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  1. Morality as an Evolutionary Exaptation.Marcus Arvan - 2021 - In Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz (eds.), Empirically Engaged Evolutionary Ethics. Springer - Synthese Library. pp. 89-109.
    The dominant theory of the evolution of moral cognition across a variety of fields is that moral cognition is a biological adaptation to foster social cooperation. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that moral cognition is likely an evolutionary exaptation: a form of cognition where neurobiological capacities selected for in our evolutionary history for a variety of different reasons—many unrelated to social cooperation—were put to a new, prosocial use after the fact through individual rationality, learning, and the development and transmission (...)
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  • How Apes Get Into and Out of Joint Actions.Emilie Genty, Raphaela Heesen, Jean-Pascal Guéry, Federico Rossano, Klaus Zuberbühler & Adrian Bangerter - 2020 - Interaction Studies. Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies / Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies 21 (3):353-386.
    Compared to other animals, humans appear to have a special motivation to share experiences and mental states with others, which enables them to enter a condition of ‘we’ or shared intentionality. Shared intentionality has been suggested to be an evolutionary response to unique problems faced in complex joint action coordination and to be unique to humans. The theoretical and empirical bases for this claim, however, present several issues and inconsistencies. Here, we suggest that shared intentionality can be approached as an (...)
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