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Worthy Lives

Social Theory and Practice 36 (2):185-212 (2010)

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  1. Possible Dilemmas Raised by Impossible Moral Requirements.Lisa Rivera - 2016 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 2 (1):1-15.
    The priority that Tessman’s argument gives to phenomenological and neuropsychological explanations of moral requirements entails a fundamental shift in our understanding of these. Two central problems of normative theory come together in Tessman’s account. The first arises when an agent’s sense of requirement clashes with what a systematic theory prescribes. The second arises when neuropsychological accounts fail to fit the prescription. Tessman argues that no account successfully resolves moral dilemmas such that ought always implies can, and she argues that neuropsychology (...)
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