La propuesta ético-política foucaulteana proyectada en torno al cura sui, a partir de la práctica de la parrhesía, ha sido criticada en términos de un puro hacer solipsista, que no busca resistir al poder sino desde una disposición estética individual. Partiendo de una mención foucaulteana —la parrhesía se acerca al modo nietzscheano de pensar la verdad desde el riesgo— buscaremos mostrar dos puntos: que dicha cercanía es pensable desde una comparación entre las relaciones de poder foucaulteanas y de lucha nietzscheanas, (...) lo cual permite concebir el cura sui de un modo más amplio; y que la diferencia desplegada en la concepción de dichas relaciones de poder y de lucha es articulable desde lo que les es, correspondientemente, antagónico en términos ético-políticos: en Foucault, el poder como dominación y en Nietzsche, la civilización heredera de los valores cristianos. (shrink)

Cet article discute l’idée d’une moralité plus ou moins minimale, qui puisse s’adapter à une approche libérale de la pensée et de l’action politique. Sur la base de certaines platitudes concernant la moralité on isole un ensemble de concepts et de principes à la fois déontologiques et conséquentialistes. On insiste sur les conceptions de la justice, de l’autonomie et des devoirs négatfis. On se focalise sur la force et la portée de ces principes et sur leur rôle dans les raisons (...) morales et leur capacité à être prégnantes, dominantes et exigeantes. (shrink)

Cet article discute l’idée d’une moralité plus ou moins minimale, qui puisse s’adapter à une approche libérale de la pensée et de l’action politique. Sur la base de certaines platitudes concernant la moralité on isole un ensemble de concepts et de principes à la fois déontologiques et conséquentialistes. On insiste sur les conceptions de la justice, de l’autonomie et des devoirs négatfis. On se focalise sur la force et la portée de ces principes et sur leur rôle dans les raisons (...) morales et leur capacité à être prégnantes, dominantes et exigeantes. (shrink)

This paper attempts to follow the changes in the concept “state” over the last two hundred years, by tracing changes in the aims of public education. Four major stages are identified. The first is characterized by the establishment of the nation-state, when a national and civic education are fused together. The second is marked by the erosion of the identity between state and nation, and by attempts to prevent this process through the development of contradictory educational strategies: ‘neutral civic education’ (...) and nation building through the mechanism of the ‘melting pot’. At the third stage, despite the above-mentioned efforts, the awakening of national minorities demanding special national education sharpens the distinction between civic and national education. This leads to the last stage, the politics of difference, when the nationally homogenous nation-state is replaced by a consciously heterogenous state. Such a state can grant all its members equal civil and national rights only if it endorses traditional liberal values. Hence, despite the fact they firmly criticize liberalism and attempt to revive particular national education supporters of the politics of difference cannot deny that liberal values and civic education offer the best protection for their own ends. (shrink)

Although Roberto Unger is sometimes described as a communitarian critic of liberalism, his recent three‐volume work on Politics disavows the major tenets of contemporary communitarianism—for example, the “embedded self,” the critique of rights, the rejection of universalizing theory. Instead, Unger's aim is to criticize liberalism from the perspective of a “superliberalism"—a perspective which takes the original liberal desire to emancipate individuals from the chains of social custom and hierarchy and rids it of the stultifying economic and political institutions within which (...) liberals have sought to contain it. Three main components of Unger's theory are analyzed: the idea of “negative capability,” or the power of individuals to revise and transcend their social contexts; the idea of an “empowered democracy,” which seeks to open up all aspects of society to the collective exercise of negative capability; and the idea of “immunity rights,” which seek to protect individuals from the potential risks of radical democracy. I argue that all three underestimate the risks to individual liberty of the over‐politicization of social life. (shrink)

But with the member of a Nonconforming or self-made religious community, how different! The sectary's eigene grosse Erfindungen, as Goethe calls them,—the precious discoveries of himself and his friends for expressing the inexpressible and defining the undefinable in peculiar forms of their own,—cannot but, as he has voluntarily chosen them and is personally responsible for them, fill his whole mind. He is zealous to do battle for them and affirm them; for in affirming them, he affirms himself, and that is (...) what we all like. Matthew Arnold. (shrink)

Deontological (as opposed to consequentialist) liberals treat freedom of action as an end in itself, not a means to other ends. Yet logically, when one makes a deliberate choice, one treats freedom of action as if it were not an end in itself, for one uses this freedom as a means to the ends one hopes to achieve through one's action. The tension between deontology and the logic of choice is reflected in the paradoxical nature of the ?right to do (...) wrong?; and in Rawls's unsuccessful attempts to justify to acting agents their interest in such a right, embodied in his conception of agents as ?self-validating sources of claims.? A self-validating source of claims is akin to God as envisioned by voluntarist theologians such as Ockham. Leibniz's critique of voluntarism, then, is applicable to the Rawlsian subject: like the voluntarist God, she would be unable to act if it were indeed the case that her action validated itself. (shrink)

Liberal political thought is underwritten by an enduring fear of civil and state violence. It is assumed within liberal thought that self?interest characterises relations between individuals in civil society, resulting in violence. In absolutist doctrines, such as Hobbes?, the pacification of private persons depended on the Sovereign's command of a monopoly of violence. Liberals, by contrast, sought to claim that the state itself must be pacified, its capacity for cruelty (e.g., torture) removed, its capacity for violence (e.g., war) reduced and (...) controlled. A core tension within liberal thought thus arises between containing civil violence by empowering the state and containing state violence by constraining the state. One result of this tension is the highly selective conception of ?pacification? within liberalism, which, historically, has accommodated indifference to endemic violence, both within civil society, and beyond civil society ? as in (past) arguments licensing imperialism and in (present) arguments for disciplining ?rogue? states. (shrink)

For Frank Knight, the fact that we are free to engage in economic pursuits brings out what is both best and worst in human nature. The same competitive economy that liberates individuals to choose their own desired ends also provides them with socially undesirable wants and fosters habits potentially at odds with the demands of liberal democracy. Given Knight’s desire both to defend human liberty and his concession that liberty is likely to be abused, his version of liberalism must of (...) necessity be anticonsequentialist. Paradoxically, Knight’s philosophical pluralism?his insistence that there are any number of incommensurable perspectives on the good or just society?underlies both his criticism of the ?ethical? possibilities of the competitive order and his defense of human liberty against the dangers of social planning. (shrink)