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  1. In defense of the disjunctive.Alexander Skiles - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):471-487.
    Are there any disjunctive properties—features of things such as being either red or round, or Nelson Goodman’s infamous example of being grue? As esoteric as the question may seem at first, central issues about the metaphysics of properties hinge upon its answer, such as whether reductive views about special science properties can handle the phenomenon of multiple realizability. A familiar argument for a negative answer is that disjunctive properties fail to guarantee that their instances are similar in some genuine respect. (...)
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  • Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's regress.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):395 – 408.
    Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without (...)
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  • A New Analysis of Quasianalysis.Hannes Leitgeb - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):181-226.
    We investigate the conditions under which quasianalysis, i.e., Carnap's method of abstraction in his Aufbau, yields adequate results. In particular, we state both necessary and sufficient conditions for the so-called faithfulness and fullness of quasianalysis, and analyze adequacy as the conjunction of faithfulness and fullness. It is shown that there is no method of (re-)constructing properties from similarity that delivers adequate results in all possible cases, if the same set of individuals is presupposed for properties and for similarity, and if (...)
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  • Do customs compete with conditioning? Turf battles and division of labor in social explanation.Todd Jones - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):407-430.
    We often face a bewildering array of different explanations for the same social facts (e.g. biological, psychological, economic, and historical accounts). But we have few guidelines for whether and when we should think of different accounts as competing or compatible. In this paper, I offer some guidelines for understanding when custom or norm accounts do and don’t compete with other types of accounts. I describe two families of non-competing accounts: (1) explanations of different (but similarly described) facts, and (2) accounts (...)
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  • Natural classes of universals: Why Armstrong's analysis fails.Lowell Friesen - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):285 – 296.
    Realists, D. M. Armstrong among them, claim, contrary to natural class nominalists, that natural classes are analysable. Natural classes of particulars, claim the realists, can be analysed in terms of particulars having universals in common. But for the realist, there are also natural classes of universals. And if the realist's claim that natural classes are analysable is a general claim about natural classes, then the realist must also provide an analysis of natural classes of universals. For Armstrong, the unity (or (...)
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  • How to Rule Out Disjunctive Properties.Paul Audi - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):748-766.
    Are there disjunctive properties? This question is important for at least two reasons. First, disjunctive properties are invoked in defense of certain philosophical theories, especially in the philosophy of mind. Second, the question raises the prior issue of what counts as a genuine property, a central concern in the metaphysics of properties. I argue here, on the basis of general considerations in the metaphysics of properties, that there are no disjunctive properties. Specifically, I argue that genuine properties must guarantee similarity-in-a-respect (...)
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  • Resemblance in Contemporary Philosophy : Foreword to the Thematic Issue.Alexis Anne-Braun & Alexandre Declos - 2020 - Philosophia Scientiae 24:5-13.
    1 La ressemblance comme problème philosophique transversal Personne ne nierait que les chats se ressemblent sous un grand nombre de rapports, ni ne douterait du fait qu’ils ressemblent plus aux chiens qu’aux bactéries ou aux matchs de tennis. En réalité, il semble légitime de croire que c’est en vertu de cette similarité d’ensemble que nous pouvons dire que certains individus appartiennent à une même espèce, qu’ils sont tous des chats. Ces intuitions partagées suggèrent que la notion de resse...
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