As was first pointed out by Gercke, there are close parallels, which clearly suggest a common source, between Apuleius,de Platone1.12, the treatiseOn Fatefalsely attributed to Plutarch, Calcidius'excursuson fate in his commentary on Plato'sTimaeus, and certain sections of the treatisede Natura hominisby Nemesius. Gercke traced the doctrines common to these works to the school of Gaius; recently however Dillon has pointed out that, while Albinus shares with these works the characteristic Middle-Platonic notion of fate as conditional or hypothetical – our actions (...) are free, but once we have acted the consequences of our actions are fated and inevitable – he doesnotshare certain other common features, such as the identification of fate as substance with the world-soul and the hierarchy of three providences. (shrink)

Philosophical influences in the personality and public life of Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, consul in 147 and 134b.c., were once emphasized in scholarship. In 1892, Schmekel demonstrated the reception of Stoic philosophy in the second half of the second centuryb.c.among the philhellenic members of the governing elite in general, and statesmen like Scipio Aemilianus in particular, in what he called the ‘Roman Enlightenment’. In the 1920s and 1930s, Kaerst showed influences of Stoic philosophy on Scipio, contemporary politics and the Principate (...) to come, while Capelle and Pohlenz identified Stoic ideas in Scipio's foreign and domestic policies. Together they formed a body of scholarship which held that Scipio possessed a serious interest in philosophy which defined his character and informed his public life. In the 1960s, the challenge to this scholarship was led by Strasburger in two articles, and by Astin in his 1967 biography. Both scholars downplayed and devalued philosophical influences on Scipio and denied him the pursuit of the Greek virtuous life. They placed him within the traditions of the Roman elite, ambitious for glory and results-driven, and they have successfully formed influential views to this end, despite the critique made by Erskine. Astin remained the authoritative study of Scipio and there was much in hisRealpolitikthat scholarship found compelling, even when it allowed Scipio an attachment to Greek culture. For example, Gruen, Elvers and Badian acknowledged Scipio's interest in Greek culture and philosophy, in combination with the practices and goals of a traditional Roman aristocrat, but they placed their accent on the latter by affirming that Greek learning did not change the current of a traditional aristocratic life. The contention of this article is that the pre-Strasburger/Astin interpretation of Scipio, despite its shortcomings, was indeed correct to detect a deep current of philosophical influences on Scipio. The article argues that the evidence demonstrates that in education, character and public life Scipio was informed by the Greek moral and political tradition; that Scipio had claimed to possess the cardinal virtues, derived ultimately from Plato; and that he had acted under a moral imperative of power formulated by the Stoic philosopher Panaetius; the conclusion will address the ethical intention of Scipio. (shrink)

Students of Stoic philosophy, especially of Stoic ethics, have a lot to swallow. Virtues and emotions are bodies; virtue is the only good, and constitutes happiness, while vice is the only evil; emotions are judgements ; all sins are equal; and everyone bar the sage is mad, bad and dangerous to know. Non-Stoics in antiquity seem for the most part to find these doctrines as bizarre as we do. Their own philosophical or ideological perspectives, and the criticisms of the Stoa (...) to which these gave rise, are no less open to criticism than are the paradoxes and puzzles under attack – but they may be, often are, better documented, less provocatively attention-begging, or simply more familiar. Even disputes within the Stoa can be obscured or distorted by modern prejudices. Posidonius rejected Chrysippus' theory of a unitary soul, one rational through and through, on the grounds that such a theory could not satisfactorily account for the genesis of bad – excessive and irrational – emotions, the πάθη. Posidonius' own Platonising, tripartite soul feels more familiar to us because the Republic tends to be a set text rather more often than do the fragments of Chrysippus' de anima; and the balance in Plato's favour is unlikely to change. When Posidonius wrote, on the other hand, the Chrysippean soul was school orthodoxy, and Platonism the latest thing in radical chic. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone advertir el momento del proceso cognitivo en el cual la habilidad del sabio de controlar sus asentimientos se haría manifiesta; dicho propósito presenta ciertas dificultades dado el marco de un determinismo radical que caracteriza al pensamiento estoico. Por tanto, y con el objetivo de dilucidar tales problemáticas, conjugaremos la existencia de una cadena de determinaciones (que constituye el destino) con la posibilidad de que un individuo cuente con una facultad que 'esté en su poder'. The (...) present paper proposes to notice the cognitive process' moment in which the sage's ability to control his assents would become apparent; this objective presents some difficulties given the context of a radical determinism that characterizes Stoic thought. Therefore, and with the aim of solving such problems, we will conjugate the existence of a determinations' chain (which constitutes fate) with the possibility that a man has a faculty which 'might be in his power'. (shrink)