The volume includes twenty-five research papers presented as gifts to John L. Bell to celebrate his 60th birthday by colleagues, former students, friends and admirers. Like Bell’s own work, the contributions cross boundaries into several inter-related fields. The contributions are new work by highly respected figures, several of whom are among the key figures in their fields. Some examples: in foundations of maths and logic ; analytical philosophy, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics and decision theory and foundations of economics. (...) Most articles are contributions to current philosophical debates, but contributions also include some new mathematical results, important historical surveys, and a translation by Wilfrid Hodges of a key work of arabic logic. (shrink)

In The Boundary Stones of Thought, Rumfitt defends classical logic against challenges from intuitionistic mathematics and vagueness, using a semantics of pre-topologies on possibilities, and a topological semantics on predicates, respectively. These semantics are suggestive but the characterizations of negation face difficulties that may undermine their usefulness in Rumfitt’s project.

According to Quine, in any disagreement over basic logical laws the contesting parties must mean different things by the connectives or quantifiers implicated in those laws; when a deviant logician ‘tries to deny the doctrine he only changes the subject’. The standard semantics for intuitionism offers some confirmation for this thesis, for it represents an intuitionist as attaching quite different senses to the connectives than does a classical logician. All the same, I think Quine was wrong, even about the dispute (...) between classicists and intuitionists. I argue for this by presenting an account of consequence, and a cognate semantic theory for the language of the propositional calculus, which respects the meanings of the connectives as embodied in the familiar classical truth-tables, does not presuppose Bivalence, and with respect to which the rules of the intuitionist propositional calculus are sound and complete. Thus the disagreement between classicists and intuitionists, at least, need not stem from their attaching different senses to the connectives; one may deny the doctrine without changing the subject. The basic notion of my semantic theory is truth at a possibility, where a possibility is a way that things might be, but which differs from a possible world in that the way in question need not be fully specific or determinate. I compare my approach with a previous theory of truth at a possibility due to Lloyd Humberstone, and with a previous attempt to refute Quine’s thesis due to John McDowell. (shrink)

Sheaf semantics is developed within a constructive and predicative framework, Martin‐Löf's type theory. We prove strong completeness of many sorted, first order intuitionistic logic with respect to this semantics, by using sites of provably functional relations.

Alongside the analogy between maximal ideals and complete theories, the Jacobson radical carries over from ideals of commutative rings to theories of propositional calculi. This prompts a variant of Lindenbaum’s Lemma that relates classical validity and intuitionistic provability, and the syntactical counterpart of which is Glivenko’s Theorem. The Jacobson radical in fact turns out to coincide with the classical deductive closure. As a by-product we obtain a possible interpretation in logic of the axioms-as-rules conservation criterion for a multi-conclusion Scott-style entailment (...) relation over a single-conclusion one. (shrink)

This paper presents several independence results concerning the topos-valid and the intuitionistic predicative theory of locales. In particular, certain consequences of the consistency of a general form of Troelstra's uniformity principle with constructive set theory and type theory are examined.

We present a proof of Goodmanʼs Theorem, which is a variation of the proof of Renaldel de Lavalette [9]. This proof uses in an essential way possibly divergent computations for proving a result which mentions systems involving only terminating computations. Our proof is carried out in a constructive metalanguage. This involves implicitly a covering relation over arbitrary posets in formal topology, which occurs in forcing in set theory in a classical framework, but can also be defined constructively.

This paper provides a constructive topological semantics for non-deducibility of a first order intuitionistic formula. Formal topology theory, in particular the recently introduced notion of a binary positivity predicate, and co-induction are two needful tools.

We present a semantic study of a family of modal intuitionistic linear systems, providing various logics with both an algebraic semantics and a relational semantics, to obtain completeness results. We call modality a unary operator on formulas which satisfies only one rale (regularity), and we consider any subsetW of a list of axioms which defines the exponential of course of linear logic. We define an algebraic semantics by interpreting the modality as a unary operation on an IL-algebra. Then we introduce (...) a relational semantics based on pretopologies with an additional binary relationr between information states. The interpretation of is defined in a suitable way, which differs from the traditional one in classical modal logic. We prove that such models provide a complete semantics for our minimal modal system, as well as, by requiring the suitable conditions onr (in the spirit of correspondence theory), for any of its extensions axiomatized by any subsetW as above. We also prove an embedding theorem for modal IL-algebras into complete ones and, after introducing the notion of general frame, we apply it to obtain a duality between general frames and modal IL-algebras. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Possibilistic states of information are fuzzy sets of possible worlds. They constitute a complete lattice, which can be endowed with a monoidal operation (a t-norm) to produce a quantal. An algebraic semantics is presented which links possibilistic formulae with information states, and gives a natural interpretation of logical connectives as operations on fuzzy sets. Due to the quantal structure of information states, we obtain a system which shares several features with (exponential-free) intuitionistic linear logic. Soundness and completeness are proved, (...) parametrically on the choice of the t-norm operation. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of infinitary preorder and use it to obtain a predicative presentation of sup-lattices by generators and relations. The method is uniform in that it extends in a modular way to obtain a presentation of quantales, as “sup-lattices on monoids”, by using the notion of pretopology.Our presentation is then applied to frames, the link with Johnstone’s presentation of frames is spelled out, and his theorem on freely generated frames becomes a special case of our results on quantales.The (...) main motivation of this paper is to contribute to the development of formal topology. That is why all our definitions and proofs can be expressed within an intuitionistic and predicative foundation, like constructive type theory. (shrink)