The `problem of time' is a cluster of interpretational and formal issues in the foundations of general relativity relating to both the representation of time in the classical canonical formalism, and to the quantization of the theory. The purpose of this short chapter is to provide an accessible introduction to the problem.

This book defends a relational theory of the passage of time. The realist view of passage developed in this book differs from the robust, substantivalist position. According to relationism, passage is nothing over and above the succession of events, one thing coming after another. Causally related events are temporally arranged as they happen one after another along observers’ worldlines. There is no unique global passage but a multiplicity of local passages of time. After setting out this positive argument for relationism, (...) the author deals with five common objections to it: (a) triviality of deflationary passage, (b) a-directionality of passage, (c) the impossibility of experiencing passage, (d) fictionalism about passage, and (e) the incompatibility of passage with perduring objects. (shrink)

We have recently developed a new understanding of probability in quantum gravity. In this paper we provide an overview of this new approach and its implications. Adopting the de Broglie–Bohm pilot-wave formulation of quantum physics, we argue that there is no Born rule at the fundamental level of quantum gravity with a non-normalisable Wheeler–DeWitt wave functional \(\Psi\). Instead the universe is in a perpetual state of quantum nonequilibrium with a probability density \(P\ne \left| \Psi \right| ^{2}\). Dynamical relaxation to the (...) Born rule can occur only after the early universe has emerged into a semiclassical or Schrödinger approximation, with a time-dependent and normalisable wave functional \(\psi\), for non-gravitational systems on a classical spacetime background. In that regime the probability density \(\rho\) can relax towards \(\left| \psi \right| ^{2}\) (on a coarse-grained level). Thus the pilot-wave theory of gravitation supports the hypothesis of primordial quantum nonequilibrium, with relaxation to the Born rule taking place soon after the big bang. We also show that quantum-gravitational corrections to the Schrödinger approximation allow quantum nonequilibrium \(\rho \ne \left| \psi \right| ^{2}\) to be created from a prior equilibrium ( \(\rho =\left| \psi \right| ^{2}\) ) state. Such effects are very tiny and difficult to observe in practice. (shrink)

Symplectic reduction is a formal process through which degeneracy within the mathematical representations of physical systems displaying gauge symmetry can be controlled via the construction of a reduced phase space. Typically such reduced spaces provide us with a formalism for representing both instantaneous states and evolution uniquely and for this reason can be justifiably afforded the status of fun- damental dynamical arena - the otiose structure having been eliminated from the original phase space. Essential to the application of symplectic reduction (...) is the precept that the first class constraints are the relevant gauge generators. This prescription becomes highly problematic for reparameterization invariant theories within which the Hamiltonian itself is a constraint; not least because it would seem to render prima facie distinct stages of a history physically identical and observable functions changeless. Here we will consider this problem of time within non-relativistic me- chanical theory with a view to both more fully understanding the temporal struc- ture of these timeless theories and better appreciating the corresponding issues in relativistic mechanics. For the case of nonrelativistic reparameterization invariant theory application of symplectic reduction will be demonstrated to be both unnec- essary; since the degeneracy involved is benign; and inappropriate; since it leads to a trivial theory. With this anti-reductive position established we will then examine two rival methodologies for consistently representing change and observable func- tions within the original phase space before evaluating the relevant philosophical implications. We will conclude with a preview of the case against symplectic re- duction being applied to canonical general relativity. (shrink)

The analysis of the temporal structure of canonical general relativity and the connected interpretational questions with regard to the role of time within the theory both rest upon the need to respect the fundamentally dual role of the Hamiltonian constraints found within the formalism. Any consistent philosophical approach towards the theory must pay dues to the role of these constraints in both generating dynamics, in the context of phase space, and generating unphysical symmetry transformations, in the context of a hypersurface (...) embedded within a solution. A first denial of time in the terms of a position of reductive temporal relationalism can be shown to be troubled by failure on the first count, and a second denial in the terms of Machian temporal relationalism can be found to be hampered by failure on the second. A third denial of time, consistent with both of the Hamiltonian constraints roles, is constituted by the implementation of a scheme for constructing observables in terms of correlations and leads to a radical Parmenidean timelessness. The motivation for and implications of each of these three denials are investigated. (shrink)

Within the philosophy of time there has been a growing interest in positions that deny the reality of time. Those positions, whether motivated by arguments from physics or metaphysics, have a shared conclusion: time is not real. What has not been made wholly clear, however, is exactly what it entails to deny the reality of time. Time is unreal, sure. But what does that mean? There has been only one sustained attempt to spell out exactly what it would mean to (...) endorse a temporal error theory; a theory that denies the reality of time—Baron & Miller’s ‘What is temporal error theory?’. Despite the fact that their paper makes significant strides in spelling out what would be required of a temporal error theory, my claim in this paper is that their position must be rejected and replaced. As well as looking to reject Baron and Miller’s position, I also look to provide that replacement. (shrink)

Following a line of research that I have developed for several years, I argue that the best strategy for understanding quantum gravity is to build a picture of the physical world where the notion of time plays no role at all. I summarize here this point of view, explaining why I think that in a fundamental description of nature we must “forget time”, and how this can be done in the classical and in the quantum theory. The idea is to (...) develop a formalism that treats dependent and independent variables on the same footing. In short, I propose to interpret mechanics as a theory of relations between variables, rather than the theory of the evolution of variables in time. (shrink)

This paper considers two problems -- one in philosophy of religion and another in philosophy of physics -- and shows that the two problems have one solution. Some Christian philosophers have endorsed the views that (i) there was a first finitely long period of time, (ii) God is in time, and yet (iii) God did not have a beginning. If there was a first finitely long period of time and God is in time then there was a first finitely long (...) period of time in God's life. But if God's life includes a first finitely long period of time, then, on one initially intuitive conception of beginning to exist, God began to exist. Thus, at first glance, (i)-(iii) are not mutually compatible. Meanwhile, on a variety of proposals for quantum gravity theories or interpretations of quantum theory, space-time is not fundamental to physical reality and instead can (somehow) be explained in terms of yet more fundamental physical substructures. As I show, there is a strong intuition that if space-time is not fundamental to physical reality, then, even if there were a first finitely long period in the life of physical reality, physical reality would be beginningless. Thus, both theistic philosophers and philosophers of physics have developed theories on which some beginningless entities have a first finitely long temporal period in their lives and so both groups should be interested in developing criteria that distinguish such entities from entities with a beginning. In this paper, I offer one necessary (but not sufficient) condition, namely, that entities that begin to exist are absent from the closest possible worlds without time. The view that I defend has one significant upshot: no sound argument can use the mere fact (if it is a fact) that past time is finite to reach the conclusion that the totality of physical reality had a beginning. (shrink)

Schrödinger’s equation says that the Hamiltonian is the generator of time translations. This seems to imply that any reasonable definition of time operator must be conjugate to the Hamiltonian. Then both time and energy must have the same spectrum since conjugate operators are unitarily equivalent. Clearly this is not always true: normal Hamiltonians have lower bounded spectrum and often only have discrete eigenvalues, whereas we typically desire that time can take any real value. Pauli concluded that constructing a general a (...) time operator is impossible. Here we show how the Pauli argument fails when one uses an external system to track time, so that time arises as correlations between the system and the clock. In this case, the time operator is conjugate to the clock Hamiltonian and not to the system Hamiltonian, but its eigenvalues still satisfy the Schrödinger equation for arbitrary system Hamiltonians. (shrink)

This paper explores the status of some notions which are usually associated to time, like datations, chronology, durations, causality, cosmic time and time functions in the Einsteinian relativistic theories. It shows how, even if some of these notions do exist in the theory or for some particular solution of it, they appear usually in mutual conflict: they cannot be synthesized coherently, and this is interpreted as the impossibility to construct a common entity which could be called time. This contrasts with (...) the case in Newtonian physics where such a synthesis precisely constitutes Newtonian time. After an illustration by comparing the status of time in Einsteinian physics with that of the vertical direction in Newtonian physics, I will conclude that there is no pertinent notion of time in Einsteinian theories. (shrink)

The conditional probability interpretation of quantum gravity has been criticized for violating the constraints of the theory and also not giving the correct expression for the propagator. We have shown that following Page’s proposal of constructing an appropriate projector for the stationary state of a closed system, we can arrive at the correct expression for the propagator by using conditional probability rule. Also, it is shown that a unitary evolution of states of a subsystem at local level may be a (...) consequence of non-unitary projection of appropriate states at global level. (shrink)

The conceptual and technical difficulties involved in creating a quantum theory of gravity have led some physicists to question, and even in some cases to deny, the reality of time. More surprisingly, this denial has found a sympathetic audience among certain philosophers of physics. What should we make of these wild ideas? Does it even make sense to deny the reality of time? In fact physical science has been chipping away at common sense aspects of time ever since its inception. (...) Section 1 offers a brief survey of the demolition process. Section 2 distinguishes a tempered from an extremely radical form that a denial of time might take, and argues that extreme radicalism is empirically self-refuting. Section 3 begins an investigation of the prospects for tempered radicalism in a timeless theory of quantum gravity. (shrink)

We propose a solution to the problem of time for systems with a single global Hamiltonian constraint. Our solution stems from the observation that, for these theories, conventional gauge theory methods fail to capture the full classical dynamics of the system and must therefore be deemed inappropriate. We propose a new strategy for consistently quantizing systems with a relational notion of time that does capture the full classical dynamics of the system and allows for evolution parametrized by an equitable internal (...) clock. This proposal contains the minimal temporal structure necessary to retain the ordering of events required to describe classical evolution. In the context of shape dynamics (an equivalent formulation of general relativity that is locally scale invariant and free of the local problem of time) our proposal can be shown to constitute a natural methodology for describing dynamical evolution in quantum gravity and to lead to a quantum theory analogous to the Dirac quantization of unimodular gravity. (shrink)

We propose an operator constraint equation for the wavefunction of the Universe that admits genuine evolution. While the corresponding classical theory is equivalent to the canonical decomposition of General Relativity, the quantum theory contains an evolution equation distinct from standard Wheeler–DeWitt cosmology. Furthermore, the local symmetry principle—and corresponding observables—of the theory have a direct interpretation in terms of a conventional gauge theory, where the gauge symmetry group is that of spatial conformal diffeomorphisms (that preserve the spatial volume of the Universe). (...) The global evolution is in terms of an arbitrary parameter that serves only as an unobservable label for successive states of the Universe. Our proposal follows unambiguously from a suggestion of York whereby the independently specifiable initial data in the action principle of General Relativity is given by a conformal geometry and the spatial average of the York time on the spacelike hypersurfaces that bound the variation. Remarkably, such a variational principle uniquely selects the form of the constraints of the theory so that we can establish a precise notion of both symmetry and evolution in quantum gravity. (shrink)

The symplectic quantization scheme proposed for matter scalar fields in the companion paper (Gradenigo and Livi, arXiv:2101.02125, 2021) is generalized here to the case of space–time quantum fluctuations. That is, we present a new formalism to frame the quantum gravity problem. Inspired by the stochastic quantization approach to gravity, symplectic quantization considers an explicit dependence of the metric tensor gμν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$g_{\mu \nu }$$\end{document} on an additional time variable, named intrinsic time at variance (...) with the coordinate time of relativity, from which it is different. The physical meaning of intrinsic time, which is truly a parameter and not a coordinate, is to label the sequence of gμν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$g_{\mu \nu }$$\end{document} quantum fluctuations at a given point of the four-dimensional space–time continuum. For this reason symplectic quantization necessarily incorporates a new degree of freedom, the derivative g˙μν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\dot{g}}_{\mu \nu }$$\end{document} of the metric field with respect to intrinsic time, corresponding to the conjugated momentum πμν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\pi _{\mu \nu }$$\end{document}. Our proposal is to describe the quantum fluctuations of gravity by means of a symplectic dynamics generated by a generalized action functional A[gμν,πμν]=K[gμν,πμν]-S[gμν]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal {A}}[g_{\mu \nu },\pi _{\mu \nu }] = {\mathcal {K}}[g_{\mu \nu },\pi _{\mu \nu }] - S[g_{\mu \nu }]$$\end{document}, playing formally the role of a Hamilton function, where S[gμν]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$S[g_{\mu \nu }]$$\end{document} is the standard Einstein–Hilbert action while K[gμν,πμν]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal {K}}[g_{\mu \nu },\pi _{\mu \nu }]$$\end{document} is a new term including the kinetic degrees of freedom of the field. Such an action allows us to define an ensemble for the quantum fluctuations of gμν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$g_{\mu \nu }$$\end{document} analogous to the microcanonical one in statistical mechanics, with the only difference that in the present case one has conservation of the generalized action A[gμν,πμν]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal {A}}[g_{\mu \nu },\pi _{\mu \nu }]$$\end{document} and not of energy. Since the Einstein–Hilbert action S[gμν]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$S[g_{\mu \nu }]$$\end{document} plays the role of a potential term in the new pseudo-Hamiltonian formalism, it can fluctuate along the symplectic action-preserving dynamics. These fluctuations are the quantum fluctuations of gμν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$g_{\mu \nu }$$\end{document}. Finally, we show how the standard path-integral approach to gravity can be obtained as an approximation of the symplectic quantization approach. By doing so we explain how the integration over the conjugated momentum field πμν\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\pi _{\mu \nu }$$\end{document} gives rise to a cosmological constant term in the path-integral approach. (shrink)

Wheeler–deWitt equation as well as some relevant current research (Chiou’s timeless path integral approach for relativistic quantum mechanics; Palmer’s view of a fundamental level of physical reality based on an Invariant Set Postulate; Girelli’s, Liberati’s and Sindoni’s toy model of a non-dynamical timeless space as fundamental background of physical events) suggest that at a fundamental level the background space of physics is timeless, that the duration of physical events has not a primary existence. By taking into consideration the two fundamental (...) theories of time represented by the Jacobi-Barbour-Bertotti theory and by Rovelli’s approach, here it is shown that the view of time as emergent quantity measuring the numerical order of material changes (which can above all be derived from some significant current research, such as Elze’s approach of time, Caticha’s approach of entropic time and Prati’s model of physical clock time) introduces a suggestive unifying re-reading. (shrink)

A level of adequacy of a given model with physical world represents an important element of physics. In an “ideal” model each element in the model would correspond exactly to one element in the physical world. In such a model each element would have a direct epistemological correlation with exactly one element of the physical world. Such a model would become a perfect picture of the physical world. The possibility of misinterpretation, in a sense that one searches for physical existence (...) of purely theoretically predicted elements of the model, would be excluded. In order to develop such a model we apply bijective function of set theory. Bijective function applied on time research shows model of space–time has no direct epistemological correlation in physical reality. Time is duration of changes which run in space. Duration does not run in time, duration is time. (shrink)

This paper provides a prospectus for a new way of thinking about the wavefunction of the universe: a Ψ-epistemic quantum cosmology. We present a proposal that, if successfully implemented, would resolve the cosmological measurement problem and simultaneously allow us to think sensibly about probability and evolution in quantum cosmology. Our analysis draws upon recent work on the problem of time in quantum gravity and causally symmet- ric local hidden variable theories. Our conclusion weighs the strengths and weaknesses of the approach (...) and points towards paths for future development. (shrink)

The constrained Hamiltonian formalism is recommended as a means for getting a grip on the concepts of gauge and gauge transformation. This formalism makes it clear how the gauge concept is relevant to understanding Newtonian and classical relativistic theories as well as the theories of elementary particle physics; it provides an explication of the vague notions of “local” and “global” gauge transformations; it explains how and why a fibre bundle structure emerges for theories which do not wear their bundle structure (...) on their sleeves; it illuminates the connections of the gauge concept to issues of determinism and what counts as a genuine “observable”; and it calls attention to problems which arise in attempting to quantize gauge theories. Some of the limitations and problematic aspects of the formalism are also discussed. (shrink)

There are a number of problematic features within the current treatment of time in physical theories, including the “timelessness” of the Universe as encapsulated by the Wheeler–DeWitt equation. This paper considers one particular investigation into resolving this issue; a conditional probability interpretation that was first proposed by Page and Wooters. Those authors addressed the apparent timelessness by subdividing a faux Universe into two entangled parts, “the clock” and “the remainder of the Universe”, and then synchronizing the effective dynamics of the (...) two subsystems by way of conditional probabilities. The current treatment focuses on the possibility of using a realistic clock system; namely, a coherent-state description of a damped harmonic oscillator. This clock proves to be consistent with the conditional probability interpretation; in particular, a standard evolution operator is identified with the position of the clock playing the role of time for the rest of the Universe. Restrictions on the damping factor are determined and, perhaps contrary to expectations, the optimal choice of clock is not necessarily one of minimal damping. (shrink)

Much current debate in the metaphysics of time is between A-theorists and B-theorists. Central to this debate is the assumption that time exists and that the task of metaphysics is to catalogue time’s features. Relatively little consideration has been given to an error theory about time. Since there is very little extant work on temporal error theory the goal of this paper is simply to lay the groundwork to allow future discussion of the relative merits of such a view. The (...) paper thus develops a conceptual framework from within which to evaluate claims about the actual existence, or not, of temporality as that notion appears in folk discourses about time, and from there to examine claims about the counterfactual existence, or not, of temporality so conceived. We subsequently apply this framework to three extant positions drawn from physics and metaphysics that deny the existence of time. We show that only one of these positions is a folk temporal error theory; that is, a view that denies the existence of time as that notion is operative in our everyday thought and talk. (shrink)

Current debate in the metaphysics of time ordinarily assumes that we should be realists about time. Recently, however, a number of physicists and philosophers of physics have proposed that time will play no role in a completed theory of quantum gravity. This paper defends fictionalism about temporal thought, on the supposition that our world is timeless. We argue that, in the face of timeless physical theories, realism about temporal thought is unsustainable: some kind of anti-realism must be adopted. We go (...) on to provide an argument against eliminativism about temporal thought. While it doesn't follow from this argument that fictionalism about temporal thought is true, we suggest that this nonetheless shows that fictionalism should be regarded as the preferred view. (shrink)

Consider the following pair of theses: all fundamental physical objects are spatiotemporal and all non-fundamental physical objects are ultimately composed of fundamental objects. Work on the physics of quantum gravity suggests that spacetime is a non-fundamental, emergent phenomenon and thus that thesis is false. The fundamentals are non-spatiotemporal in nature. This paper will argue against on the grounds that non-fundamental spatiotemporal objects cannot be composed of fundamental non-spatiotemporal objects. So, assuming that spacetime is emergent, new metaphysical resources are needed to (...) explain the relationship between the fundamental objects posited by quantum gravity and spacetime. (shrink)

The Montevideo interpretation of quantum mechanics, which consists in supplementing environmental decoherence with fundamental limitations in measurement stemming from gravity, has been described in several publications. However, some of them appeared before the full picture provided by the interpretation was developed. As such it can be difficult to get a good understanding via the published literature. Here we summarize it in a self contained brief presentation including all its principal elements.

The conceptual incompatibility between General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics is generally seen as a sufficient motivation for the development of a theory of Quantum Gravity. If - so a typical argumentation - Quantum Mechanics gives a universally valid basis for the description of the dynamical behavior of all natural systems, then the gravitational field should have quantum properties, like all other fundamental interaction fields. And, if General Relativity can be seen as an adequate description of the classical aspects of gravity (...) and spacetime - and their mutual relation -, this leads, together with the rather convincing arguments against semi-classical theories of gravity, to a strategy which takes a quantization of General Relativity as the natural avenue to a theory of Quantum Gravity. And, because in General Relativity the gravitational field is represented by the spacetime metric, a quantization of the gravitational field would in some sense correspond to a quantization of geometry. Spacetime would have quantum properties. But, this direct quantization strategy to Quantum Gravity will only be successful, if gravity is indeed a fundamental interaction. Only if it is a fundamental interaction, the given argumentation is valid, and the gravitational field, as well as spacetime, should have quantum properties. - What, if gravity is instead an intrinsically classical phenomenon? Then, if Quantum Mechanics is nevertheless fundamentally valid, gravity can not be a fundamental interaction; a classical and at the same time fundamental gravity is excluded by the arguments against semi-classical theories of gravity. An intrinsically classical gravity in a quantum world would have to be an emergent, induced or residual, macroscopic effect, caused by a quantum substrate dominated by other interactions, not by gravity. Then, the gravitational field (as well as spacetime) would not have any quantum properties. And then, a quantization of gravity (i.e. of General Relativity) would lead to artifacts without any relation to nature. The serious problems of all approaches to Quantum Gravity that start from a direct quantization of General Relativity (e.g. non-perturbative canonical quantization approaches like Loop Quantum Gravity) or try to capture the quantum properties of gravity in form of a 'graviton' dynamics (e.g. Covariant Quantization, String Theory) - together with the, meanwhile, rich spectrum of (more or less advanced) theoretical approaches to an emergent gravity and/or spacetime - make this latter option more and more interesting for the development of a theory of Quantum Gravity. The most advanced emergent gravity (and spacetime) scenarios are of an information-theoretical, quantum-computational type. A paradigmatic model for the emergence of gravity and spacetime comes from the Pregeometric Quantum Causal Histories approach. (shrink)

This dissertation is concerned with two of the largest questions that we can ask about the nature of physical reality: first, whether physical reality begin to exist and, second, what criteria would physical reality have to fulfill in order to have had a beginning? Philosophers of religion and theologians have previously addressed whether physical reality began to exist in the context of defending the Kal{\'a}m Cosmological Argument (KCA) for theism, that is, (P1) everything that begins to exist has a cause (...) for its beginning to exist, (P2) physical reality began to exist, and, therefore, (C) physical reality has a cause for its beginning to exist. While the KCA has traditionally been used to argue for God's existence, the KCA does not mention God, has been rejected by historically significant Christian theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, and raises perennial philosophical questions -- about the nature and history of physical reality, the nature of time, the nature of causation, and so on -- that should be of interest to all philosophers and, perhaps, all humans. While I am not a religious person, I am interested in the questions raised by the KCA. In this dissertation, I articulate three necessary conditions that physical reality would need to fulfill in order to have had a beginning and argue that, given the current state of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot determine whether physical reality began to exist. -/- Friends of the KCA have sought to defend their view that physical reality began to exist in two distinct ways. As I discuss in chapter 2, the first way in which friends of the KCA have sought to defend their view that physical reality began to exist involves a family of a priori arguments meant to show that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, the past must be finite. If the past is necessarily finite, then the past history of physical reality is necessarily finite. And if having a finite past suffices for having a beginning, then, since the past history of physical reality is necessarily finite, physical reality necessarily began to exist. I show that the arguments which have been offered thus far for the view that the past is necessarily finite do not succeed. Moreover, as I elaborate on in chapter 5, having a finite past does not suffice for having a beginning. -/- As I discuss in chapter 3, the second way in which friends of the KCA have sought to defend their view that physical reality began to exist involves a family of a posteriori arguments meant to show that we have empirical evidence that physical reality has a finite past history. For example, the big bang is sometimes claimed to have been the beginning of physical reality and, since we have excellent empirical evidence for the big bang, we have excellent empirical evidence for the beginning of physical reality. The big bang can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, the big bang can be understood as a theory about the history and development of the observable universe. Understood in that sense, then I agree that the big bang is supported by excellent empirical evidence and by a scientific consensus. On the other hand, some authors (particularly science popularizers, science journalists, and religious apologists) have wrongly interpreted big bang theory as a theory about the beginning of the whole of physical reality. As I argue, while a beginning of physical reality may be consistent with classical big bang theory, classical big bang theory does not provide good reason for thinking that physical reality began to exist. -/- In part II, I turn to discussing three necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, conditions for physical reality to have a beginning. Before discussing the three conditions, in chapter 4, I introduce three metaphysical accounts of the nature of time (A-theory, B-theory, and C-theory) as well as some formal machinery that will subsequently become useful in the dissertation. I introduce the first of the three conditions in chapter 5. According to the Modal Condition, physical reality began to exist only if, at the closest possible worlds without time, physical reality does not exist. I show that this condition helps us to make sense of various views in both theology and philosophy of physics. In chapter 6}, I introduce the second of my three conditions, the Direction Condition, according to which, roughly, physical reality began to exist only if all space-time points agree about the direction of time, so that all space-time points can agree that physical reality's putative beginning took place in their objective past. In chapter 7, I discuss the third condition, the Boundary Condition, according to which physical reality began to exist only if there is a past temporal boundary such that physical reality did not exist before the boundary. I show that there are two senses in which physical reality could be said to have had a past temporal boundary. Lastly, in chapter 8, I show that there is a relationship between my three conditions and classical big bang theory, even though the relationship is not the one usually identified in the literature. -/- In part III, I present four arguments for the view that, at the present stage of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot know whether physical reality satisfies the three necessary conditions to have had a beginning and, consequently, we cannot know whether physical reality had a beginning. As I will prove in chapter 9, no set of observations that we currently have, when conjoined with General Relativity, entails that physical reality satisfies the Direction or Boundary Conditions. As I show in chapter 10, considerations in the philosophical foundations of statistical mechanics entail either that the Cosmos violates the Modal Condition or else that there is a transcendental condition on the possibility of our knowledge of the past that prevents our access to data we would need to gather to determine whether physical reality satisfies the Boundary Condition. In chapter 11, I show that there are a number of live cosmological models according to which physical reality does not satisfy the Boundary Condition. As long as we don't know whether any of those cosmological models are correct, we do not know whether physical reality satisfies the Boundary Condition. Lastly, I turn to confirmation theory and show that, at our present stage of inquiry, ampliative inferences for the conclusion that physical reality satisfies the Modal, Direction, and Boundary Conditions are not successful. (shrink)

This is a contribution to a book on quantum gravity and philosophy. I discuss nature and origin of the problem of quantum gravity. I examine the knowledge that may guide us in addressing this problem, and the reliability of such knowledge. In particular, I discuss the subtle modification of the notions of space and time engendered by general relativity, and how these might merge into quantum theory. I also present some reflections on methodological questions, and on some general issues in (...) philosophy of science which are are raised by, or a relevant for, the research on quantum gravity. (shrink)

We offer a new proposal for cosmic singularity resolution based upon a quantum cosmology with a unitary bounce. This proposal is illustrated via a novel quantization of a mini-superspace model in which there can be superpositions of the cosmological constant. This possibility leads to a finite, bouncing unitary cosmology. Whereas the usual Wheeler–DeWitt cosmology generically displays pathological behaviour in terms of non-finite expectation values and non-unitary dynamics, the finiteness and unitarity of our model are formally guaranteed. For classically singular models (...) with a massless scalar field and cosmological constant, we show that well-behaved quantum observables can be constructed and generic solutions to the universal Schrodinger equation are singularity-free. Key features of the solutions of our model include a cosmic bounce due to quantum gravitational effects, a well-defined FLRW limit far from the bounce, and a super-inflationary epoch in the intermediate region. Furthermore, our model displays novel features including: i) superpositions of values of the cosmological constant; ii) a non-zero scattering length around the big bounce; and iii) bound ‘Efimov universe’ states for negative cosmological constant. The last feature provides a new platform for quantum simulation of the early universe. A companion paper provides detailed interpretation and analysis of particular cosmological solutions. (shrink)

A novel approach to quantization is shown to allow for superpositions of the cosmological constant in isotropic and homogeneous mini-superspace models. Generic solutions featuring such superpositions display: i) a unitary evolution equation; ii) singularity resolution; iii) a cosmic bounce. Explicit cosmological solutions are constructed. These exhibit characteristic bounce features including a ‘super-inflation’ regime with universal phenomenology that can naturally be made to be insensitive to Planck-scale physics.

String Theory is the result of the conjunction of three conceptually independent elements: the metaphysical idea of a nomological unity of the forces, the model-theoretical paradigm of Quantum Field Theory, and the conflict resulting from classical gravity in a quantum world - the motivational starting point of the search for a theory of Quantum Gravity. String Theory is sometimes assumed to solve this conflict: by means of an application of the model-theoretical apparatus of Quantum Field Theory, interpreting gravity as the (...) result of an exchange of gravitons, taken here to be dynamical states of the string. But, String Theory does not really solve the conflict. Rather it exemplifies the inadequacy of the apparatus of Quantum Field Theory in the context of Quantum Gravity: After several decades of development it still exists only in an essentially perturbative formulation. And, due to its quantum field theoretical heritage, it is conceptually incompatible with central implications of General Relativity, especially those resulting from the general relativistic relation between gravity and spacetime. All known formulations of String Theory are background-dependent. And no physical motivation is given for this conceptual incompatibility. On the other hand, although String Theory identifies all gauge bosons as string states, it was not even possible to reproduce the Standard Model. Instead, String Theory led to a multitude of internal problems - and to the plethora of low-energy scenarios with different nomologies and symmetries, known as the String Landscape. All attempts to find a dynamically motivated selection principle remained without success, leaving String Theory without any predictive power. The nomological unification of the fundamental forces, including gravity, is only achieved in a purely formal way within the model-theoretical paradigm of Quantum Field Theory - by means of physically unmotivated epicycles like higher dimensionality, Calabi-Yau spaces, branes, etc. Finally, the possibility remains that some of the central assumptions of String Theory are physically wrong. On the one hand, the idea of a nomological unity of the forces could be simply wrong. On the other hand, even if a nomological unity of all fundamental forces should be realized in nature, the possibility remains that gravity is not a fundamental force, but a residual, emergent and possibly intrinsically classical phenomenon, resulting from a quantum substrate without any gravitational degrees of freedom. (shrink)