A rational process for assessment of environmental policy options should be based on an appreciation of how humans value nature. Increased understanding of values will also contribute to the development of appropriate ways for us to relate to and manage natural areas. Over the past two decades, environmental philosophers have examined the notion that there is an intrinsic value in nature. Economists have attempted to define and measure the market and nonmarket economic values associated with decisions concerning natural areas. Psychologists (...) have tried to assess the extent to which people believe in an intrinsic value in nature, and have also begun to work with economists to improve nonmarket valuation techniques. I briefly review the contributions made to our understanding of natural area value by environmental philosophy, psychology and economics, and develop a model that integrates insights from these disciplines. Components in the model include cognitions, held values, assigned values and various modes of value expression. I make recommendations for future validation, development and use of the model. (shrink)

In 'No Experience Necessary: Foundationalism and the Retreat from Culture in Environmental Ethics'. Ben A. Minteer forgivably misconstrues my critique of moral pluralism. Contrary to Minteer’s representation: I do not accuse moral pluralists of ‘moral promiscuity’: nor do I posit a ‘master principle’ to govern all human action respecting the environment: and although I offer conceptual foundations for environmental ethics, I do not claim that they rest on certain, a priori, and non-empirical intuitions. Rather, the conceptual foundations I offer for (...) environmental ethics are largely scientific. Contrary to Minteer’s representation: I do consider a multiplicity of contexts in which ethical actions are situated: and I do respectfully attend to and creatively engage a variety of cultural points of view, both western and nonwestern. in constructing environmental ethics. Anti-foundationalists, such as Minteer and Bryan G. Norton, ironically pose an insidious threat to democratic discussion and debate of environmental values, because they themselves posit, but do not frankly acknowledge, foundational beliefs. (shrink)

If valuation processes are dualistic in the sense that ethical values are given priority over instrumental values, and if old-growth forests are considered to be valuable in their own right, then the cost-benefits approach to valuing old growth is inappropriate. If this is the case, then ethical standards must be used to determine whether preservation is the correct policy when human material needs and ecosystem preservation are in conflict. Such a standard is suggested and evaluated in the context of the (...) policy debate over the preservation of spotted owl habitat in the Pacific Northwest region of the U.S. (shrink)