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Categories, life, and thinking.Michael T. Ghiselin - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):269-283.details
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Schaffner’s Model of Theory Reduction: Critique and Reconstruction.Rasmus Gr⊘Nfeldt Winther - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (2):119-142.details
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Randomness and perceived-randomness in evolutionary biology.William C. Wimsatt - 1980 - Synthese 43 (2):287 - 329.details
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Emergence as non-aggregativity and the biases of reductionisms.William C. Wimsatt - 2000 - Foundations of Science 5 (3):269-297.details
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Aggregate, composed, and evolved systems: Reductionistic heuristics as means to more holistic theories. [REVIEW]William C. Wimsatt - 2006 - Biology and Philosophy 21 (5):667-702.details
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The metaphysics of individuality and its consequences for systematic biology.E. O. Wiley - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):302-303.details
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Fitness made physical: The supervenience of biological concepts revisited.Marcel Weber - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):411-431.details
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Ontological and Methodological Limitations of Certain Cultural Evolution Approaches.Martina Valković - forthcoming - Philosophy of the Social Sciences.details
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Towards a characterization of metaphysics of biology: metaphysics for and metaphysics in biology.Vanesa Triviño - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-21.details
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A Poor man's Guide to Supervenience and Determination 1.Paul Teller - 1984 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (S1):137-162.details
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The arithmetic mean of what? A Cautionary Tale about the Use of the Geometric Mean as a Measure of Fitness.Peter Takacs & Pierrick Bourrat - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (2):1-22.details
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The multiple realizability argument against reductionism.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.details
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Popper’s Shifting Appraisal of Evolutionary Theory.Elliott Sober & Mehmet Elgin - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (1):31-55.details
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Panglossian functionalism and the philosophy of mind.Elliott Sober - 1985 - Synthese 64 (August):165-93.details
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'Fitness' and 'altruism': Traps for the unwary, bystander and biologist alike. [REVIEW]Tom Settle - 1993 - Biology and Philosophy 8 (1):61-83.details
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Natural kinds.Stephen P. Schwartz - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):301-302.details
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Models of reduction and categories of reductionism.Sahotra Sarkar - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):167-94.details
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The world represented as a hierarchy of nature may not require “species”.Stanley N. Salthe - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):300-301.details
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Conservative Reduction of Biology.Christian Sachse - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):33-65.details
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Species as individuals: Logical, biological, and philosophical problems.Michael Ruse - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):299-300.details
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Typologies: Obstacles and opportunities in scientific change.Alexander Rosenberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):298-299.details
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Fitness as primitive and propensity.Alexander Rosenberg & Mary Williams - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (3):412-418.details
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¿Son los genetistas de poblaciones inductivistas estrechos?Ariel Jonathan Roffé & Santiago Ginnobili - 2017 - Scientiae Studia 15 (2):263.details
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Survival of the fittest: Law of evolution or law of probability? [REVIEW]David B. Resnik - 1988 - Biology and Philosophy 3 (3):349-362.details
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The demise of mental representations.Edward S. Reed - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):297-298.details
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Taxonomy is older than thinking: Epigenetic decisions.Andrew Packard - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):296-297.details
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Units “of” selection: The end of “of”?F. J. Odling-Smee & H. C. Plotkin - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):295-296.details
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The Varieties of Molecular Explanation.Marco J. Nathan - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (2):233-254.details
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Reduction, Supervenience, and the Autonomy of Social Scientific Laws.Lee C. McIntyre - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (2):101-122.details
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Gould on laws in biological science.Lee Mcintyre - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):357-367.details
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Why We Should Care About Universal Biology.Carlos Mariscal & Leonore Fleming - 2018 - Biological Theory 13 (2):121-130.details
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Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 193.details
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Cultural evolution, reductionism in the social sciences, and explanatory pluralism.Jean Lachapelle - 2000 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (3):331-361.details
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What does Ghiselin mean by “individual”?Joseph B. Kruskal - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):294-295.details
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Natural categories and natural concepts.Frank C. Keil - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):293-294.details
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Behavioral systems interpreted as autonomous agents and as coupled dynamical systems: A criticism.Fred A. Keijzer & Sacha Bem - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):323-46.details
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Categorization and affordances.Rebecca K. Jones & Anne D. Pick - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):292-293.details
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‘Species-typicality’: Can individuals have typical parts?Timothy D. Johnston - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):291-292.details
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Aspects of Reductive Explanation in Biological Science: Intrinsicality, Fundamentality, and Temporality.Andreas Hüttemann & Alan C. Love - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):519-549.details
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Metaphysics and common usage.David L. Hull - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):290-291.details
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Universals, particulars, and paradigms.Helen Heise - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):289-290.details
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Reconstrucción estructuralista de la teoría de la selección natural.Santiago Ginnobili - 2012 - Agora 31 (2):143-169.details
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Missing Concepts in Natural Selection Theory Reconstructions.Santiago Ginnobili - 2016 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 38 (3):1-33.details
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Taxa, life, and thinking.Michael T. Ghiselin - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):303-313.details
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