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  1. Can Flogging Make Us Less Ignorant?Freya Möbus - 2023 - Ancient Philosophy 43 (1):51-68.
    In the Gorgias, Socrates claims that painful bodily punishment like flogging can improve certain wrongdoers. I argue that we can take Socrates’ endorsement seriously, even on the standard interpretation of Socratic motivational intellectualism, according to which there are no non-rational desires. I propose that flogging can epistemically improve certain wrongdoers by communicating that wrongdoing is bad for oneself. In certain cases, this belief cannot be communicated effectively through philosophical dialogue.
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  • Socrates’ Aversion to Being a Victim of Injustice.Joel A. Martinez & Nicholas D. Smith - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (1):59-76.
    In the Gorgias, Plato has Polus ask Socrates if he would rather suffer injustice than perform it. Socrates’ response is justly famous, affirming a view that Polus himself finds incredible, and one that even contemporary readers find difficult to credit: “for my part, I would prefer neither, but if it had to be one or the other, I would choose to suffer rather than do what is unjust”. In this paper, we take up the part of Socrates’ response that Polus (...)
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  • The role of practice and habituation in Socrates’ theory of ethical development.Mark E. Jonas - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (6):987-1005.
    ABSTRACTThe goal of this paper is to challenge the standard view that Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues is an intellectualist with respect to virtue. Through a detailed analysis of the educational theory laid out in the early dialogues, it will be argued that Socrates believes that the best way to cultivate virtues in his interlocutors is not to convince them of ethical truths by way of reason and argument alone, but to encourage them to participate in the practice of (...)
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  • Reply to Rowe.Thomas C. Brickhouse & Nicholas D. Smith - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (3):325-338.
    In our reply to Rowe, we explain why most of what he criticizes is actually the product of his misunderstanding our argument. We begin by showing that nearly all of his Part 1 misconceives our project by defending a position we never attacked. We then question why Rowe thinks the distinction we make between motivational and virtue intellectualism is unimportant before developing a defense of the consistency of our views about different desires. Next we turn to Rowe’s criticisms of our (...)
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