This paper reconstructs the conceptual foundations of Locke’s unilateralist theory of original appropriation through a critical comparison with the rival compact theories of Grotius and Pufendorf. Much of the normative and conceptual framework of Locke’s theory is common to theirs. Integrating his innovative doctrines on labour and natural self-proprietorship into this received theoretical framework logically required Locke to make several conceptual amendments. I highlight three all but overlooked revisions: (i) an unusually broad conception oflabour; (ii) a reduction of mere use-rights (...) toproperty rights; and (iii) a novel non-self-preservationist interpretation of thedivine authorizationto use natural resources in common. The reconceptualization of ‘labour’ is theoretically the most fundamental, underpinning the other two. My contextual reconstruction enhances our grasp of the structure of Locke’s theory of original appropriation. It also reveals Locke’s main objection to compact theories to be an external one, hinging on idiosyncratic conceptualizations of key notions. (shrink)

Research Articles Adam Mossoff, Social Philosophy and Policy, FirstView Article.

“Resilience” is booming. No longer a mere metaphor or abstract reference to dispositional properties, the resilience of communities or social-ecological systems is increasingly grounded in specific first-order properties. Consequently, resilience now constitutes a contentful and achievable partial conception of a good society. Yet political philosophers have taken little notice. The current article first discerns within recent social-scientific literature a set of attainable and measurable first-order properties that constitute “community resilience” or “ecological resilience.” Then, specifying “resilience” as the resilience of high-HDI (...) democratic societies to environmental disasters, infrastructure failures, and economic collapse, the current article argues from within a liberal framework that both “classical” and “egalitarian” liberals must treat resilience so understood as a necessary condition of legitimacy and justice; and this conclusion forces an overhaul of these liber... (shrink)

Defenders of strong Intellectual Property rights or of a nonutilitarian basis for those rights often turn to Locke for support.1 Perhaps because of a general belief that Locke is an advocate of all things proprietary, this move seldom receives careful scrutiny. That is unfortunate for two reasons. First, as I will argue, Locke does not issue a blank check in support of all property regimes, and the application of his reasoning to intellectual property would actually tend to favor a substantially (...) limited rights regime. Second, the attempt to understand intellectual property as an instance of Lockean property, though admittedly anachronistic, offers an opportunity to further our understanding of Locke's own thought. My major claim will be twofold: on the one hand, intellectual property would be an almost paradigmatic case of Lockean property; on the other hand, Locke's provisos—specifically the widely neglected spoilage proviso—would sharply limit the scope of any entitlements. My secondary claim will accordingly be that the spoilage proviso's neglect is undeserved, and that it deserves a more central place in our understanding of Locke. I will not here address whether Locke provides the right way to think about property, whether IP is a good idea, or whether property rights ought to include a right to destroy; my concern is to elucidate Locke's arguments and then to block this application of them. (shrink)