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Criteria and necessity

Noûs 7 (4):313-327 (1973)

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  1. L'argument du langage privé.Denis Sauvé - 1985 - Dialogue 24 (1):3-.
    Peu de passages de l'oeuvre de Wittgenstein ont suscité autant de commentaires et de discussions que les paragraphes des Recherches philosophiques dans lesquels il presénte ce que l'on a appele« ; l'argumentdu langage privé »;. Wittgenstein definit un langage prive comme un langage dont les mots sont censés se referer« ; á ce dont seul celui qui parle peut avoir connaissance; a ses sensations immediates et privées »;.' Il s'agit de montrer, par cet argument, Timpossibilite d'un langage comme celui-ci. Une (...)
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  • Mathematical Alchemy.Penelope Maddy - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (3):279-314.
  • Criteria and truth.Bernard Harrison - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):207–235.
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  • Criteria, perception and other minds.Harrison Hall - 1976 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (June):257-274.
    The paper uses thompson clark's theory of the relation of perceptual parts and wholes to illuminate certain aspects of our knowledge of other minds. The thesis is that the traditional problem can be usefully broken down into two parts--One of which calls for a better understanding of the logic of perceptual concepts; the other, For a closer look at what happens when we try to take the epistemological skeptic seriously.
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  • Criteria, meaning and justification.Alan H. Goldman - 1981 - Philosophia 9 (3-4):281-297.
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  • Richard Rorty's realism.William James Earle - 2023 - Metaphilosophy 54 (2-3):341-351.
    An examination of late Rorty shows that he does not abandon belief in an external world about which we can, and indeed must, acquire knowledge. His disapproval of the correspondence theory of truth does not involve the idea that anything other than local weather, for example, could falsify remarks about local weather. It is just that once we get done looking out the window or, if we are outside, feeling the right kind of drops make contact with our skin, there (...)
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