From the point of view of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, Raymond Ruyer's work appears to bear out two distinct tendencies of unequal appeal. On the one hand, Ruyer appears to be an anti-Aristotelian thinker of formation, rejecting any hylomorphic account of the production of reality. However, and notably despite his serious commitment to the work of the sciences of his day, he remains wedded to the ultimately conservative Leibnizian principle of closure. Nowhere is this dichotomy more striking than in (...) his account of human society. The aim of this paper is to show how his positive account of form finds a significant and convincing extension in Deleuze and Guattari's notion of social surface or socius in Anti-Oedipus. (shrink)

Cet article propose d'utiliser le concept d'utopie rationnelle pour rendre compte des pratiques managériales et tout particulièrement de la production de réformes répétées dans les organisations. Dans cette perspective, après avoir décrit une décennie de transformations au sein d'une organisation publique, certaines caractéristiques de la « culture managériale » sont dégagées de sa pratique réformatrice. Dans un second temps, le concept d'utopie rationnelle est construit à partir de textes canoniques et des travaux d'« utopologues ». Dans un troisième temps, utopie (...) rationnelle et culture managériale sont comparées, afin de préciser l'apport cognitif de cet outil à la compréhension du fonctionnement des organisations. (shrink)

Que Marx n'ait pas une haute opinion de l'utopie, l'inventaire de ses oeuvres le confirme tout en permettant de nuancer sa position et surtout de montrer qu'elle relève d'une double stratégie de dénomination et de combat. Or c'est plutôt d'une stratégie théorique que relèvent les études de l'utopie, et c'est cette stratégie théorique qui permet de comprendre que Bloch puisse se réclamer de Marx tout en accordant, à l'utopie, une fonction fondamentale et essentiellement positive.Does Marx really think that utopia is (...) a reactionary chimera? A survey of his works shows that such is the case, though one ought to take into account a possible transitory revolutionary role of utopia, and that his concern for utopia stems from a denominative strategy and a strategy of struggle, whereas most studies of utopia belong to a theoretical strategy. It is this theoretical strategy wich allows Ernst Bloch to stress the fundamentally positive role of utopia while pretending to be faith-full to Marx's philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the difficulty of distinguishing between science fiction and philosophy. The boundary between these genres is somewhat vague. There is a “neutral zone” separating the genres. But this neutral zone is often transgressed. One key distinction considered here is that between entertainment and edification. Another crucial element is found in the importance of the author’s apparent self-consciousness of these distinctions. Philosophy seeks to edify, and philosophers are often deliberately focused on thinking about the question of the (...) borders that distinguish genres. Science fiction is more interested in entertainment, and narrative authors tend to care less about policing the border. This distinction is a pragmatic one. And canonical authors often violate the boundary. I examine key authors to make this point, including Plato, Kant, and H.G. Wells. My discussion shows that these canonical authors wandered into the neutral zone in their own work, reminding us that the boundaries we draw around genres are arbitrary and subject to transgression. (shrink)

In their strife for designing a moral system where everyone is given equal consideration, cosmopolitan theorists have merely tolerated partiality as a necessary evil (insofar it means that we give priority to our kin opposite the distant needy). As a result, the cosmopolitan ideal has long departed from our moral psychologies and our social realities. Here I put forward partial cosmopolitanism as an alternative to save that obstacle. Instead of demanding impartial universal action, it requires from us that we are (...) equally responsive in all the relationships we stand in. That goes from the local to the cosmopolitan sphere, since I defend that we are related with strangers as co-members of the global community. Thus, partiality not only is accommodated by cosmopolitanism, but actually supports it: only by having meaningful personal relationships we become able to care for distant strangers. (shrink)