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  1. Signaling probabilities in ambiguity: who reacts to vague news?Dmitri Vinogradov & Yousef Makhlouf - 2020 - Theory and Decision 90 (3-4):371-404.
    Ambiguity affects decisions of people who exhibit a distaste of and require a premium for dealing with it. Do ambiguity-neutral subjects completely disregard ambiguity and react to any vague news? Online vending platforms often attempt to affect buyer’s decisions by messages like “20 people are looking at this item right now” or “The average score based on 567 reviews is 7.9/10”. We augment the two-color Ellsberg experiment with similarly worded signals about the unknown probability of success. All decision-makers, including ambiguity-neutral, (...)
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  • Choosing monetary sequences: theory and experimental evidence. [REVIEW]Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti & Luigi Mittone - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (3):327-354.
    We formulate and investigate experimentally a model of how individuals choose between time sequences of monetary outcomes. The model assumes that a decision maker uses, sequentially, two criteria to screen options. Each criterion only permits a decision between some pairs of options, while the other options are incomparable according to that criterion. When the first criterion is not decisive, the decision maker resorts to the second criterion to select an alternative. We find that: (1) traditional economic models based on discounting (...)
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  • Conservative Stable Standards of Behavior and φ-Stable Sets.Xiao Luo - 2006 - Theory and Decision 60 (4):395-402.
    Within Luo’s (2001, J. Math. Econ. 36, 95–109) framework of a general system, I establish an equivalence theorem for the conservative stable standard of behavior (CSSB for short) developed by J. Greenberg (“The Theory of Social Situation: An Alternative Game-Theoretic Approach,” Cambridge University Press, 1990). It is shown that a standard of behavior for a situation is a CSSB if, and only if, its graph is a φ-stable set for the associated general system.
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  • Learning from Minimal Economic Models.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (1):81-99.
    It is argued that one can learn from minimal economic models. Minimal models are models that are not similar to the real world, do not resemble some of its features, and do not adhere to accepted regularities. One learns from a model if constructing and analysing the model affects one’s confidence in hypotheses about the world. Economic models, I argue, are often assessed for their credibility. If a model is judged credible, it is considered to be a relevant possibility. Considering (...)
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  • Discussion of “behavioral economics”.Ariel Rubinstein - manuscript
    For me, economics is a collection of ideas and conventions which economists accept and use to reason with. Namely, it is a culture. Behavioral economics represents a transformation of that culture. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Camerer and Loewenstein (2003), its methods are pretty much the same as those introduced by the Game Theory revolution. At the core of most models in Behavioral Economics there are still agents who maximize a preference relation over some space of consequences and the solution (...)
     
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  • Irrational diversification in multiple decision problems.Ariel Rubinstein - 2002 - European Economic Review 46:1369–1378.
    The paper deals with multiple decision problems, which are similar to the task of guessing the color outcomes of five independent spinnings of a roulette wheel, 60% of whose slots are red and 40% white. Each correct guess yields a prize of $1. The guess of 5 Reds clearly first order stochastic dominates any other strategy. In contrast, subjects diversify their choices when facing a multiple decision problem in which the choice is between lotteries with clear objective probabilities. The diversification (...)
     
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