Although most scholars agree that the lexicon of Sophist 232b1-236d4 is similar to that of Republic X, they leave undetermined whether they are theoretically compatible. Notably, both dialogues elucidate the art of imitation through the metaphor of the painter who deceives his pupils through φαντάσματα. I argue that Plato’s conception of imitation of the Republic is not only consistent with that presented in the Sophist, but also importantly integrates it.

This paper gives a new interpretation of the central section of Plato's Symposium (199d-212a). According to this interpretation, the term "καλóν", as used by Plato here, stands for what many contemporary philosophers call "intrinsic value"; and "love" (ἔρως) is in effect rational motivation , which for Plato consists in the desire to "possess" intrinsically valuable things - that is, according to Plato, to be happy - for as long as possible. An explanation is given of why Plato believes that "possessing" (...) intrinsically valuable things, at least for mortals like us, consists in actively creating instantiations of the intrinsic values, both in oneself and in the external world, and in knowing and loving these intrinsic values and their instantiations. Finally, it is argued that this interpretation reveals that Plato's "eudaemonism" is a different and more defensible doctrine than many commentators believe. (shrink)

En este trabajo defenderé que los erísticos del Eutidemo se dedican a la sofística tal como esta es definida en el Sofista. Propondré que en tanto la quinta y la séptima definición se sirven del concepto de ἀντιλογικός, ambas son capaces de capturar el componente dialéctico y refutativo de la práctica erística. Preferiré indentificarlos con la séptima no sólo porque constituye la definición final del sofista, sino también porque esta incluye entre sus determinaciones el empleo engañoso de tal forma de (...) argumentación, rasgo que se ajusta más a la erística que el cobro de dinero, elemento principal de la quinta. (shrink)

La prophétie inspirée et la divination par les signes impliquent des activités distinctes et requièrent des compétences différentes de ceux qui les pratiquent. Une relecture des sources anciennes débouche sur l’idée que la suprématie de la prophétie directe ne peut être écartée comme une invention platonicienne. Des modes de prophétie sont loin d’être une interprétation moderne et ils étaient déjà perçus ainsi au second millénaire avant notre ère. La prophétie extatique, phénomène précieux, dépendant de la volonté des dieux, était imprévisible (...) et difficile à manipuler. Il n’est pas étonnant que la plupart des spécialistes définissent la divination directe en Mésopotamie comme secondaire par comparaison avec la divination traditionnelle par les signes; c’est la situation en Grèce, où la corrélation est inverse, ce qui demande une explication. Abandonner la dichotomie entre prophétie directe et indirecte revient à retirer à la culture grecque une de ses caractéristiques principales. (shrink)

I argue for the view that the scientific model which Plato consistently had in mind when sharpening his main ethical theory was medicine. Moreover, I ascribe to Plato a “medical model of ethics”. A careful examination of this model reveals how Plato appropriates several medical concepts and ideas by employing two central methodological devices in his thought: dialectical transposition and analogical characterisation. In discussing them, I identify different kinds of medical references in the dialogues –not all medical references in Plato (...) have the same methodological status– and draw greater attention to the most recurrent medical analogies in them. More generally, the paper is also meant to provide a case study of the complex relationship between medicine and philosophy in Antiquity by examining in a new light the various ways in which the former served as an epistemological and ethical model for the latter. (shrink)

Plato's "Ion," despite its frail frame and traditionally modest status in the corpus, has given rise to large exegetical claims. Thus some historians of aesthetics, reading it alongside page 205 of the Symposium, have sought to identify in it the seeds of the post-Kantian notion of 'art' as non-technical making, and to trace to it the Romantic conception of the poet as a creative genius. Others have argued that, in the "Ion," Plato has Socrates assume the existence of a technē (...) of poetry. In this article, these claims are challenged on exegetical and philosophical grounds. To this effect, Plato's use of poiētēs and poiēsis in the Symposium is analysed, the defining criteria of technē in the "Ion" and other dialogues are identified and discussed, and the 'Romantic' interpretation of the dialogue is traced to Shelley's tendentious translation of it. These critical developments lead to what is presented as a more faithful reading of the dialogue. In the "Ion," it is claimed, Plato seeks to subvert the traditional status of poetry by having Socrates argue that poetry is both non-rational and non-cognitive in nature. In the third part of the article, suggestions are offered as to the contribution made by the "Ion" to the evolution of Plato's reflections on poetic composition, and particularly as to the reasons which later induced Plato to substitute the concept of mimesis for that of inspiration in his account of poetry. (shrink)

Platón procura establecer en el Fedro una estrecha vinculación entre la poesía y el ámbito eidético propio del saber filosófico, o al que accede el filósofo mediante una ejercitada captación sinóptico-dialéctica. Tal tipo de poesía filosófica aparece ilustrada a la perfección en la propia palinodia socrática, la cual erige a Sócrates – y en última instancia a Platón – como paradigma de filósofo poeta, palinodia que ha sido obligada a pronunciarse “con ciertos términos poéticos”. Partiendo de esa palinodia como modelo, (...) Platón se propone abordar el tema del éros con discursos filosóficos que se nutran de términos poéticos, o sea, a través de una explícita mixtura de elementos filosóficos y poéticos, cuyo ejemplo más claro es el Fedro en su conjunto, o, en términos más generales, el género dialógico platónico en tanto este pone en escena una interacción entre los registros filosófico y poético. Teniendo en cuenta esta relación de compatibilidad que Platón establece en el Fedro entre su paradigma poético-filosófico y el de tipo tradicional – paradigmas que en los libros II, III y X de la República aparecían claramente en tensión –, en este artículo me interesa apoyar tal relación en la anécdota del sueño relatada por Sócrates al comienzo del Fedón, en la cual el filósofo confiesa ante Simmias y Cebes haber compuesto desde su encierro en la cárcel – ya que anteriormente jamás lo había hecho – poemas basados en la versificación o musicalización de las fábulas de Esopo y un himno a Apolo. (shrink)

Le passage, au livre II de la République, décrivant ce que Glaucon, un des principaux interlocuteurs de Socrate, considère avec dédain comme une cité seulement digne de porcs, est en réalité central dans la stratégie globale de Platon. Le Socrate de Platon nomme de fait cette cité la cité « véritable » et « saine », et cela est vrai pour Platon comme pour Socrate – ce que démontre le présent article. La « belle cité », Callipolis, que Socrate souhaite (...) ériger dans la suite de la République, est donc par conséquent une cité moins « véritable », et les développements concernant l ’âme et la justice qui se fondent sur elle (au livre IV) sont, de même, des développements qui n’embrassent pas la vérité de l’âme ni de la justice. Dans leur nature vraie et essentielle, ni la cité ni l ’âme ne sont divisées en parties, que ces parties s’opposent ou coopèrent ; et la justice non plus ne peut être absolument définie, au sens de sa nature véritable, en terme de coopération entre les parties d’une âme divisée. Si nous regardons rétrospectivement l’ensemble de la démonstration à partir du livre X, le dernier de la République, tous ces éléments semblent être anticipés dans la description de la « cité des porcs » et sa suite immédiate. (shrink)

This paper presents Olympiodorus’ and Damascius’ explanations of the philosopher’s practice of dying in Plato’s Phaedo. It also includes a presentation of Ammonius’ exegesis of the practice of death. The Neoplatonic commentators discern two kinds of death, the bodily or physical death and the voluntary death. Olympiodorus suggests that bodily death is only an image of voluntary death and cannot be recognized as an original death, because original death presupposes the preparation for death and the constant effort for the purification (...) of the soul during the philosopher’s life-time. Only preparation for death and purification can ensure the complete separation of the soul from the body. Relative to this distinction is that between apothnēskein and tethnanai; these infinitives denote the dual meaning of death: death as an event or a process and death as a state. Our study examines thoroughly the subtle distinctions made by Olympiodorus and Damascius and offers a comparative analysis of the two definitions of death as well as that of purification. It reaches the conclusion that apothnēskein is a necessary condition of tethnanai, i.e. of a definitive release and parting of the soul from the body. On the other hand, the process of eventual purification, a notion which betrays the religious character of purification, can be identified with apothnēskein, which is the practice of dying by the true philosopher. Finally, our study also emphasizes and explains the difference between the voluntary philosophical death and the voluntary unphilosophical suicide; the latter guaranteeing only bodily or physical death. (shrink)

Plato's Symposium contains various myths dealing with gender and the erotic, among them Aristophanes' account of the three original sexes, which are here treated from the standpoint of modern science. In particular we see how, since the 19th century, sexology and psychoanalysis have updated concepts of a third sex and androgyny. Similarities with positions in antiquity demonstrate the relevance and force of the general propositions of myths. Differences appear to imply the effective presence of other myths of Judeo-Christian origin. All (...) things considered, the ancient tensions between Aristophanes' and Socrates' attitude are still at work. It is from that viewpoint that the conceptual relationships between androgyny and the third sex are examined. (shrink)

In this paper I present an original interpretation of the concept of separation in Plato. First, I argue that despite the fact that the ancient Greek word for “separation” almost never appears in the metaphysical discussions of Plato’s dialogues, the key role of the concept of separation in Plato’s metaphysics can be attested by the importance the platonic tradition gives to it. Therefore, understanding separation in Plato seems to be a problem we must face, but we do not have a (...) clear strategy to solve it. My strategy will be to tackle this problem by looking at a specific passage in which Plato distinguishes the ontological status of Forms and sensible things. Through the analysis of this passage and its relations to another metaphysical argument in Plato, I hope to show that Plato’s careful choice of words and syntactical structure of sentences aims to distinguish two ontologically different types of entities: the unrelational, separate Forms, and the relational sensible things. (shrink)

El presente artículo pretende, tras pasar revista a la bibliografía existente y al estado de la cuestión sobre el mito delPolítico de Platón, proponer en primer lugar una nueva lectura de este a la luz de la tradición religiosa griega y, concretamente, del Leitmotiv hesiódico del mito de las edades del hombre. En segundo lugar, la comparación de este mito y su trasfondo religioso con otros diálogos políticos del filósofo ateniense, notablemente con las Leyes, revela a nuestro ver a una (...) insistencia en las nociones de la edad de oro y del gobierno divino como ideal político. Considerar este pasaje del Político como un fundamento en el nivel mítico y alusivo para estas nociones en otros diálogos de Platón permitiría, si nuestra hipótesis de trabajo se confirma, ilustrar la interacción del proyecto político global del filósofo con el recurso a la tradición religiosa y con los ejemplos míticos de otros diálogos políticos. (shrink)

Cet article se propose d’étudier les procédés platoniciens de l’exemple, de l’analogie et du paradigme, en insistant à la fois sur leur distinction et sur leur articulation mutuelle. En ce qui concerne l’exemple, il convient d’en distinguer un usage dianoétique, que Platon proscrit, d’un usage proprement dialectique, qu’il encourage et qui peut avoir deux fonctions différentes : faire comprendre une question ou une méthode et faire saisir une structure. L’analogie au sens strict développe cette deuxième fonction, en la complexifiant parfois (...) (notamment dans le Gorgias et la République) par une dimension « constructive ». Reste que le but de l’analogie, comme celui de l’exemple, est avant tout de faire saisir des rapports ; et dans la mesure où ces rapports sont purement intelligibles, l’analogie peut elle aussi être considérée comme un procédé dialectique. Enfin, le paradigme tel qu’il est utilisé dans le Sophiste et le Politique développe les traits précédents au sein d’un dispositif très élaboré, qui a pour but essentiel de faire saisir une méthode susceptible d’être appliquée à ce qui fait l’objet de l’examen. En ce sens, il s’agit d’un prolongement de l’un des usages dialectiques des exemples que l’on trouve dès les premiers Dialogues. La pensée paradigmatique de Platon manifeste ainsi une grande continuité, qui repose sur une conception fondamentale : la dialectique, en tant que science suprême qui étudie les Idées, ne peut être décrite de l’extérieur, mais seulement se pratiquer. Cette pratique se prépare, non pas en commençant par se tourner vers le sensible, comme on l’écrit parfois, mais en se tournant vers des cas tout aussi intelligibles – en tant que rapports ou ensembles de rapports, c’est‑à‑dire structures –, quoique « plus faciles », afin de rendre le dialecticien ultimement capable d’examiner n’importe quel sujet. (shrink)

In the so-called “erotic dialogues”, especially the Symposium and the Phaedrus, Plato explained why erotic desire can play an epistemic function, establishing a strong connection between erotic desire and beauty, “the most clearly visible and the most loved” among the Ideas. Taking the erotic dialogues as a background, in this paper I elucidate Plato’s explanation in another context, the one of the Phaedo, for discussing the epistemic function of erotic desire in relation to the deficiency argument and the affinity argument. (...) My claim is that the erotic desire of the philosopher is activated by the recognition of traces of the Ideas as something that the material world lacks and that, nevertheless, his soul is familiar with. This desire for the Ideas triggers the process of recollection, and thus erotic desire acquires a decisive role in the acquisition of knowledge in the Phaedo. In the final section of the paper, I highlight the contemporary relevance of Plato’s epistemology of erotic desire. (shrink)

Mucho se ha escrito acerca del significado de las últimas palabras de Sócrates en el Fedón: “Critón, debemos un gallo a Asclepio. Pues bien, ¡páguenselo! Y no se descuiden…”. En el presente trabajo nos proponemos retomar el enigma de la deuda con Asclepio a fin de rescatar cierto matiz político presente en él. Para ello, tras reseñar brevemente las principales interpretaciones que se han dado en el último siglo, nos detendremos en la concepción socrática del nacimiento y de la vida (...) en tanto fenómenos eminentemente políticos para, a partir de allí, repensar el statusde su muerte en esa misma clave. (shrink)

This paper deals with the deuteros plous, literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s Phaedo, the key passage being Phd. 99e4-100a3. I argue that (a) the ‘flight into the logoi’ can have two different interpretations, a standard one and a non-standard one. The issue is whether at 99e-100a Socrates means that both the student of erga and the student of logoi consider images (‘the standard interpretation’), or the student of logoi does not consider images but (...) that “consistency should suffice for truth” (‘the non-standard interpretation’); (b) the non-standard one implies the problem of the hypothesis, a problem analogous to the problem of the elenchus; (c) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th Meditation and the final proof for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo. (shrink)

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article.

Here I aim to show how the views on the body in Plato´’s Symposium must be considered not as contradictory but as complementary. The three main thesis of this paper are: a) The body is essential for the triggering of “erôs”, insofar as sexual attraction to beautiful bodies is the most natural way in which anyone can start to develop an erotic experience. b) The ascent towards beauty itself implies detachment from a particular body as such in order to move (...) to an appraisal of it from a wider, more general understanding. c) Additionally the loving relationship between Socrates and beautiful young men shows that the physical dimension of “erôs” is never completely eradicated by Plato but, on the contrary, it works as an essential trigger of desire. (shrink)

Resumen: Mientras que en Banquete Platón presenta a Éros como un daímon metaxý, i.e. como una divinidad intermedia e intermediaria entre dioses y hombres, en Fedro lo caracteriza, en cambio, como un theós -un dios. Procuraremos mostrar aquí que esto no implica, sin embargo, un cambio doctrinal substancial sino que se trata de dos aproximaciones distintas pero complementarias respecto a la verdadera naturaleza de Éros. Según el Fedro, si bien éros puede permanecer en una expresión puramente física, sin desarrollar su (...) aspecto divino, es posible también que, debido al intenso deseo sexual por el bello muchachito, el amante recuerde la Forma de la belleza y crezcan en él las alas del Éros divino. Pero únicamente los dioses nunca pierden las alas de sus almas y están regularmente en pleno contacto con las Formas. Las almas humanas deben adquirirlas, y aun así, con riesgo a perderlas, quedando entonces en un lugar “intermedio” -metaxý- como el Éros de Banquete.: Although in the Symposium Plato describes Erôs as a daimôn-metaxy, i.e. as an intermediate and intermediary divinity between gods and men, in the Phaedrus it is said that Erôs is a theos -a god. I will try to show that these different descriptions do not imply a substantial change of mind but work as two complementary views about the true nature of Erôs. According to the Phaedrus, although erôs can remain just at a physical level and not develop its divine power, it is also possible that, thanks to the same intense, sexual desire for the beautiful boy, the lover recollects the Form of beauty and so grows divine Erôs`s wings. However, only the gods never lose their wings and so are in regular, full contact with the Forms. The human souls need to acquire the wings and even so take the risk of losing them; they are then in an intermediate state -metaxy- like Erôs in the Symposium. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship between Achilles Tatius' novel Leucippe and Cleitophon and the Platonic corpus. I have searched for Platonic allusions of various natures and purposes and grouped them into thematic chapters. I have also compared instances of similar uses of Plato in contemporary authors in order to classify both the individual cases and the place of Achilles Tatius' novel in its literary environment, including the intended readership. In my introduction I have argued that (...) through the combination in his works of philosophy and literary excellence Plato was an extremely important figure to the Greeks of the second sophistic. However, despite the increasingly influential opinion that Greek novel readership was not dissimilar to that of other works, the possibility that the Greek novelists used Plato in a more than cosmetic fashion has been relatively neglected. The uses of Plato on which I have concentrated are the employment of Platonic names as allusions to their namesakes; Platonic narrative technique as the model for the dialogue form and open-endedness of Leucippe and Cleitophon with the integration of this technique into the broader question of the discrepancies between the beginning and the end; the allusion to a particularly famous passage of the Phaedrus in the name of the heroine; the repeated allusions to the Phaedran flow of beauty, their purposes and the light they shed on the characterisation of Cleitophon; and the Phaedran scene-setting, indulged in by many other writers, which Achilles Tatius uses in two significant passages. The conclusions I have reached are that Achilles Tatius uses Plato far more extensively and imaginatively than hitherto realised; that such an intimate engagement can shed light on other issues, such as psychological characterisation and the question of humour; that Achilles Tatius wrote something of an "anti-Platonic" novel; and that his work displays many similarities with other works whose sophistication is less in doubt. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of appetite in Plato’s Timaeus, Republic and Phaedrus. In recent research is it often suggested that Plato considers appetite (i) to pertain to the essential needs of the body, (ii) to relate to a distinct set of objects, e.g. food or drink, and (iii) to cause behaviour aiming at sensory pleasure. Exploring how the notion of appetite, directly and indirectly, connects with Plato’s other purposes in these dialogues, this dissertation sets out to evaluate these ideas. (...) By asking, and answering, three philosophically and interpretatively crucial questions, individually linked to the arguments of the dialogues, this thesis aims to show (i) that the relationship between appetite and the body is not a matter of survival, and that appetite is better understood in terms of excess; (ii) that appetite is multiform and cannot be defined in terms of a distinct set of objects; and (iii) that appetite, in Plato, can also pertain to non-sensory objects, such as articulated discourse. -/- Chapter one asks what the universe can teach us about embodied life. It argues that Plato, in the Timaeus, works with an important link between the universe and the soul, and that the account of disorder, irrationality and multiformity identifying a pre-cosmic condition of the universe provides a key to understanding the excessive behaviour and condition of a soul dominated by appetite. -/- Chapter two asks why the philosophers of the Republic’s Kallipolis return to the cave, and suggests that Plato’s notion of the noble lie provides a reasonable account of this. By exploring the Republic’s ideas of education, poetry and tradition, it argues that appetite – a multiform and appearance oriented source of motivation – is an essential part of this account. -/- Chapter three asks why Socrates characterizes the speeches of the Phaedrus as deceptive games. It proposes that this question should be understood in the light of two distinctions: one between playful and serious discourse and one between simple and multiform. It argues that the speeches of the Phaedrus are multiform games, and suggests that appetite is the primary source of motivation of the soul addressed, personified by Phaedrus. -/- . (shrink)