One of the main characteristics of the philosophy of Descartes which marked the starting point of modern philosophy and was continued by English empiricism and German Idealism is a special attention to the subject instead of cosmos, being or God. But what caused such a turn to subject? With a historical linguistic approach it can be shown that the replacement of old languages of philosophy namely Greek, Arabic and Latin language by modern European languages namely French, English and German can (...) be one of the causes of that turn in the history of philosophy. It seems interesting that the change in modern European language occurred exactly at the same time the modern philosophy appeared. In this research we will concentrate on the word order and the possibility of the omission of the subject in the sentence. In modern European languages there is a insistence on the subject to appear at the beginning of the sentence. This can lead to a special attention to the subject in philosophical aspect. It may seem interesting that old languages of philosophy are null-subject languages in the sense that in these languages the subject can be omitted. In these languages the subject sometimes comes after the verb or even will not appear in the phrase. That may seem why in those languages a philosophy similar to modern philosophy did not appear. Finally it will be shown that the change in language did not confine to mere language and has important philosophical implications. (shrink)

This thesis offers a naturalist revision of Alain Badiou’s philosophy. This goal is pursued through an encounter of Badiou’s mathematical ontology and theory of truth with contemporary trends in philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science. I take issue with Badiou’s inability to elucidate the link between the empirical and the ontological, and his residual reliance on a Heideggerian project of fundamental ontology, which undermines his own immanentist principles. I will argue for both a bottom-up naturalisation of Badiou’s philosophical approach (...) to mathematics and a top-down naturalisation. Articulating my particular understanding of what realism and naturalism should commit us to, I propose a creative fusion of Badiou’s attention to metamathematical results with a structural-informational metaphysics, proposing a ‘matherialism’ uniting the more daring speculative insights of the former with the naturalist and empiricist commitments motivating the latter. (shrink)

Las narraciones que presentan la filosofía moderna como un periodo particular de la historia de la filosofía, al igual que las narraciones sobre otros periodos de la historia de la filosofía, son deudoras tanto de determinadas concepciones de la filosofía como de ciertas concepciones de su historia y de la historia. La mirada hacia el pasado filosófico se sitúa en un presente que, implícitamente o no, delimita el campo de lo que es considerado como filosofía y de lo propiamente filosófico, (...) delimitación que implica una selección de las manifestaciones que caracterizan la filosofía, como, por ejemplo, sus autores, sus problemas, sus escenarios y sus formas discursivas. Dicho de otra manera, al narrar una historia de la filosofía se determinan de alguna manera quiénes son filósofes, qué temas son filosóficos, dónde se hace filosofía y cómo se escribe filosofía, entre otras cosas. A su vez, la narración histórica de las expresiones de ese pasado asume ciertas posiciones acerca de la historicidad de lo filosófico, de sus relaciones con los diferentes ámbitos de su emergencia, de sus métodos de investigación y de las modalidades discursivas deseables para esta narración. (shrink)