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  1. Socrates and Plato on the Possibility of Akrasia.Thomas Gardner - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):191-210.
  • Akrasia and Self-Control.David Wall - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):69 – 78.
    According to Gary Watson (1977), if we choose not to implement a judgment about what it is best to do then we must have changed that judgment. On those grounds he rejects an otherwise plausible account of akrasia, or weakness of will, that explains it in terms of the relative strengths of the agent's desires to act against and in accordance with their evaluative judgment. However, Watson seems to assume what I call a 'principle of closure of evaluation', a principle (...)
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  • A Counterargument to Skepticism of Akrasia.Koki Asano - 2008 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 41 (2):17-29.
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  • Plato's Protagoras the Hedonist.Joshua Wilburn - 2016 - Classical Philology 113 (3):224-244.
    I advocate an ad hominem reading of the hedonism that appears in the final argument of the Protagoras. I that attribute hedonism both to the Many and to Protagoras, but my focus is on the latter. I argue that the Protagoras in various ways reflects Plato’s view that the sophist is an inevitable advocate for, and himself implicitly inclined toward, hedonism, and I show that the text aims through that characterization to undermine Protagoras’ status as an educator. One of my (...)
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  • Colloquium 4.Glenn Lesses - 1990 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 6 (1):141-150.
  • Knowledge and Hedonism in Plato's Protagoras.M. Dyson - 1976 - Journal of Hellenic Studies 96:32-45.
    The argument in theProtagoraswhich starts with an analysis of giving in to pleasure in terms of ignorance, and leads into a demonstration that courage is knowledge, is certainly one of the most brilliant in Plato and equally certainly one of the trickiest. My discussion deals mainly with three problems: Precisely what absurdity is detected in the popular account of moral weakness, and where is it located in the text? On the basis of largely formal considerations I believe that the absurdity (...)
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  • Free Choice, Effort, and Wanting More.Randolph Clarke - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41.
    This paper examines the libertarian account of free choice advanced by Robert Kane in his recent book, The Significance of Free Will. First a rather simple libertarian view is considered, and an objection is raised against it the view fails to provide for any greater degree of agent-control than what could be available in a deterministic world. The basic differences between this simple view and Kane's account are the requirements, on the latter, of efforts of will and of an agent's (...)
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  • A Note to Protagoras 353de.Kamil Sokołowski & Michał Bizoń - 2012 - Phronesis 57 (4):319-331.
    At Protagoras 353de, Socrates gives three possible reasons for calling some pleasures `wrong'. Scholarly attention has focused on the second of these, according to which pleasures are `wrong' when they have negative consequences. This paper argues that the first reason (the pleasures are fleeting) corresponds to beliefs held by Democritus, among others; and that the third reason (the pleasant things “give pleasure in whatever way and for whatever reason“) is the view adopted by Socrates in the dialogue.
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