This volume examines the entire logical and philosophical production of Nikolai A. Vasil’ev, studying his life and activities as a historian and man of letters. Readers will gain a comprehensive understanding of this influential Russian logician, philosopher, psychologist, and poet. The author frames Vasil’ev’s work within its historical and cultural context. He takes into consideration both the situation of logic in Russia and the state of logic in Western Europe, from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of (...) the 20th. Following this, the book considers the attempts to develop non-Aristotelian logics or ideas that present affinities with imaginary logic. It then looks at the contribution of traditional logic in elaborating non-classical ideas. This logic allows the author to deal with incomplete objects just as imaginary logic does with contradictory ones. Both logics are objects of interesting analysis by modern researchers. (shrink)

This article examines the traditional and modern doctrines of categorical propositions and argues that both doctrines have serious problems. While the doctrines disagree about existential imports...

In questo paper cercherò di mostrare che la visione tradizionale del mutamento da parte di Russell della sua teoria delle descrizioni definite negli anni che vanno dai Principles of Mathematics del 1903 a «On Denoting» del 1905, visione secondo cui Russell produce una nuova teoria delle descrizioni (anche) per liberarsi dagli impegni ontologici manifesti di stampo meinonghiano ad entità inesistenti connessi alla sua precedente teoria delle descrizioni, non è convincente, perché le due teorie...

The work of Hugh MacColl (1837–1909) suffered the same fate after his death as before it:despite being vaguely alluded to and in part even commended, on the whole it has remained an unknown quantity. Even worse, those of his ideas which have played a decisive role in the history of logic have been credited to his successors; this is especially the case with the definition of strict implication and the first formal development of formal modal logic. This paper takes an (...) initial step towards a rectification of this unfortunate misrepresentation, presenting a bibliography of MacColl’s most significant publications with particular regard to their reception. (shrink)

The paper argues that philosophers commonly misidentify the substitutivity principle involved in Russell’s puzzle about substitutivity in “On Denoting”. This matters because when that principle is properly identified the puzzle becomes considerably sharper and more interesting than it is often taken to be. This article describes both the puzzle itself and Russell's solution to it, which involves resources beyond the theory of descriptions. It then explores the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of that solution. One such consequence, it argues, is that (...) Russell must abandon his commitment to propositions. (shrink)

A metafísica de 'Os Princípios da Matemática' de Russell e a controvérsia à respeito da suposta semelhança entre essa metafísica e a ontologia meinongiana Resumo: No presente artigo, objetiva-se apresentar as principais características da metafísica do realismo lógico, desenvolvido por Russell em Os Princípios da Matemática, de 1903, e, principalmente, analisar a controvérsia sobre se os princípios dessa metafísica podem realmente ser interpretados como semelhantes aos princípios da ontologia meinongiana. São comparados os pontos de vista opostos dessa controvérsia à luz (...) dos trechos de Os Princípios da Matemática que supostamente comprometeram Russell de ter elaborado uma gramática filosófica na qual todo e qualquer nome próprio ou descrição definida, ocupando a posição de sujeito lógico nas proposições, referem-se a objetos com alguma categoria de Ser. Ao realizar tal análise, conclui-se que o problema central diz respeito aos nomes próprios vazios e que, portanto, a metafísica de Os Princípios da Matemática expressa uma perspectiva instável da teoria da denotação de Russell. Palavras-chave: Russell; Ser; Existência; Significado. Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics metaphysics and the controversy over the supposed similarity between this metaphysics and the meinongian ontology Abstract: This article aims to present the main characteristics of the metaphysics of logical realism, developed by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics, of 1903, and, mainly, to analyze the controversy about whether the principles of this metaphysics can really be interpreted as similar to the principles of meinongian ontology. The opposing points of view of this controversy are compared in the light of the excerpts from The Principles of Mathematics that supposedly committed Russell to having elaborated a philosophical grammar in which all and any proper names or definite descriptions, occupying the position of logical subject in the propositions, refer to objects with some category of Being. In carrying out such an analysis, it is concluded that the central problem concerns empty proper names and that, therefore, the metaphysics of The Principles of Mathematics expresses an unstable perspective of Russell’s theory of denotation. Keywords: Russell; Being; Existence; Meaning. La metafísica de Los Principios de las Matemáticas de Russell y la controversia sobre la supuesta similitud entre esta metafísica y la ontología meinongiana Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo presentar las principales características de la metafísica del realismo lógico, desarrollada por Russell en Los Principios de las Matemáticas, de 1903, y, principalmente, analizar la controversia sobre si los principios de esta metafísica pueden realmente interpretarse como similares a los principios de la ontología meinongiana. Los puntos de vista opuestos de esta controversia se comparan a la luz de los extractos de Los Principios de las Matemáticas que supuestamente comprometieron Russell a haber elaborado una gramática filosófica en la que todos y cualquier nombre propio o descripción definida, ocupando la posición de sujeto lógico en las proposiciones, se refieren a objetos con alguna categoría de Ser. Al realizar tal análisis, se concluye que el problema central concierne a los nombres propios vacíos y que, por lo tanto, la metafísica de Los Principios de las Matemáticas expresa una perspectiva inestable de la teoría de la denotación de Russell. Palabras clave: Russell; Ser; Existencia; Significado. Data de registro: 10/04/2020 Data de aceite: 08/12/2020. (shrink)

The widely held assumption about what motivated On Denoting is irreconcilable with Russell's position shortly beforehand; but discarding it leaves one with a carefully worked out solution whose problem is missing. The real motivation is to be found in a notoriously obscure passage in OD, in which Russell exposes a decisive (though easily overlooked) flaw in his former theory of denoting; a flaw which also cripples Frege's theory of sense and reference. A comprehensive account of this passage is the chief (...) concern of the present paper. Recognizing the critical role of this argument of Russell's leads to a more credible account of his argumentation in that essay. It also suggests that the fundamental standpoint underlyingThe Principles of Mathematics remains intact. In this light, the appropriation of OD to the philosophy of language may be misguided. (shrink)

George Boole published the pamphlet The Mathematical Analysis of Logic in 1847. He believed that logic should belong to a universal mathematics that would cover both quantitative and nonquantitative research. With his pamphlet, Boole signalled an important change in symbolic logic: in contrast with his predecessors, his thinking was exclusively extensional. Notwithstanding the innovations introduced he accepted all traditional Aristotelean syllogisms. Nevertheless, some criticisms have been raised concerning Boole’s view of Aristotelean logic as the solution of algebraic equations. In order (...) to circumvent such criticisms, we show here how Boole’s conclusions may be deduced from the axioms and inference rules proposed in his pamphlet, from which Aristotle’s deductions in Prior Analytics (including those that are completed through an impossibility) can be stated as theorems. We clarify his method for dealing with both universal and particular premises by means of his symbol v and demystify some criticisms concerning the way he expressed particular premises. Boole’s conclusions for some of those premises for which according to Aristotle there is no deduction are also discussed. The deductive system presented here has the potential to provide a new perspective on Boole’s approach to logic in The Mathematical Analysis of Logic. (shrink)

This is a review of G. Stevens. The Theory of Descriptions: Russell and the Philosophy of Language.

Dans la seconde moitié des années 1900, Bertrand Russell et Hugh MacColl échangèrent sans s’entendre sur les questions de l’implication et de l’existence, dans le cadre d’un débat plus général sur la nature de la logique. Il est tentant de voir dans cet échange une opposition entre le moniste logique Russell et le pluraliste MacColl. Dans cet article, j’affirme que cette interprétation est inexacte, et que les deux hommes étaient tous deux monistes, bien qu’ayant des allégeances différentes. La transition du (...) monisme au pluralisme ne s’effectue en réalité qu’à partir du début des années 1910, peu après la mort de MacColl en 1909. Les premiers signes de cette transition sont à trouver particulièrement chez le philosophe américain C. I. Lewis, le mathématicien néerlandais L. E. J. Brouwer, et le logicien polonais Jan Łukasiewicz. Ces auteurs sont des exemples de l’avènement graduel de la métalogique. (shrink)

Dans la seconde moitié des années 1900, Bertrand Russell et Hugh MacColl échangèrent sans s’entendre sur les questions de l’implication et de l’existence, dans le cadre d’un débat plus général sur la nature de la logique. Il est tentant de voir dans cet échange une opposition entre le moniste logique Russell et le pluraliste MacColl. Dans cet article, j’affirme que cette interprétation est inexacte, et que les deux hommes étaient tous deux monistes, bien qu’ayant des allégeances différentes. La transition du (...) monisme au pluralisme ne s’effectue en réalité qu’à partir du début des années 1910, peu après la mort de MacColl en 1909. Les premiers signes de cette transition sont à trouver particulièrement chez le philosophe américain C. I. Lewis, le mathématicien néerlandais L. E. J. Brouwer, et le logicien polonais Jan Łukasiewicz. Ces auteurs sont des exemples de l’avènement graduel de la métalogique. (shrink)

La réflexion philosophique sur la non-existence est une thématique qui a été abordée au commencement même de la philosophie et qui suscite, depuis la publication en 1905 de « On Denoting » par Russell, les plus vifs débats en philosophie analytique. Cependant, le débat féroce sur la sémantique des noms propres et des descriptions définies qui surgirent suite à la publication du « On Referring » par Strawson en 1950 n’engagea pas d’étude systématique de la sémantique des fictions. En fait, (...) le développement systématique d’un lien qui articule approches logiques, philosophiques et littéraires de la fiction devait attendre les travaux de John Woods publiés en 1974 dans son livre The Logic of Fiction : A Philosophical Sounding of Deviant Logic. Un des enjeux les plus excitants du livre de Woods se situe au niveau de l’interaction entre les points de vue internalistes ou interne-à-l’histoire (principalement pragmatiques) et les points de vue externalistes ou externe-à-la-fiction (principalement sémantiques). Sur ce point, Woods fut le premier à formuler une sémantique pour l’opérateur de fiction à lire comme « selon l’histoire… » en relation à la notion logique de portée, ce qui permettait l’étude de l’internalisme et de l’externalisme. Suite au livre de Woods, loin de s’essouffler, les débats trouvaient une nouvelle impulsion. Le fait pertinent pour notre article est que la tradition phénoménologique également, l’étude de la fiction a joué un rôle central. En effet, l’une des problématiques les plus sujettes à controverses dans l’intentionnalité est celle de l’indépendance à l’existence, c’est-à-dire le fait que les actes intentionnels n’ont pas besoin d’être forcément dirigés vers un objet existant. Influencée par les travaux de Roman Ingarden (1893-1970), l’un des plus importants disciples de Husserl, Amie L. Thomasson développe le concept phénoménologique de dépendance ontologique en vue d’expliquer les processus de références inter- et transfictionnels – dans le contexte de l’interprétation littéraire par exemple. L’enjeu essentiel de cet article est de proposer une reconstruction multimodale bi-dimensionnelle de la théorie des personnages fictionnels de Ingarden-Thomasson. Cette théorie qui entend prendre au sérieux le fait que les fictions sont des créations montre la voie pour une articulation entre les approches internalistes et externalistes. Nous motivons certains changements quant à l’approche artéfactuelle - incluant une sémantique appropriée pour l’opérateur de fictionalité qui, nous l’espérons, éveillera l’intérêt des théoriciens de la littérature. L’article est à d’autres égards un panorama de la façon dont différents concepts d’intentionnalité pourraient fonder différentes sémantiques formelles pour la fictionalité. Nous proposerons enfin un cadre dialogique qui est une extension modale d’un certain système de preuve développé par Matthieu Fontaine et Juan Redmond. Le cadre dialogique développe la contrepartie inférentielle de la sémantique bi-dimensionnelle introduite par Shahid Rahman et Tero Tulenheimo dans un article récent. (shrink)

A key theme throughout Maimon’s works is a circularity he diagnoses at the heart of Kant’s response to Hume. The objective validity of Kant’s category of causality ultimately rests, Maimon argues, upon the logical status of the hypothetical judgement – on its inclusion among the forms of pure general logic. In turn, however, the inclusion of the hypothetical within pure general logic itself rests upon the objective validity of causal judgements. This article examines Maimon’s diagnosis and traces it back to (...) a debate that has its origins in Wolff’s German Logic, concerning the relationship between categorical and hypothetical judgements. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell’s _Principles of Mathematics_ (1903) gives rise to several interpretational challenges, especially concerning the theory of denoting concepts. Only relatively recently, for instance, has it been properly realised that Russell accepted denoting concepts that do not denote anything. Such empty denoting concepts are sometimes thought to enable Russell, whether he was aware of it or not, to avoid commitment to some of the problematic non-existent entities he seems to accept, such as the Homeric gods and chimeras. In this paper, (...) I argue first that the theory of denoting concepts in _Principles of __Mathematics_ has been generally misunderstood. According to the interpretation I defend, if a denoting concept shifts what a proposition is about, then the aggregate of the denoted terms will also be a constituent of the proposition. I then show that Russell therefore could not have avoided commitment to the Homeric gods and chimeras by appealing to empty denoting concepts. Finally, I develop what I think is the best understanding of the ontology of _Principles of __Mathematics_ by interpreting some difficult passages. (shrink)

Contemporary logicians continue to address problems associated with the existential import of categorical propositions. One notable problem concerns invalid instances of subalternation in the case of a universal proposition with an empty subject term. To remedy problems, logicians restrict first-order predicate logics to exclude such terms. Examining the historical origins of contemporary discussions reveals that logicians continue to make various category mistakes. We now believe that no proposition per se has existential import as commonly understood and thus it is unnecessary (...) to restrict first-order predicate logics to non-empty classes. After introducing the problem, we trace some nineteenth century treatments of the issue to locate a source of misconstruing propositional import in misconceptions of ‘implies’ and ‘affirms’ and name the process/product fallacy, along with the translation of categorical sentences using quantifiers and accommodating an empty class. Next we treat some metalogical matters to orient our discussion by which we provide a more precise nomenclature about ‘sentence’ and ‘proposition’ to correct previous misconceptions; here we uncover a common category mistake in respect of a proposition’s efficacy. The semantic distinction between agent and force is helpful in this connection. We conclude by showing that logicians have reinserted existence as a predicate, a position previously excised by Kant, and that the Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis applies only to relationships within a categorical sentence between grammatical predicate and subject. (shrink)

At first russell thought (p) that whatever a proposition is about must be a constituent of it. Then, Around 1900, He discovered denoting concepts and realized that a proposition could be about something and have only its denoting concept as constituent. However, A number of remarks that he made through the years can only be understood as inspired by (p). In particular, The arguments offered in "on denoting" against the doctrine of denotation of "principles" are grounded on (p).

Part 1 of the thesis questions the traditional relation model of intentionality. After fixing reference on the target phenomenon, intentionality, and explaining my interest in it, I ask what sorts of things intentionality might be a relation to. I consider ordinary objects, properties, propositions and hybrid views, and conclude all make the intentional relation appear rather mysterious. From there, I move on to examine the relation view’s most prominent proponents, the tracking theorists—pointing out some challenges such views face, and concluding (...) that it might be worthwhile looking into alternatives to the relation view. Part 2 asks whether the newly emerging phenomenal intentionality movement can provide a viable alternative to the relation model of intentionality. After focusing on a specific kind of phenomenal intentionality theory—something I call modificationism—I examine three such accounts. From there I go on to discuss some common complaints/challenges these kinds of views face, and consider how they might be addressed within the modificationist framework. In Part 3, I address what I call the problem of cognitive contact: how do our contentful mental states manage to make cognitive contact with the ordinary objects (e.g. tables and chairs) that they appear to. The problem is particularly acute for any version of phenomenal intentionality that denies the relation view, and has been given very little attention in the literature. I consider how a modificationist might address this problem, and conclude that though some avenues appear promising, there is nevertheless a great deal of work to be done if modificationism, and phenomenal intentionality theory, is to overcome this problem. (shrink)

Aristotle explains existence through postulating essences that are intrinsic and percep- tion independent. I argue that his theory is more plausible than Hume’s and Russell’s theories of existence. Russell modifies Hume’s theory because he wants to allow for the existence of mathematical objects. However, Russell’s theory facilitates a problematic collapse of ontology into epistemology, which has become a feature of much analytic philosophy. This collapse obscures the nature of truth. Aristotle is to be praised for starting with a clear account (...) of ordinary objects rather than immediately reifying mathematical objects. He thus allows us to have a coherent account of existence and truth, and to easily resist collapsing ontology into epistemology. (shrink)

این‌ نوشتار به گزارش و بررسی یکی از مهم‌ترین دیدگاه‌ها در رد وجود محمولی، یعنی بحث اشاره‌پذیری/‌ اشاره‌ناپذیری، می‌پردازد. همچنین نشان می‌دهد اغلب ادعاهای زیر از قوت چندانی برخوردار نیستند: 1. وجود مطلقاً محمول نیست؛ 2. وجود محمول منطقی نیست؛ و حتی، از جهاتی، این ادعای معتدل‌تر که می‌گوید: 3. گرچه وجود به‌صورت موضوع ـ محمولی محمول منطقی نیست، می‌توان آن را محمول منطقی به‌شمار آورد. برای این منظور دیدگاه برگزیده به کمک تساوی وجود و اشاره‌پذیری، تحلیلی از وجود محمولی (...) در فلسفة اسلامی ارائه می‌کند و نشان می‌دهد در دو بحث نخست دیدگاه مطرح در فلسفه و منطق دورة اسلامی قابل دفاع و تقویت است و در بحث سوم نیز دیدگاه‌های رقیب در تحلیل منطقی، بر فلسفه و منطق دورة اسلامی ترجیحی ندارند. همچنین، این جستار، با اصلاح‌ مبنای فلسفة اسلامی، اشاره‌پذیری معدوم به اشارة عقلی تبعی و غیر مستقیم را می‌پذیرد. (shrink)

This thesis is about indicative conditionals and apparent counterexamples to classically valid argument forms. Specifically, it applies the following four theories: - material (inspired by Grice (1961, 1975 and 1989)); - possible-worlds (inspired by Stalnaker (1981); Lewis (1976); and Kratzer (2012)), - suppositional (inspired by Adams (1975) and Edgington (1995 and 2014)); and - hybrid (inspired by Jackson (1987)) to try and solve the following two counterexamples: - Vann McGee’s to modus ponens (1985); and - Lewis Carroll’s to modus tollens (...) (1894). I argue that none of the theories I consider can explain – without facing any problems – the three individually plausible but jointly inconsistent theses that give rise to the apparent counterexamples. The three theses of the trilemma are the following: (1) the argument is invalid; (2) the argument is an instance of modus ponens or modus tollens; and (3) modus ponens or modus tollens is valid. (shrink)