Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Two HOTS to Handle: The Concept of State Consciousness in the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Jennifer Matey - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):151-175.
    David Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory is one of the most widely argued for of the higher-order accounts of consciousness. I argue that Rosenthal vacillates between two models of the HOT theory. First, I argue that these models employ different concepts of 'state consciousness'; the two concepts each refer to mental state tokens, but in virtue of different properties. In one model, the concept of 'state consciousness' is more consistent with how the term is typically used, both by philosophers and scientists, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Consciousness and Mental Qualities for Auditory Sensations.Adriana Renero - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):179-204.
    The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory mental phenomena to show how we are able to capture qualitative distinctions of auditory sensations. I argue that our consciousness of auditory states consists in having thoughts (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Colour Discrimination And Monitoring Theories of Consciousness.René Jagnow - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):57 - 74.
    According to the monitoring theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious in virtue of being represented in the right way by a monitoring state. David Rosenthal, William Lycan, and Uriah Kriegel have developed three different influential versions of this theory. In order to explain colour experiences, each of these authors combines his version of the monitoring theory of consciousness with a specific account of colour representation. Even though Rosenthal, Lycan, and Kriegel disagree on the specifics, they all hold that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Fine-Grained Functionalism: Prospects for Defining Qualitative States.George Seli - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):765 – 783.
    Inverted spectrum and absent-qualia arguments have at least shown that giving the functional role of a qualitative state is challenging, as it is arguable that the same functional organization among one's inputs, outputs, and mental states can be preserved despite having one's qualia radically altered or eliminated. Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a promising strategy for the functionalist: defining a given qualitative state as being disposed to cause a belief that one is in such a state. Such beliefs would be different (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology, Or: What is It Like to Think That One Thinks That P?Richard Brown & Pete Mandik - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):1-12.
    Among our conscious states are conscious thoughts. The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology—is there something it’s like? One way of clarifying the question is to say that it concerns whether there is any proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought. Is there any phenomenology due to thinking, as opposed to phenomenology that is due to some co-occurring sensation or mental image? In this paper (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Consciousness and Intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • The Myth of Phenomenological Overflow.Richard Brown - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):599-604.
    In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Rosenthal on Mental Qualities.Alex Byrne - forthcoming - In Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the Philosophy of David Rosenthal. Cambridge University Press.
    David Rosenthal couples his higher-order thought theory of consciousness with a theory of “mental qualities”, properties of mental states. The first thesis of this paper is that there are no mental qualities as Rosenthal conceives of them. The second thesis is that Rosenthal’s residual insights are significant. They naturally lead to a simple first-order theory of consciousness.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What is the Point of Persistent Disputes? The Meta-Analytic Answer.Alexandre Billon & Philippe Vellozzo - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    Many philosophers regard the persistence of philosophical disputes as symptomatic of overly ambitious, ill-founded intellectual projects. There are indeed strong reasons to believe that persistent disputes in philosophy (and more generally in the discourse at large) are pointless. We call this the pessimistic view of the nature of philosophical disputes. In order to respond to the pessimistic view, we articulate the supporting reasons and provide a precise formulation in terms of the idea that the best explanation of persistent disputes entails (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Consciousness and its Function.David Rosenthal - 2008
    MS, under submission, derived from a Powerpoint presentation at a Conference on Consciousness, Memory, and Perception, in honor of Larry Weiskrantz, City University, London, September 15, 2006.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall.Daniel M. Haybron - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):394–428.
    This paper aims to show that widespread, serious errors in the self-assessment of affect are a genuine possibility-one worth taking very seriously. For we are subject to a variety of errors concerning the character of our present and past affective states, or "affective ignorance." For example, some affects, particularly moods, can greatly affect the quality of our experience even when we are unable to discern them. I note several implications of these arguments. First, we may be less competent pursuers of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • In Defense of the What-It-Is-Likeness of Experience.Greg Janzen - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):271-293.
    It is common parlance among philosophers who inquire into the nature of consciousness to speak of there being something it is like for the subject of a mental state to be in it. The popularity of the ‘what-it-is-like’ phrase stems, in part, from the assumption that it enables us to distinguish, in an intuitive and illuminating way, between conscious and unconscious mental states: conscious mental states, unlike unconscious mental states, are such that there is something it is like for their (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Transitivity and Transparency.Joseph Gottlieb - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):353-379.
    Two popular theses central to recent theorizing about consciousness are the transitivity principle and the transparency of experience. According to the former, conscious mental states are mental states we are aware of in some way. According to the latter, there is some awareness-relation that we seemingly cannot bear to our experiences. I argue that, within certain reasonable constraints, there is no precisification of these theses that renders them compatible.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • There is no “I” in “AI”.Ashkan Farhadi - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-12.
    With recent advancements in technology and computer science, we have reached a point where we can clearly state that thinking is no longer the exclusive privilege of living minds. Artificial intelligence can gather and process information in a manner fairly similar or even superior to our thinking process. AI can use this processed information in a reasoning process to make decisions and execute them. However, what makes our mind distinct from AI is the addition of “I,” that is, an entity (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Isabel Gois - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):143-156.
    Higher Order theories of consciousness have their fair share of sympathisers, but the arguments mustered in their support are—to my mind—unduly persuasive. My aim in this paper is to show that Higher Order theories cannot accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation without either falling into contradiction, or collapsing into a First-Order theory. If this diagnosis is on the right track, then Higher Order theories—at least in the specific versions here considered—fail to give an account of what they set out to explain: (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Same Old, Same Old: The Same-Order Representational Theory of Consciousness and the Division of Phenomenal Labor.Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):161-181.
    The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Misrepresenting Consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.
    An important objection to the "higher-order" theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic characterizations of consciousness, and I propose several desiderata a successful characterization of consciousness must meet. I then defend the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Does the Concept of “Altered States of Consciousness” Rest on a Mistake?Adam J. Rock & Stanley Krippner - 2007 - International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 26 (1):33-40.
    Block has argued that the multiplicity of meanings ascribed to consciousness is due to the erroneous treatment of very different concepts as a single concept. Block distinguished four notions of consciousness intended to encapsulate the various meanings attributed to the term: phenomenal, access, self, and monitoring consciousness. We argue that what is common to all of these definitions is the implicit distinction between consciousness and the content of consciousness. We critically examine the term “altered state of consciousness” and argue that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.
    One popular approach to theorizing about phenomenal consciousness has been to connect it to representations of a certain kind. Representational theories of consciousness can be further sub-divided into first-order and higher-order theories. Higher-order theories are often interpreted as invoking a special relation between the first-order state and the higher-order state. However there is another way to interpret higher-order theories that rejects this relational requirement. On this alternative view phenomenal consciousness consists in having suitable higher-order representations. I call this ‘HOROR’ (‘Higher-Order (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • The Received Method for Ruling Out Brain Areas From Being NCC Undermines Itself.Benjamin Kozuch - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):145-69.
    Research into the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) aims to identify not just those brain areas that are NCC, but also those that are not. In the received method for ruling out a brain area from being an NCC, this is accomplished by showing a brain area’s content to be consistently absent from subjects’ reports about what they are experiencing. This paper points out how this same absence can be used to infer that the brain area’s content is cognitively inaccessible, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Smelling Phenomenal.Benjamin D. Young - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Qualitative-consciousness arises at the sensory level of olfactory processing and pervades our experience of smells to the extent that qualitative character is maintained whenever we are aware of undergoing an olfactory experience. Building upon the distinction between Access and Phenomenal Consciousness the paper offers a nuanced distinction between Awareness and Qualitative-consciousness that is applicable to olfaction in a manner that is conceptual precise and empirically viable. Mounting empirical research is offered substantiating the applicability of the distinction to olfaction and showing (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Type-Q Materialism.Pete Mandik & Josh Weisberg - 2008 - In Chase Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson. Peter Lang Publishing Group.
    s Gibson (1982) correctly points out, despite Quine’s brief flirtation with a “mitigated phenomenalism” (Gibson’s phrase) in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, Quine’s ontology of 1953 (“On Mental Entities”) and beyond left no room for non-physical sensory objects or qualities. Anyone familiar with the contemporary neo-dualist qualia-freak-fest might wonder why Quinean lessons were insufficiently transmitted to the current generation.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • The Experience Dependent Dynamics of Human Consciousness.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2018 - Open Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):116-143.
    By reviewing most of the neurobiology of consciousness, this article highlights some major reasons why a successful emulation of the dynamics of human consciousness by artificial intelligence is unlikely. The analysis provided leads to conclude that human consciousness is epigenetically determined and experience and context-dependent at the individual level. It is subject to changes in time that are essentially unpredictable. If cracking the code to human consciousness were possible, the result would most likely have to consist of a temporal pattern (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Representationalism About Sensory Phenomenology.Matthew Ivanowich - unknown
    This dissertation examines representationalism about sensory phenomenology—the claim that for a sensory experience to have a particular phenomenal character is a matter of it having a particular representational content. I focus on a particular issue that is central to representationalism: whether reductive versions of the theory should be internalist or externalist. My primary goals are to demonstrate that externalist representationalism fails to provide a reductive explanation for phenomenal qualities, and to present a reductive internalist version of representationalism that utilizes the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Change Blindness and Misrepresentation.Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):37-56.
    Some proponents of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness defend the view that higher-order misrepresentation is possible. In support of this view they have proposed various pieces of empirical evidence. This paper examines one such piece of proposed empirical evidence; Change blindness. CB occurs when a subject fails to detect salient changes in visual scenes. I propose an alternative interpretation of the CB phenomenon on which misrepresentation does not occur. Finally, I examine three lines of reply that might be pursued (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.
    To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • How Rich is Consciousness? The Partial Awareness Hypothesis.Sid Kouider, Vincent de Gardelle, Jérôme Sackur & Emmanuel Dupoux - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (7):301-307.
  • Respuesta a Sebastián: en defensa de la naturaleza de las creencias de primera persona.Javier Vidal - 2018 - Critica 50 (150):65-89.
    En esta revista, argumenté en favor de la naturaleza consciente de las creencias de primera persona. En un artículo más reciente, Miguel Ángel Sebastián trata de mostrar que tal argumento no es sólido. Aquí procedo a lidiar con sus tres críticas principales. En primer lugar, sostengo que el argumento es válido si conocer una creencia de primera persona consiste en creer que uno la tiene. Defiendo también que no hay ninguna regresión al infinito de creencias conscientes de orden superior que (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Neurocognitive and Socioecological Model of Self-Awareness.Alain Morin - 2004 - Genetic Social And General Psychology Monographs 130 (3):197-222.
    In the past, researchers have focused mainly on the effects and consequences of self-awareness; however, they have neglected a more basic issue pertaining to the specific mechanisms that initiate and sustain self-perception. The author presents a model of self-awareness that proposes the existence of 3 sources of self-information. First, the social milieu includes early face-to-face interactions, self-relevant feedback, a social comparison mechanism that leads to perspective taking, and audiences. Second, contacts with objects and structures in the physical environment foster self–world (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Psychophysical “Blinding” Methods Reveal a Functional Hierarchy of Unconscious Visual Processing.Bruno G. Breitmeyer - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:234-250.
  • Effects of Loss Aversion on Post-Decision Wagering: Implications for Measures of Awareness.Stephen M. Fleming & Raymond J. Dolan - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):352-363.
    Wagering contingent on a previous decision, or post-decision wagering, has recently been proposed to measure conscious awareness. Whilst intuitively appealing, it remains unclear whether economic context interacts with subjective confidence and how such interactions might impact on the measurement of awareness. Here we propose a signal detection model which predicts that advantageous wagers placed on the identity of preceding stimuli are affected by loss aversion, despite stimulus visibility remaining constant. This pattern of predicted results was evident in a psychophysical task (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Mind as an Horizon of Sense.Giuseppe Mininni - 2009 - World Futures 65 (2):111 – 125.
    One of the most fascinating topics of research within human sciences is the “Body-Mind Problem.” Since its beginning psychological research has focused on the notions of mind and consciousness adopting a purely naturalist perspective, which tends to explain them in terms of causal relationships and to reduce their intrinsic complexity. Conversely, the analysis of the discursive practices through which mind and consciousness reveal themselves through communication suggest the adoption of a psycho-semiotic approach, thus enhancing a “culturalist epistemology.” The aim of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Reflexive Theories of Consciousness and Unconscious Perception.Graham Peebles - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):25-43.
    A core commitment of the reflexive theory of consciousness is that conscious states are themselves necessarily the contents of mental states. The strongest argument for this claim—the necessity of inner-content for consciousness—is the argument from unconscious perception. According to this argument, we find evidence for the necessity claim from cases of alleged unconscious perception, the most well-known and widely discussed of these being blindsight. However, the reflexive theory cannot partake in this argument and therefore, must rely on at least one (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations