The reference to Albinus in a refutation of Bardesanes († c. 222) by Ephrem the Syrian († 373) is not unknown to modern commentators. This text, edited and translated into English since the beginning of the twentieth century, is regularly mentioned, albeit rather cursorily, by scholars of Middle Platonism. Although much has been clarified between the first publication of the book just over a century ago and the present day, the following pages aim to continue the exploration. The aim will (...) be to better understand what has so far remained unnoticed: the dependence of Albinus’ work on Posidonius on three crucial points: (1) his classification of incorporeals, (2) his doctrine of comprehensive representation, and (3) the deep relationship between (1) and (2). (shrink)

In Sense and Content , Christopher Peacocke points out that two equally-sized trees at different distances from the perceiver are normally represented to be the same size, despite the fact that in a certain sense the nearer tree looks bigger ; he concludes on the basis of this observation that visual experiences possess irreducibly phenomenal properties. This argument has received the most attention of all of Peacocke’s arguments for separatism—the view that the intentional and phenomenal properties of experiences are independent (...) of one another. However, despite its notoriety, the argument is widely misunderstood and underappreciated. I argue that once the structure of the argument is clarified and the replies that have been offered are considered closely, one must conclude that the trees argument is successful. (shrink)

The Gestalt principle of isomorphism reveals the primacy of subjective experience as a valid source of evidence for the information encoded neurophysiologically. This theory invalidates the abstractionist view that the neurophysiological representation can be of lower dimensionality than the percept to which it gives rise.

A coin rotating back in depth in some sense presents a changing, elliptical shape. How are we to understand such (in this case) ‘appearances of ellipticality’? How is the experiential sense of such shifting shape appearances related to the experiential sense of enduring shape definitive of perceived shape constancy? Is the experiential recovery of surface shape based on the prior (perhaps more fundamental) recovery of point or element 3D spatial locations?—or is the perception of shape a largely independent perceptual achievement? (...) Do we gain access to enduring shape properties by first detecting and working from ‘shape appearances’? These are some of the topics taken up in this paper. (shrink)

This monograph explains in terms of specified neuronal brain mechanisms and systems, how the human brain does its cognitive work. It elucidates functions such as declarative and episodic learning, imagery, spatial representation, object recognition, semantic processing, narrative comprehension, planning, and motivation. Neurophysiological, psychological, and clinical findings are presented in support of the theoretical model, and a variety of computer simulation tests demonstrate its competence. -/- .