done, and enabling the grief of significant others to be properly addressed. Even more general moral reasons have been used to morally legitimize the use of (...) futile CPR: That significant others are a type of patient with medical or care needs that should be addressed, that the interest of significant others should be weighed into what to do and given an equal standing together with patient interests, and that significant others could be benefited by care professionals unless it goes against the explicit wants of the patient. In this article we explore these arguments and argue that the support for providing physiologically futile CPR in the prehospital context fails. Instead, the strategy of ambulance professionals in the case of a sudden death should be to focus on the relevant care needs of the significant others and provide support, arrange for a peaceful environment and administer acute grief counselling at the scene, which might call for a developed competency within this field. (shrink)

In the western healthcare, shared decision making has become the orthodox approach to making healthcare choices as a way of promoting patient autonomy. Despite the fact that the autonomy paradigm is poorly suited to paediatric decision making, such an approach is enshrined in English common law. When reaching moral decisions, for instance when it is unclear whether treatment or non-treatment will serve a child’s best interests, shared decision making is particularly questionable because agreement does not ensure moral validity. With reference (...) to current common law and focusing on intensive care practice, this paper investigates what claims shared decision making may have to legitimacy in a paediatric intensive care setting. Drawing on key texts, I suggest these identify advantages to parents and clinicians but not to the child who is the subject of the decision. Without evidence that shared decision making increases the quality of the decision that is being made, it appears that a focus on the shared nature of a decision does not cohere with the principle that the best interests of the child should remain paramount. In the face of significant pressures toward the displacement of the child’s interests in a shared decision, advantages of a shared decision to decisional quality require elucidation. Although a number of arguments of this nature may have potential, should no such advantages be demonstrable we have cause to revise our commitment to either shared decision making or the paramountcy of the child in these circumstances. (shrink)

Objective To study how doctors care for their patients, both medically and as fellow humans, through observing their conduct in patient–doctor encounters. Design Qualitative study in which 101 videotaped consultations were observed and analysed using a Grounded Theory approach, generating explanatory categories through a hermeneutical analysis of the taped consultations. Setting A 500-bed general teaching hospital in Norway. Participants 71 doctors working in clinical non-psychiatric departments and their patients. Results The doctors were concerned about their patients' health and how their (...) medical knowledge could be of service. This medical focus often over-rode other important aspects of the consultations, especially existential elements. The doctors actively directed the focus away from their patients' existential concerns onto medical facts and rarely addressed the personal aspects of a patient's condition, treating them in a biomechanical manner. At the same time, however, the doctors attended to their patients with courteousness, displaying a polite and friendly attitude and emphasising the relationship between them. Conclusions The study suggests that the main failing of patient–doctor encounters is not a lack of courteous manners, but the moral offence patients experience when existential concerns are ignored. Improving doctors' social and communication skills cannot resolve this moral problem, which appears to be intrinsically bound to modern medical practice. Acknowledging this moral offence would, however, be the first step towards minimising the effects thereof. (shrink)

Next SectionThe principle of respect for autonomy has shaped much of the bioethics' discourse over the last 50 years, and is now most commonly used in the meaning of respecting autonomous choice. This is probably related to the influential concept of informed consent, which originated in research ethics and was soon also applied to the field of clinical medicine. But while available choices in medical research are well defined, this is rarely the case in healthcare. Consideration of ordinary medical practice (...) reveals that the focus on patient choice does not properly grasp the moral aspects involved in healthcare. Medical decisions are often portrayed as if doctors and patients in confidence confront specific decisions about examinations or treatment, yet the reality often involves many different participants, with decisions being made over time and space. Indeed, most of the decisions are never even presented to patients, as it would be unethical to suggest something that is not medically justifiable. The options patients do confront are somewhat arbitrarily constructed within the narrow framework of both what is deemed to be medically appropriate and how the healthcare system is organised practically. While the autonomy discourse has proven valuable, a failure to distinguish between the fields of medical research and clinical medicine has generated a focus on patient choice that does not reflect what is really at stake in healthcare settings. This is alarming, because the current discourse misrepresents medical practice in a way that actually contributes to bioethical self-delusion. (shrink)