The concept of o or "pre-emotions" is known not only to the Roman Stoics and Christian exegetes but also to Philo of Alexandria. Philo also supplies the term o at QGen 1.79. As Philo cannot have derived what he knows from Seneca (despite his visit to Rome in 39), nor from Cicero, who also mentions the point, he must have found it in older Stoic writings. The o concept, rich in implications for the voluntariness and phenomenology of the passions proper, (...) is thus confirmed for the Hellenistic period. It is not to be expected that Philo's handling of this or any concept will necessarily conform to the usage of his Stoic sources. His evidence is nonetheless of great value where it coincides with that of other witnesses. In QGen 4.73 the emphasis falls upon involuntariness and the mechanisms of impression and assent as in Epictetus fr. 9. The o saves the virtuous person's insusceptibility to emotion exactly as it does for the Stoic spokesman in Gellius NA 19.1; this point is of some interest in view of the Christological use of this concept in Origen and Didymus. QGen 1.55 and 3.56 indicate that the occurrence of the o is dependent upon uncertainty, and further, that for Philo, as for Seneca in Ira 2.3.4, a thought not acted upon can count as a o. In QGen 4.15-17 and 1.79, Philo indicates that hope and perhaps laughter may be related to joy as o to o; these assertions are not paralleled in extant Stoic texts. Further, in QGen 2.57, he names "biting and contraction" as the shrink)

The concept of πρoπαειαι or "pre-emotions" is known not only to the Roman Stoics and Christian exegetes but also to Philo of Alexandria. Philo also supplies the term πρoπαεια at QGen 1.79. As Philo cannot have derived what he knows from Seneca, nor from Cicero, who also mentions the point, he must have found it in older Stoic writings. The πρoπαεια concept, rich in implications for the voluntariness and phenomenology of the passions proper, is thus confirmed for the Hellenistic period. (...) It is not to be expected that Philo's handling of this or any concept will necessarily conform to the usage of his Stoic sources. His evidence is nonetheless of great value where it coincides with that of other witnesses. In QGen 4.73 the emphasis falls upon involuntariness and the mechanisms of impression and assent as in Epictetus fr. 9. The πρoπαεια saves the virtuous person's insusceptibility to emotion exactly as it does for the Stoic spokesman in Gellius NA 19.1; this point is of some interest in view of the Christological use of this concept in Origen and Didymus. QGen 1.55 and 3.56 indicate that the occurrence of the πρoπαειαι is dependent upon uncertainty, and further, that for Philo, as for Seneca in Ira 2.3.4, a thought not acted upon can count as a πρoπαεια. In QGen 4.15-17 and 1.79, Philo indicates that hope and perhaps laughter may be related to joy as πρoπαεια to παoς; these assertions are not paralleled in extant Stoic texts. Further, in QGen 2.57, he names "biting and contraction" as the ευπαεια corresponding to grief, supplying a helpful parallel for Cic. Tusc. 3.83 and Plut. Virt. Mor. 449a. The topic may well have been discussed by Posidonius, as suggested by Cooper and others, but Posidonius' attested innovations are rather different in character from the points which have caught the attention of Philo. Taking together the indirect evidence of Philo, Seneca, and Cicero, we may reasonably infer that the πρoπαεια concept belonged already to an earlier period of Stoicism. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone rastrear la influencia de la tradición platónica Acerca de los primeros principios, en sus diversas formulaciones, sobre la filosofía de Orígenes de Alejandría. La lectura origeniana de los autores platónicos y su afinidad con ellos se confirman en las fuentes históricas. El alejandrino adopta y asimila numerosos aspectos de la doctrina y la terminología de los seguidores de Platón. Sin embargo, también toma distancia de ellos en algunos puntos neurálgicos de su concepción de lo divino (...) y de la creación del mundo. Se analizan especialmente los papeles que cumplen en la teoría origeniana las categorías académicas de lo absoluto y lo relativo, la noción mesoplatónica y filoniana del agente demiúrgico y una original adaptación del esquema causal derivativo neopitagórico. -/- The present paper intends to trace the influence of the Platonic tradition On first principles;, considering its different versions, on the philosophy of Origen of Alexandria. Origen's knowledge of the Platonists and his affinity with them are confirmed by the historical sources. The Alexandrian adopts and assimilates many aspects of the doctrine and terminology of Plato's followers. However, he also departs from them regarding some of the essential elements in his conception of the divine and of the world's creation. Particularly, the paper focuses on the roles played in Origen's theory by the Academic categories of absolute and relative, the Middle-platonic and Philonian notion of the demiurgic agent and an original reframing of the Neopythagorean derivative system of causes. (shrink)

The article reviews the successive symbolic dimensions that the figure of Sarah, Abraham’s wife, acquires, from its biblical origins in Genesis of LXX to the comments of the Fathers of the Church, focusing especially in the interpretations of Philo of Alexandria and Paul of Tarsus. Sarah symbolizes in Philo virtue–ἀρετή– and wisdom –σοφία– and, by means of a particular exegesis of Gn 18. 11, virginity in its pure state. Paul’s version of the story of Sarahand Hagar displaces the Jews from (...) the inheritance of the promise and places Christians on that pedestal, and Sarah as the mother of Christianity. (shrink)

In contemporary research, the prevailing view is that the Therapeuts, of which Philo of Alexandria writes in Vita Contemplativa, were a Jewish group or sect. There is also an opinion that Therapeuts are the product of Philo’s utopian fantasy. In both cases, the report of Eusebius of Caesarea in the Church history is dismissed as unfounded. In this paper, we will outline the reasons why we believe that Eusebius’s view cannot be rejected as unfounded, and that it is more convincing (...) than alternative assumptions. (shrink)